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The distinction between saying and showing is 
fundamental to Wittgenstein's attempt in the Tractatus to 
explain the communication of significant propositions, the 
function of non-significant assertions , and the general 
relationships between thought, language and reality. In 
fact, the saying and showing distinctions provide the key 
to an interpretation of the philosophies of logic and 
language in the Tractatus. 
The distinction has not been thoroughly investi-
gated in the Wittgensteinian literature. When it has been 
discussed, it has not been analyzed rigorously; nor, I 
think, has it been analyzed correctly. It is quite 
remarkable that a distinction so important to the 
Tractatus has been given such brief treatment. 
I critically construct the positions of the six 
leading commentators on the Tractatus doctrines ·of saying 
and showing early in the dissertation. The commentators 
are: Pitcher, Black, Stenius, Favrholdt, Schwyzer and 
Shwayder. Arguments are presented to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of each of their intepretations. 
By paying attention to just how Wittgenstein uses 
various "show" and "say" terms or expressions in the 
Tractatus, and by exploring what follows from those uses, 
an appropriate interpretation is found. In Chapters Three 
and Four, I structure this intepretation and I indicate 
how it avoids the criticisms and errors attributed to the 
other commentaries. 
The last chapter buttresses my intepretation of 
what Wittgenstein is doing in, and with, the doctrines of 
showing and saying in the Tractatus by presenting support-
ing evidence from the pre-Tractatus manuscripts. 
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As we shall discover, the distinction between say-
ing and showing i s fundame ntal to Wittgenstein's attempt 
in the Tractatus to distinguish claims which ''say some-
thing about the world'' (significant propositions)· from 
those which fail to do so (tauto l ogies ). The distinction 
between saying and showing i s indi spensable to 
Wittgenstein 's account of the communication of significant 
propositions. With it Wittgenstein can explain both how 
we come to understand the syntax of l anguage , and the very 
character of logical inference . The manner in which a 
significant proposition relates to the world is given in 
terms of the distinctions. The explanation Wittgenstein 
offe rs of what it means to talk of the truth of any propo-
sition is also ti ed to the distinction between saying and 
showing. 
Clarification of the distinction between saying 
and showing makes intelligible Wittgenstein's view of the 
relationships between thought, language and reality. The 
distinction provides the key to a~y interpretat i on of the 
philosophies of logic and language in the Tractatus. 
1 
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The ·dissertation contains five chapters. The 
first is an analy s is and criticis m of the standard inter-
pretation of the distinction between saying and showing 
given by several well -known comme ntators. The second 
chapter discuss e s an unorthodox but provocative reading of 
Sa!:ze which has important implications for the interpreta-
tion of the showing-saying distinction. In the third 
chapter I present my own inte rpre t a tion of the pas sages 
from the Tractatus in which saying and showing is dis-
cussed. The fourth chapter collects the specific dif-
ferences between my analysis and the interpretations dis-
cussed in Chapters I and II. The last chapter buttresses 
my interpretation of what Wittgenstein is doing in, and 
with, the showing and saying distinction in the Tractatus 
by presenting supporting evidence from the pre-Tractatian 
material. 
All Tractatus references are to the Pears and 
McGuinne~ translation (1 961). A complete bibliography of 
material related to the Tractatus has recently been com-
piled by K. T. Fann. 1 The bibliographical information 
given here contains only items used in the preparation of 
this dissertation and is not intende d to b e exhaustive. 
1 :i? . T. Fann, "Wittge n s tein Bibliography , 11 
Internationa l Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. VII, (June , 
19 6 7 ) , rr3 11- 3 3 9 . 
CHAP'l,ER I 
The Showing-Saying Distinction 
in the Comme ntaries of 
Pitche r, Black, Ste nius and Favrholdt 
4 
The following is an exposition and critical dis-
cussion of the several efforts to render understandable 
Wittgenstein ' s distinction between saying and showing. 
Included as the central crnmnentaries on these distinctions 
are the positions of Pitcher, 1 Black , 2 Stenius,3 and 
Favrholdt. 4 I argue that non e of the r ender ings of the 
distinctions presented here is fully satisfactory . The 
burde n of the present section will be to establish the 
reasons for rej ec ting these commentaries and to make the 
necessary distinctions for a more satisfactory account 
which will appear in chapter three. In the second chapter 
the interpre tations of ShwayderS and Schwyzer6 will b e 
discussed . The ir approach i s exciting and merits much 
attention; even so , I will argue that their exposition of 
the distinctions we are concerned with is neither complete 
no r wholly correct. 
1George Pitcher, The Philosophy of Wittge n stein , 
N. J., 19 64 . 
2Max Black , A Companion to Wittgenstein ' s 
Tractatu s , Ithaca, 1964. 
3Erik Stenius , Wittgenstein ' s Tractatus : A 
Critical Exposition of It s Ma in Lines of Thou ght, Oxford , 
1960. 
4 David Favrholdt , An Interpretation and Critique 
of Wittgenstein ' s Tractatus , Copenhagen, i964 . 
50avid Shwayder , Wittgenst2in ' s Trac t atu s , (a 
thes i s ) Bodleian Library , Oxford , 19 54 . 
6 .H. R . G. Schwyzer , "Wittgenstein· ' s Picture Theory 
of Langu age ," Inquiry , 1 962 . 
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In its preface , Wittgenstein claims tha t the whole 
sense of the Tracta tus can be swnmarized as: "What can b e 
said at all can be said clear ly, and what we can not talk 
about we must consign to silence." A similar but more 
elaborate " summary " is made in Wittge nstein's l e tters to 
Ru ssell where he notes tha t the "cardinal problem of 
philosophy'' [clarifying the possible content of language] 
is solved only by distinguishing "what can be expressed 
(gesagt ) by propos itions, i.e., by language (and what comes 
to the same, what can be thought) from what cannot be 
d b ' 
0 b 1 h ( 0 t) II l expresse y propositions ut on y sown gezeig .... 
Ironically, little effort has been made by recent com-
mentators to elucidate these "summaries." Their restraint 
is interestingly ascribed to either the distinctions being 
so clear and simple that merely noting them is sufficient 
(see, for example, Maslow 2 ); or to their being so opaque 
and difficult that one hardly knows whether or how to say 
anything at all about them.3 
If one is to understand what Wittgenstein is doing 
with the doctrines of saying and showing then I suggest 
that there is a need to reconcile: 
1From a l etter to Russell dated August 19, 1919. 
Excerpts from the letter are reprinted in L. Wittgenstein, 
Note books 191 4-191 6, Oxford, 1961, p. 130. 
2Alexander Maslow, A Study in Wittge nstein's 
"Tractatus ," Berkeley and Los Angeles , 1961, pp. 154-160. 
3Pitcher , Wittge nstein, p. llOn. 
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a) the assertions that a proposition shows its sense 
(4.022) and that what shows cannot be said (4 . 1212) 
with the assertion tha t its (the proposition's ) sense 
is just what is affirme d (4.064 ) ; 
A proposition shows its sense. A proposition 
shows how thingsstand if it is true. And it 
says that they do so stand (4.022 ) . 
What can be shown , cannot be said (4.1212) . 
Every proposition must already have a sense : it 
cannot be given a sense by affirmation. Indeed 
its sense is just what is affirmed. And the same 
applies to negation , etc. ( 4. O 6 4 ) , 
b ) the assertion that what can be shown cannot be said 
(4.1212 ) wi th the assertion that propositions show 
what they say ( 4 . 461); 
Propositions show what they say : tautologies 
and contradictions show that they say nothing. 
A tautology has no truth conditions , since it 
is unconditionally true ; and a contradiction is 
true on no condition. 
Tautologies and contradictions lack sense . 
(Like a point from which two arrows go out in 
opposite directions to one another .) 
(For example , I know nothing about the weather 
when I know that it i s either raining or not 
raining. ) ( 4 . 461 ) . 
c ) the assertion that a proposition shows how things 
stand if it is true and says that they do so stand 
(4.022 ) wi th the assertion that ev~ry proposition must 
already have a sense: it cannot be given a sense by 
affirmation; and 
d) the assertion that propositions show log i cal form 
(4 .1 21 ) and the claim that only some ( the sensible ) 
proposit i ons show the ir sense (4.022 and 4 . 461 ), which 
l eads us to assume that two different kinds of things 
are being shown . 
Propositions cannot represent logical form : 
it is mirrored in them. 
What finds its reflect3on in l anguage , l anguage 
cannot represent. 
What expresses itself in l anguage , ~ cannot 
express by means of language . 
Propositions show t h e logical form of reality. 
They display rr- ( 4 . 121 ) , 
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It i s helpfu l to formulate these i ssues in a matiner which 
makes clear the conflicts in Wittgenstein's position. A 
proposition cannot abbildt (picture , represent) log ical 
form (4.014 and 4.041); a proposition cannot darstellt 
(here used as "represent " sometimes as "present " 1 ) 
logical form (4.12, 4.121). It (the proposition --
either sens ible or tautological) zcigt logical form 
(4.121); it aufweist (shows forth, displays) logical 
form (4.121). Since logical form s h ows itse lf, it cannot 
be gesagt (4.1212) nor can it be pictured (if abbildt 
is, as Wittgenstein u s ually claims, equiva l e nt in this 
context to sagt; 4. 03) . To attempt to say (_· · · zusprechen) 
what the logica l form is r esults in nonsense (4.124). 
Regarding sensible propositions, we are given evidence 
that what a proposition o r picture darstelt (in this 
case, r epresents , pictures, or even says), it also 
1Darstellt has two different categories of u ses 
here: 
(a) as "represent " when it appears to be u sed by 
Wittgenstein as h e uses abbildt, for exampl e , 2.19, 2.201, 
as compared 0 : t-1, 2. 202 and~IT; 
(b) as "present" which has as synonyms for 
Wittgenstein vorstellt and on some occasions zeigt or 
a:ufw_e i _sen . See especia lly 4. 031 and its more complete 
statement 4.0311; also 4.115, 4.12, 4.124, 4.125, and 
4.462. 
With a great number of important cases it i s 
unclear which rendering (a orb) is preferable. Especially 
bothe r some are those remarks which suggest that proposi-
tions are "pictures " of reality (4.011, 4.021, 4.031, 4.04 
and 4 .1) -·- for h ere it appears thdt darstell t can be us ed 
by those who argue for propositions representing reality 
(a s some pictures "represent " their object) and by those 
who argue that propositions present situations and thereby 
feel obliged to deny that propositions are pictures (in 
that exc lusively representing fashion) of reality. 
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vorstellt (pre s e nts, exhibits or shows 4.031, 4.0311). We 
read from 4.022 that a picture or proposition sagt what it 
zeigt. However, at 2.172 we have a case of its being 
impossible to have a picture aufweist what is abbildt 
(from above, sagt). Finally, the most worrisome conflicts 
to be reconciled are those between the remark that what 
can be zeigt cannot be sagt (4.1212), on the one hand, and, 
on the other the assertions that propositions zeigt what 
they sagt (4,461), and that a proposition zeigt how things 
stand if it is true and it sagt that they do so stand 
(4.022). 
Admittedly, several doctrines and sets of distinc-
tions are in need of analysis in this material. But it 
will be helpful to make some rather obvious classifica-
tions before noticing how commentators have attempted to 
unravel this nest of distinctions. 
Regarding what is sayable, we should distinguish 
that which is: 
a) sayable by me (us); 
b) sayable by sensible propositions or 
pictures; 
c) sayable by tautological propositions. 
Regarding what is unsayable, we distinguish 
what. is: 
a) unsayable by me (us); 
b) unsayable by sensible propositions or 
picutres; 
c) unsayable by tautological propositions. 
And regarding what is showable, we distinguish 
what is: 
a) showable by me (us); 
b) showable by sensible propositions or 
pictures ; 
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c) showable by tautological propositions. 
To indicate what is at stake in the showing and 
saying distinctions, and to suggest what I think needs to 
be taken into account in undertaking an analysis of them, 
we need to roughly mark the relations holding between the 
classifications noted above. We begin by indicating those 
relations which at least seem to have a firm basis either 
in evident definitions or textual material. 
1. What is sayable by me (us) is by definition 
not unsayable by me (us). 
2. What is sayable by a sensible proposition 
is by definition not unsayable by that 
sensible proposition. 
3. From 4.121 and 4.124 we also infer that 
what is showable by a tautological propo-
sition is unsayable by that proposition. 
4. 4.022 permits us to infer that at leas t 
something which is sayable by a sensible 
proposition is showable by that proposition. 
5. However, at 4.1212 we are to understand 
that whatever is showable (i.e. by either 
a tautological or a sensible proposition) 
is thereby not sayable (by the proposi-
tion) . 
6. 6.1264 permits what is sayable by a 
sensible proposition to be showable as a 
result of something done by me (us). 
7. Part of what is shown by a sensible propo-
sition (viz., its form -- that it is 
sensible) is not sayable by the sensible 
proposition (4.121). 
8. "To say the unsayable must be to say 
nonsense." It means we cannot say what 
we cannot say. However, Wittgenstein 
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does not make the claim that "we cannot 
say wh a t the proposition shows. " 
Within these eight claims (which are in the text 
or inferred from the text) are the difficulties in clarify-
ing just what Wittgenstein would have us understand about 
saying and showing. For instance, the remarks listed 
above as 4) and 5) do not appear compatible, and some 
resolution of their incompatibility must be found. More-
over, it is not clear whether or not Wittgensteiri thought 
it necessary to distinguish what is sayable by a sensible 
proposition from what is showable by me (us ). Thirdly, 
Wittgenstein did not seem to notice the relationships which 
obtain between what shows and what we as l anguage users 
find impossible to say in (or with) the l anguage. An 
adequate reading of the saying ~nd showing doctrines must 
resolve these difficulties and others like them; and in 
doing so it must rigorously appraise the distinctions 
Wittgenstein did employ. 
II 
Recent Commentaries 
Pitcher's treatment of the saying and showing 
thesis is quite brief and on occasion without refinement. 
For instance his analysis of "say" or "saying" is by his 
I, 
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own admission not complete. Moreove r, he fails to con-
sider any number of the issues we have found to be con-
nected with Wittge nstein's rema.rks at 4.022 and 4.1212. 
What is helpful about Pitcher's discussion is, 
I think, that he gives to his readers many correct hunches 
as to plausible lines an explication of the Tractatus 
showing doctrine might follow. Unfortunately he fails 
to develop the suggestions he does make. His own explana-
tion of the incompleteness of his suggestions is that he 
finds the elements of the showing doctrine(s) exceedingly 
obscure. 1 Nevertheless, Pitcher does make the following 
important and helpful observations. 
a) There is little difference between our 
saying and a proposition's saying: 
And on Wittgenstein's thesis that a proposition 
is a kind of picture, this convention reads that 
the very act of making the sounds of producing the 
written marks "aRb" means that the person is 
asserting that this, namely the way things are 
pictured by the proposition, is the way things are 
(are not). Given this convention, it makes little 
difference whether we sa.y that it is the fact that 
the proposition is uttered (or written) which does 
the asserting or whether we say that the proposi-
tion itself does it. Wittgenstein usually speaks 
in the latter way. 2 
1Pitcher , Wittgenstein, p. 110 f. 




b) It is important to understand that a Satz 
both says and shows something. Pitcher argues tha t 
Wittgenstein's sensible propositions say only because they 
show. What they show i s some state of affairs; what they 
say is that the state of affairs they picture 
does obtain. 
And so there is no rea l incompatibility between, on 
the one hand, the fact that according to our present 
conventions concerning ordinary pictures they are not 
in themselves de emed to say anything and , on the other 
hand, Wittgenstein's thes is that propositions, which 
do say something, are pictures. 
Hence the following two doctrines of Wittgenstein are 
perfectly consistent: 
(a) a proposition i s a picture of a situation, and 
(b) a proposition states, or says, something. 
Wittgenstein, however, as we have seen, goes much 
further than merely defending the consistency of (a) 
and (b). He claims that (b) is true only because 
(a) is true. 
4.03(4) A proposition states something only in so far 
as it is a picture. 1 
We will develop the point later, but it is worth noting 
here that Pitcher misses an opportunity to indicate that 
there are several items shown by a Satz. What the propo-
sition says is what the proposition shows; but tha t the 
proposition says (i. e . that it is sensible) also shows, 
and thi s showing appears dependent upon the Satz saying 
(the fact of its saying, not what it says). 
c) Pitcher, among others, 2 distinguishes between 
1 rbid., p. 98. 
2Arne Naess, Four Mod e rn Philosophers, Chicago, 








illuminating and non-illuminating nonsense in order to 
discuss an important implication of the showing and 
saying doctrines. 
Wittgenstein considered his philosophical assertions 
(the Tractatus assertions) to be illuminating non-
sense -- what he had intended to say is quite true --
only, as it turns out , it can 't be said. So we must 
grasp what it is that he intende d to say, l earn the 
lesson climb up the ladder. But precisely in 
virtue of having done so we will no longer continue 
trying to say such things, for we realize that they 
cannot be said . 1 
On this account , Wittgenstein's own "lessons " can be 
cl a imed as illuminating nonsense. Even though 
Wittgenstein is saying (in writing the Tractatus) what 
cannot be said but only shown, that he is attempting to 
say is illuminating -- in virtue of what it shows, we 
can l earn some lesson. Some nonsense is evidently not 
of this illuminating sort ; from it no l essons are learned . 
d) A major element in the showing thesis in the 
Tractatus is untenab le. This contention of Pitcher's, 
which I think is generally correct, is not, however , 
made between higher and lower nonsense. Higher nonsense 
results in the attempt to say the unsayable (in this case 
the showable which is not sayable ). It is the attempt to 
use signs that cannot be used significantly in language. 
It is Naess' position that the remarks constituting the 
Tractatus are of this higher sort of nonsense. The lower 
nonsense is the unsayable that is neither sayable nor 
showable. It is not part of the content or the logical 
form of tbis or any language. 
P'1~cher , \, J \ ~\.~n.S +<' ;"' 
p. 155. 
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adequately supported by ana lysis and argument. 
So we must grasp what it is that he intended to say, 
learn the lesson - climb up the ladder. But precisely 
in virtue of having done so , we will no longer con-
tinue trying to say such things, for we will realize 
that they cannot be said. We will throw away the 
ladder by means of which we came to have this insight. 
We will see that certain important things are the 
case - things which are shown, but cannot be said. 
But from then on we will say only what can be said , 
namely, the propositions of the natural sciences. 
One inm1ediately feels a sense of uneasiness with 
Wittgenstein's position here, and I think it is in 
fact untenable .... We understand these doctrines 
(relation of propositions to states of affairs , etc. ), 
we weigh their merits and demerits and no doubt take a 
stand on them, either accepting or rejecting them. 
But then at the end (of the Tractatus) we are told 
that they are all nonsense, and that such doctrines 
cannot be said. This evaluation cannot be accepted. 
Wittgenstein has said these things and therefore they 
can be said .... What has to be abandoned, it would seem , 
is not only the idea that those cannot be said but 
also - and more basically - the theory (of what can be 
said) that impli es that they cannot be said. 1 
Wittgenstein's contention that some of what shows cannot 
be said may well be mistaken; but that he is mistaken can-
not be seen without careful elucidation of the subtleties 
of his thought and argument. 
M. Black offered in 1964 (A Companion to 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus) a solution to some of the 
problems we have defined. 
It is a distinctive feature of his ~ittgenstein's) 
conception of language to insist upon two radically 
different modes of significance, "showing" and 
"sayii1g": to signify, to have meaning is either to 
show something or to say something , but what can be 
shown cannot be said 14:·1212) . Only a proposition 
can say anything ; what is li able to puzzle a r eader 
1 rbid. 
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(a s it h as already p erp l exed previous commentators ) is 
tha t a proposi tion a l s o s how s some thing, its sense 
(4.022). Th e point h as already been made, in othe r 
words , at 2.221, where Wittgenstein h as s a id that a 
picture (including a logica l picture , a proposition, 
we are entitled to add) presents (d a r s tellt) its 
s ense . We mig ht r easonably infer from 4.022 tha t 
dar stellt (presents) is a synonym for z e igt (shows ) 
But the sense agrees or di sagrees with re a lity 
(2 .222 ); what function i s l ef t over for saying? One 
might b e inclined to equate " saying" with "affirming" 
or "asserting " - but for r emarks such as 4.064 and 
the like which tell conclusively against this view . 
The answer is to b e found at 4.461 (a propo s ition 
shows wh a t it says ) which I take to imply th a t the 
"saying " is p ar t of - or rathe r, an aspect of - the 
s e ns e , not something superadded to it. 1 
I think Black 's reasoning can b e mor e carefully spelled 
out in the following way : 
a) A picture (proposition ) dar s tellt its s e nse 
(2.221). 
b) A proposition ze igt its sense (4.022). 
c) From a) and b) we 
zeigt are synonyms. 
the r e mark at (a ) to 
at (b); all that (a ) 
remark at (b) is not 
peculiar. 
can assume darstellt and 
Black rea lly doesn't need 
genera t e the cla im we have 
indica t es is that the 
isolated , or some how 
d) The sens e (of the picture or propos ition) 
agrees or disagrees with r ea lity,which mean s it 
has a truth-va lue (2.22 2 ). 
e) We are to infer from the statements at a ) 
arid d), a picture or proposition d ars tellt its 
sense,which ha s a truth-value . 
f) A proposition says tha t matte rs stand in 
just the way tha t it shows them 6-..s s --l- C\...f'lc.\1'()c\ . 
g) The conjunction of E) and f) appears to h a v e 
the consequ ence that either the say ing or the 
showing of sense is superfluous . For instance , 
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what is to be said if it is not the saying of 
what is either true or false? 
h) Black assumes that the author of the 
Tractatus does not wish to describe the func-
tions of saying and showing in the manner of 
( g) • 
i) If the conclusion drawn at (g) is not to be 
accepted, Black suggests that we construe say-
ing as part of, or an aspect of, the sense 
which i s being shown. Indirect support for 
this interpretation is given at 4.461: 
"Propositions show what they say: t auto logies 
and contradictions show that they say nothing." 
j) 4.022 would then allow of thi s reading, 
according to Black's solution: A proposition 
darste llt (shows ) its sense, (how things stand 
if it is true ), and in showing its sense, that 
thing s so stand is said. But the fact that the 
sens e is said is due to the saying being a part 
of the sense and not to the saying being a part 
of the showing (presenting). 
Black's solution is not satisfying. First, if the 
sense of a proposition is its agreement with pos s ibilities 
of existence and non-existence of states of affairs (4.2) 
then much n eeds to be said to explain what "aspects" or 
"parts" of that sense come to, and to explain the strange 
thought that one of these parts is equ iva l ent to the 
activity of saying. This is not to say that Black is 
mistaken, only that without further explanation it is 
impossible to assess his though~. Secondly, if the saying 
spoken of in 4.022 i s , on Black's interpretation , a part 













shown, but what is said is also shown . What is said must 
be shown because the sense of a proposition is what it 
says, not that it says (the fact of its saying ). But 
saying what_ is s h own i s ruled out by 4 .1212, and Bl ack 
provides no reso lution of this conflict. Thirdly, from 
the claim at (c) Black would have us infer the synonymy 
between zeigt and darstell} We noted, however, that 
Wittgenstein u ses darstellt in no univoca l way; and 
unfortunately in the most crucial places h e is ambivalent 
(see above , p. 6 f). Thu s it i s questionable whether or 
not we can justify the inference Black wants to make. 1 
Black's earlier interest in the problems of show-
ing and saying had been centered on the question of 
whether or not the Tractatus itself was somehow internally 
inconsistent. In his review of the Tractatus in 
Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1938-39, Black says that 
" ... the primary negative thesis of the Tractatus is tha t 
the logic of facts (the relation between the structure of 
propos itions and the structure of states of affairs) can-
not be represented (said ) -- but only shown ." It follows, 
1 No one, I wou ld think, would infer that darstel l t 
and zeigt are synonymous because they both take " sense" as 
an object. That I can open and close my door does not 
allow me to infer tha t "open" and "clos e " are synonymou s . 
18 
Black argues ,that the Tractatus on its own principles must 
consist of showing . 1 
Yet if the Tractatus itself is or contains the 
sort of thing tha t can only be shown , then the obvious dif-
ficulty is with 4.1212 - "what can be shown cannot be 
said." Wittgenstein has clearly said what he claims can 
only show. For instance , Wittgenstein states (says ) that 
the relation between the structure of an elementary propo-
sition and the structure of a state of affairs cannot be 
said. (4.121) But by his own doctrine this cannot be 
said; his statement is not a Satz, for it pictures no 
elementary state of affairs. It must be a meta-statement. 
Such meta-level claims are common in the Tractatus , and all 
of them must be nonsense. 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the fol-
lowing way: anyone who understands me eventually 
recognizes them as nonsensical .... He must transcend 
these propositions, and then he will see the world 
aright. (6.54) 
Is the Tractatus then, self-contradictory? Black 
feels that this is the central issue or problem in trying 
to understand the distinctions Wittgenste in is making 
between showing and saying in the Tractatus. Black, in 
his answer to whe ther or not the Tractatus is consistent, 
argues that both the distinction and the Tractatus are 
1Max Black , "S ome Problems Connec t e d With 
Language," Proceedings of the Aristote lian Society , 39 
(1939), p. 49. 
19 
quite correct but very b ad ly understood by mo s t com-
me ntator s . What follow s i s an analysis of Black's 
argument. 
(1) A senseless proposi tion is not a propos i-
tion at all. But this does not mean that tautologies and 
contradictions are nonsensical concatenations of symbols: 
"Tautologies and contradict ions are not,howe ver , non-
sensical. rrhey are part of the symbolism , just as "O" is 
part of the symbolism of arithcme tic . " (4.4 611 ) . 
(2) It is logically impossible that whateve r we 
understa nd should finally, or at any time , be revealed to 
be sense l ess . 
(3) Either there is nothing to unde rstand and a 
remark is a nons e nsical collocation of sounds, etc. , or 
something is und e rstood, and the remark is not a colloca-
tion of sounds . 
(4) From the Tractatus statements at 6.54 and 
7, eithe r Wittge nstein cannot mean that each of the propo-
sitions of the Tractatus is senseless in the manne r in 
which an unorganiz e d grouping of symbols is senseless or 
he does so intend 6.54 and 7. But if the latter alterna-
tive is accepted the n nothing is communica t e d by the 
Tractatus . That's fals e . Therefore Wittge nstein mu s t 
inte nd th2 "senseless" in 6.54, et.c ., in some special way. 
(5) It is "characteristic of Wittge nstein ," 1 
1 Ibid., p . 160. 
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argues Black , that "p can be said" is restricted to cases 
where "p" is an empirical proposition. To strengthen his 
reading of the Tractatus on this issue Black offers as 
support: 
that: 
a. (5.2) Propositions of mathematics are 
equations and therefore are pseudo-
propositions. 
b. (6.22) The logic of the world which 
shows in tautologies, mathematics show 
in equations. 
c. (6.11) The propositions of logic say 
nothing. They are analytic propositions. 
(6) From the claim at (5) we are to conclude 
to say "p says something" i s to say "pis empirical "; 
to say "p shows but does not say " is to hold at least that 
"pis not empirica l." 
(7) There are both empirica l and non-empirical 
propositions but the terms "sensible propositions" seem to 
be reserved for just those propositions which do say i.e. 
those which are empirical. 
(8) "My propositions are nonsensical " becomes 
on Black's interpretation a quite misleading way of saying 
"my propositions are not empirical." Thus Black can argue 
that Wittgenstein could avoid the charges of inconsistency 
by making this empirical and non-empirical division among 
propositions. [Black also discusses it as a distinction 
between the u se of contingent propos itions and the use of 
necessary propositions .] On Black ' s interpretation the 
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propositions composing the Tractatus, are non-empirical, 
they are not used to make some extra-linguistic ·reference; 
rather they are used'' ... to reveal and emphasize the kind 
of ways in which it is perrnissibie in language to use 
them.'' 1 Understood in this way, the inconsistency dis-
sipates and "the " problem of the Tractatus (in Black's 
view) is dissolved. 2 
It seems to me that both Black and Wittg~nstein 
want to hold that the terms "sense l ess" and " sensible " 
do no t between them characterize all propositions 
(from claims (1) and (7)) Propositions are either 
sensible or non-sensible (i.e., tautologies, etc.) All e lse 
may masque rade as a proposi tion but will be a senseless 
group of sounds or signs. This, I think, is rightheaded and 
while not directly ascribable to Black, hi s 1939 position 
would allow him to embrace the position. But I disagree 
!Ibid., p. 151. 
2It must be admitted , however, that the exposition 
given here of the 1939 article is generous - especial ly 
regarding the statements at (1) and (7) above. Someone may 
object that Black wants us to call all of those proposi-
tions which show but do not say, senseless and thereby not 
propositions at all. The point depends on whether Blac~ 
intends the remarks at (1) and (7) in the manner we have 
suggested. I f it was Black's intention to so render all 
propositional signs which show but do not say " senseless ," 
then I think the textual evidence for its truth is clearly 
missing. On the other hand, the move t aken here to render 
such propositional signs as "non-sensible " is I think a 
more tenable and generally consistent thesis that is in 
fact similar to the position taken by Pitcher on the same 
issue. 
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with his judgme nt as to what constitutes "the " problem of 
saying and showing. 
Black thinks that the problem is to take the 
l essons of the Tractatus , as from an external point of 
vi e w, and to apply those lessons to the Tractatus itse lf. 
In doing so, some difficulty is found in maintaining the 
consistency of the lessons learne d from the Tractatus 
regarding what s hows and cannot b e said with the applica-
tion of fuose lessons to the very writing of the Tractatus. 
From this position "the" question is wh e ther we can dis-
solve this inconsistency. I cannot de ny that this problem 
is an important one, and no doubt Black's argument goes 
some way to settle the puzzle. Nevertheless , the problem 
I wish to emphasize is an " internal" problem concerning 
Wittge nstein's saying and showing theses. "The" problem, 
in my view , is that of discovering consiste ncy within the 
eleme nts of the saying and showing distinctions 
Wittge nstein chos e to make . 
Concerning my version of " the probl em ," Black's 
most interesting suggestion is that we should make clear, 
on Wittge nstein ' s behalf (since Wittge nste in neglecte d to 
do so) , the difference between the formal and the mater ial 
features of a proposition. 
ful treatme nt. 
This suggestion deserves care -
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... [W] e may summarize Wittgenstein's usage by saying 
that what shows itse lf is either (i) something 
material about th~ reference or the sense of a given 
expression (e.g. that it stands for a certain obj e ct, 
for no obj e ct , or the same object as some other given 
expression) or (ii) something about the logica l form of 
the reference or sense (e.g. that it i s a number, or a 
significant proposition, or the contradiction of a 
given proposition, or a consequence of another propo-
sition). (If we u sed "meaning" to cover both sense 
and reference , we could say more brief ly that what i s 
shown is some feature of either the content or the 
form of the meaning of a given expression. ) The 
second type of cas e is the more prominent in 
Wittgenstein ' s exposition. 1 
If what shows itself is a "material" feature of the 
meaning, this presumably appears in some feature of 
the use of the symbol (though Wittgenstein does not 
explicitly say so) . 2 
In the second type of case, where what shows itself is 
something about the form of the meaning, this manifests 
itself in a corresponding "formal" or "logical" 
feature of the correspond ing symbol. For example, 
that "p v q" follows from "p" manifests itself in 
"p -+ p v q" being a tautology. Wittgenstein says that 
some forma l features of propositions are " shown" by 
their structure (4.1211b). Such formal f eatures may 
be expressed by means of what Wittge nste in calls 
II rules of syntax f II but these do not II sa~r· anything f 
are not assertions having truth-values. 
Unclear in Black's remarks is whether or not the 
formal features are predicable of propositions or of propo-
sitional signs. One u se of "forma l" would be appropriate ly 
used to characterize the sign and not the proposition 
itse lf. For instance , a formal feature of "aRb" is that R 
is a two place predicate. Black speaks of this as a 
1Black, Companion , p. 191. 
2 Ibid. 
3rbid., pp. 191-2. 
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formal feature of a "symbol." However, when we say "pis 
contingent," we are , following Black, also callii1g atten-
tion to a formal feature. But in this later case it is 
clearly the proposition (Satz) which is contingent (i.e. 
possibly true or possibly false ) and not the sign (or 
symbol). 
Black's statement that " the formal features may 
be expressed ... " shou l d not permit him , or us , to assume 
that at least in some cases both the material and the 
formal features of the proposition can be said (by us ) 
If such an interpretation were given , (and it is not 
clear that Black would do so ), where both sorts of features 
cou l d be said , then in the case of the forma l features we 
would be saying what Wittgenstein argues can only be 
shown and not said . 
When something falls under a formal concept as one 
of its objects , th i s cannot be expressed by means 
o f a proposition. Instead it i s shown in the very 
s ign for this ob j ect . . . ( 4 . 126 ) . 
Finally , if we are to accept Bl ack ' s way of 
characterizing the distinction between formal and material 
featu res in the Tractatus , then what we would be accepting 
is a distinction made in terms of the difference between 
form and content . Bl ack , for example , discusses the 
material feature of a sensible proposition as what the 
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proposition says - - "its content" -- "its meaning. " It 
seems to me that there is nothing self-evident!~ mistake n 
in such an interpretation, but there is something at least 
unfortunate about it. Since Wittgenstein claims in the 
Tractatus (3., 3.01) that we should consider sensible 
propositions as thoughts, Black is oblige d to supply a 
form-cont e nt appraisal for Wittgensteinian "thoughts. " 
Unfortunately for Black, there is no discussion by 
Wittgenste in of the "form" of a thought as opposed to its 
"content. " Moreover, it i s not necessarily the case that 
we must assume a form and content dichotomy for an 
adequate analysis of pictures and picturing in the 
Tractatus. The character of Satz is linked rigidly to 
that of both thoughts and pictures, and I think all that 
we are suggesting to Bl ack is that some further argument 
is needed on his part. Black needs an argument the outcome 
of which should convince us that the analysis of Satze can 
adequately be done in terms of material and formal 
features. 
My feeling is that Black's intent with the formal-
material feature issue is to find some clear way of re-
asserting a distinction to which Wittgenstein is certainly 
committed--viz., that between Satz~ and tautologies. It 
is undeniably true that the Tractatus makes such a distinc-
tion, and this distinction is marked in a numb e r of ways. 
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The most interesting and illuminating way, however, in 
which the difference between Satze and tautologies is made 
is by means of the distinction between saying and showing. 
The saying a nd showing distinctions are not the same as 
those between what we are given to under stand in Black as 
the difference between formal and material features. In 
fact, Black appeals to the complex ity of saying and showing 
to assist him in marking the difference b etween "form" and 
"content" regarding propos itions (or signs). The outcome 
of his efforts seems to be only one way of pointing out that 
the Tractatus demands that we separate sensible proposi-
tions from senseless tautologies . We are agreed to that. 
What we suggest is that we are prevented from understand-
ing the charac t er of saying and showing in the Tractatus 
by Black's use of the terminology of content and form. 
Black's purpose was to illuminate . But if we are right on 
the several charges of obscurity noted earlier, then Black 
has not taken us far in appreciating what Wittge nste in 
intends for us to understand in this part of the Tracta tu s . 
We said that the major interest in this discussion 
is to set "the " problem of showing and saying a s one of 
determining the internal cons iste ncy of several e leme nts 
in Wittge n ste in's own formulation of the say and show 
distinctions . A commentator who ha s made a most interes t-
ing effort to exami ne these interna l is sues i s Erik 
Ste niu s . Stenius' primary interest i s with the subtleties 
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of Wittgenstein ' s picturing theories. Because of that 
interest he has given us a rather detailed account of the 
showing a nd saying distinc tion s in their connections with 
the picture theories. Al so , Stenius attempts to find a 
solution to some of the problems we outlined on p ages 
four and five of this chapter . 
argue for two senses of zeigen. 
Stenius ' course i s to 
We will start our analysis from 4.1212. What can be 
shown in language cannot b e said , Wittge nsteins-tat es 
here . But thi s statement seems to be contradicted i n 
4.022, according to which a sentence shows how things 
stand , if it is true , and says that the y do so stand. 
Obviou s ly Wittgenstein us es the word " show " (zeigen ) 
in two different senses : in one sens e of "show " 
s entences say what they show , in another they cannot 
say what they " show. " At l east in the latter sense 
the word "show" i s , according to 4.121, syn onymous 
with " exhibi t" (aufweisen). And what a sentence 
exhibit s but cannot say i s the "logical form of 
reality." According to 4 .12 this i s something that a 
sentence must have in common with reality to be 
capable of representing it. 1 
To justi fy his interpre tation, Stenius argues that the 
distinction b e tween the two senses of show must be under -
stood in light of what h e takes to b e corresponding claims 
regarding pictures . 
On Stenius ' reading we are to r ecognize a dif-
ferenc e b e tween a picture theory of some proposition (he 
u ses " sentence ") and a complete picture theory of l anguage . 
The "picture theory of sentence " is us e d to c haracterize 
the r e l at ion b e tween the spec ific sentence (or proposition) 
1Ste niu s , Wittgenste in' s Tractatus , p. 179. 
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and the rea lity described by that sentence. The "picture 
theory of language" is used, on the other hand, to 
characterize the relation between language as a complete 
system and reality as a whole. In Stenius' terms 
'' ... language, considered as the system used in sentence 
formation, is thought of as reflecting the "logical " 
structure of reality. We might call this the "ontologica l 
picture theory" in order to distinguish it from the 
"descriptiona l .picture theory" of sentence meaning. 111 
This difference in types of picturing theories is 
related by Stenius to a distinction between what he terms 
internal and external structure. The internal structure 
of a fact is its logical character-- its form. Since the 
fact is a construct of elements each with its own form, 
the internal structure can be defined as the totality and 
arrangement of the logical forms of the different con-
stituent elements. The internal structure indicates what 
the form of the fact would be in any possible world. The 
external structure of substance (of a fact) involves only 
what is actually the case in a given world. 2 With the 
external structure of a particular substance (a fact), 
which is comprised of atomic states of affairs, we can 
indicate which of the constituent states of affairs i s 
1 rbid., p. 177. 
2 rbid ., pp. 70-71, 79 . 
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existent and wh i ch is non- ex i stent (but still poss ibl e ). 
Using both this distinction a nd the one between the sorts 
of pictur ing, St e nius argues: 
... whereas the d escr iptiona l picture theory states 
tha t there i s a similarity in externa l structure 
between a sentence and what it d escr ibes , the 
"ontologica l" picture t heory states that there i s 
a similarity in interna l structure b etween language 
and r eality. 1 
Before we are ready to und e rstand why Ste nius 
thinks tha t the differ e nce b e twe e n the descriptional a nd 
ontologica l picture theory corres ponds to the distinction 
in the Trac t atu s between what can be shown and what said 
we n eed to brief ly explain some further t e rminology in 
Stenius' ana lysis. 
a) Pictures do not need to represent or de pict 
something to b e pictures. For instance there are repre-
senta tiona l pictures, having no existing "re presentata" 
but all pictures are of something , i.e. the y h ave what 
Stenius t erms a "prototype." Prototypes are the objects 
of depiction and they may b e r ea l or not r ea l. Non-real 
prototypes (mythological figur es , characters of fiction, 
etc.) do not come up for c areful analys i s by e ither 
Wittge n s t e in or Stenius. 
b) A "picture fi e ld" is an uninterpr e t e d pie-
ture. It is an "articulate field capabl e of different 
interpretations - i.e. one to which a ke y of interpre t at i o n 
1rbid., p. 177. 
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is not fixed. " 1 To appreciate this remark of Stenius' we 
are to understand an "articulate field " as an arrangement. 
of facts capable of being analysed in different ways such 
that certain objects and predicates would appear as 
elements (as part of the external structure ) of that field. 
\)._ 
An " artic,J_ate"field differs from an analysed "world as 
a fact" only in (1) that it need not comprise more 
than a certain portion of the world as a fact and 
(2) that the elements need not be "atomic'' ... In 
respect of its elements an articulate field has a 
fixed "external structure." 2 
c) Finally, a "key of interpretation " is the 
means by which the facts of one articulate field are seen 
to stand for the facts of another articulate field -- "thus 
the criterion for F being a picture of G is the existence 
of the key only." 3 That they (the facts) stand as pictured 
i.e., that the relation between facts of a picture field 
and existent facts "of the world" is isomorphic -- is the 
criterion for the truth of a picture, not that there is a 
picture. The key of interpretation indicates that there is 
a picture of some prototype, the truth of that picture i s 
determined by our checking the world and not the key. 
Now I think we can understand Stenius' attempt to 
r e late these various theses to the saying and showing 
doctrine. 
1 Ibid. , p. 98. 
2 Ibid. , p. 90. 
3Ibid., p. 97. 
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... [ I]n order to be capable of repre s e nting a proto-
type either truly or falsely a picture mu s t alre a dy 
have some thing in · conm1on with the prototype , and this 
i s the "logical form of representation," which con-
sists in the identity in internal structure between 
the system of elements in the picture and the proto-
type . 
We can thus distinguish between t wo different 
kind s of "showing " in regard to pictures. On the one 
hand a picture "shows" by the external structure of 
the picture field and by means of the key of inter -
pretation a state of affairs that it presents or 
depicts ; on the other hand it "shows" -- according to 
Wittge nstein - - by the internal structure of its 
elements the internal structure of the elements of the 
prototype. And what it " shows" in the latter sense it 
cannot " show " in the former sense , b ecause the 
possibility of "showing" in the former sense 
presupposes that the e l ements of the prototype have 
the internal structure " shown " in the l atter sense. 
If we take the word "show" in the latter sense we may 
therefore state (cf. 2.172 ): 
Xl. A picture can only "show" or "exhibit" the 
internal structure of reality but not d epict 
it .... 
X4. Th e elements of a picture always exhibit the 
logical form of the elements they stand for. 1 
To complete the correspondence, Stenius returns to 
explicate two sorts of showing by characterizing them in 
the grammar of "interna l" a nd "external ." 
Showing of what can be "shown" and said is an "external " 
showing whereas showing of what can only be " shown ," 
but not sa id is an "internal" showing. 
A sentence shows by its external structure how 
thing s stand if it is true , and says that they do so 
stand. It describes reality as having the same 
external structure as the sentence itself. 
But what a sentence shows by its external structure 
must be distinguished from what it shows by the 
internal structure of its elements. The elements of a 
sentence s how the logical form of the " things" they 
name , and since all description presupposes , according 
to Wittgenstein ' s view , that the elements of reality 
have the internal structure " shown " in this way by the 
1 rbid. , pp. 179-180. 
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elements of languag e , we must infer , on the one hand, 
that the internal s tructur e of r ea lity can only be 
shown or exhibited by l a ng uage but not described by 
sentences, and on the other h a nd, that it is essenti a l 
to the possibility of a lingui sti c description that 
the interna l structure of language r ea lly exhibits the 
intern a l s tructur e of the r eality d escr ibed in it. We 
thu s urr~ve at the following theses: 
XS. The inte rnal structure of r ea lity c a n only be 
shown or exhibited by language , not d escrib ed 
in s e nte nce s . 
X6. The interna l structure of language exhibits 
the interna l structure of r ea lity. (Compl e t-
ing the compar ison, we note tha t XS corres -
ponds to Xl, and X6 to X4.) 1 
Summarizing Stenius' pos ition we find that 
., 
sentences (or Sa tze) show in two different senses . The 
inte rna l showing of the Satz involves the showing of the 
logical form of reality. That is, the "internal structure" 
of the Satz shows the internal structure of the world. The 
interna l showing cannot b e said; and Stenius suggests that 
the u se of "exhibit" i s ade quate to character ize a showing 
that is not s ay ab le. The second sort of showing is c a lled 
"external." Wha t a Satz shows ex t e rna lly can b e said, and 
to mark this differenc e , Stenius sugges ts the t erm "de pict" 
to characte rize what is both a showing and a saying. The 
exte rnal structure of a picture "depicts " a state of 
affairs . A Satz shows by external structure how thing s 
stand if true-·- it "de picts " a state of affairs -- it s hows 
and says how thing s s tand. 
easily a pprec i a t ed: 
1 rbid., p. 181. 
Ste niu s ' conclus ions the n are 
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a) A picture can show (exhibit ) internal 
structure but not depict it. 
b) The e l ements of a picture show (exhibit ) 
their own logical form as well as the cor -
responding logical form of what they 
depict. 
c) The internal structure of reality and 
language can be exhibited but not depicted 
it can not be described by language. 
d) The external structure of reality and 
language can be depicted - - can be both shown 
in l anguage and - described or said by 
language . 
We must return to these topic s in the third 
chapter where we will attempt an analysis which is quite 
different from Stenius' analysis and interpretation . For 
, ., If 
instance , there are several uses or senses of show in the 
Tractatus -- but Stenius h as overlooked different u ses or 
senses of " say" which are also to be found there. 
There is a que s tion as to whether or not 
Wittgenstein did or would have marked a distinction 
; ', '~ 
between uses of · show in the manner Stenius describes; 
ther e is no good textual evidence for Wittgenstein ' s main-
taining a difference between "depict " and "exhibit. " 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Wittgenstein does think 
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there is some difference between a showing compatible with 
saying and a showing that is not compatible with saying --
(and, as we noted, this difference will be laid out in our 
chapter three). 
Stenius' interpretation may be open to a charge of 
ambiguity. Stenius uses several different sorts of expres-
sion in discussing the "internal-external distinction." 
He claims within a matter of two pages of text that in 
addition to the fact that sentences show categorically dif-
ferent things (a sentence shows its logical form while it 
shows and says its sense), they can be said to show by 
their internal or external structure ("a sentence 'shows' 
by its external structure how things stand .... ") . 1 In 
addition, Stenius suggests that the terms "internal" and 
"external" apply to the showing itself, for Wittgenstein. 
That is, not only are we to speak of showing by internal 
or external structure, but the showing itself is to be 
termed internal or external depending on what is shown. 
The following quote suggests this interpretation: 
Showing of what can be "shown" and said is an 
"external" showing whereas showing of what can only 
be "shown," but not said is an "internal showing." 2 
I see nothing clearly inconsistent in Stenius' remarks. 
But we do need some explanation of how he, or Wittgenstein, 




character iz e both the means by which a sentence shows and 
the very showing itself, as determined by what is shown. 
Ste nius appears to ignore any difference between 
our saying and the sentence ' s saying . Pitcher has argued 
(and we agree ) tha t li ttle rests on such a distinction, 
though it can intelligently be made; but quite a lot does 
depend on noticing a difference between our (as language 
users) showing and the sentence showing - yet this too 
Stenius i gnores. 1 A final point is related to this issue. 
Stenius has g e nerally allowed the term "describe " to be 
treated as a synonym for " say ." This, by itself, causes 
no real difficulties until we appreciate several u ses of 
"say" and "describe " in the 'I'ractatus --- not all of which 
are synonymous. Take for examp l e the remarks at Tractatus 
4.022 and 4.023. 
A proposition shows its sense. 
A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. 
And it says that they do so stand-.-
A proposition is~escription of a state of affairs. 
Just as a description of an object describes it by 
giving its external properties, so a proposition 
describes reality by its interna l properties. 
Here "beschreibt " cannot be rendered as "s ay " for we have 
agreed with Stenius that a Satz does not "say " with or by 
its interna l properties. 
1 in Chapter 3, the u se of our s howing is found not 
to be the same as the showing of sense done by a Satz . 
For instance , we show that the Satz i s true - but---U-does 
not show it s own truth. 
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We ar e ready now to turn to a s e cond l e ve l of 
critici sm . To do so we mu s t introduce an inte rpre t a tion 
of the Tra cta tu s which is critical of Stenius ' fund a me ntal 
a s sump tion s r egarding Wittge ns t e in's the ory of picturing 
and the r e by c r itica l of Ste nius' inte rpr etation of the 
distinctions in the Tra cta tu s b e tween showing and saying. 
In An Inte rpretation and Critique of Wittge n s tein's 
Tractatus , Favrholdt's proce dure is to strike at the 
cente r of Ste nius' reading by off e ring a compe ting theory 
of picturing that, claims Favrholdt, rende rs the saying 
and showing dichotomy understandable. 
Favrholdt contends that "thought" can be sub-
stituted for "eleme ntary propo s ition" wherever the latter 
occur s in the Tractatus (his support coming from 2.1, 3, 
3.1, 3.11, 3.12, 3.2, 3.5, 4). A thought, Favrholdt 
argue s, is a configuration of p s ychical eleme nts b e longing 
to conscious ne s s; and a thought-sign is the appearance of 
a thought wh e n the thought is conside r e d intros p e ctively. 
"Thought" and "thought sign" the n, are to b e cons idered 
synonymou s for "proposition" and "propos itional sign," 
although a "thought" should be conside red equiva l e nt to 
the expre s sed proposition. 1 This manner of viewing the 
use of "tnought" and "proposition" leads, in Favrholdt's 
view, to holding wh a t h e h as t e rme d the "W" propos itiona l 
1ste nius , Wittge n s t e in's Tract a tu s , pp. 77-78. 
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theory of picturing. A "W" proposition is a "configura-
tion of physical elements that are used as substitutes for 
psychical elements of a thought," so that the thought as 
it is expressed becomes a public phenomenon. Put briefly 
the view held by Favrholdt -- he calls it the "W view," 
meaning by this, I assume, "the authentic Wittgenstein 
view" -- involves the following ideas: 
Wi) We picture facts to ourselves. 
Wii) The logical picture of a fact is a 
thought. 
Wiii) The thought "p" and the corresponding 
proposition "p" only differ from each 
other in respect of the elements which 
constitute them (e .g. psychical/as 
opposed to physical elements). 
Wiv) The thought "p" and proposition "p" 
exemplify the same structure. 
Wv) Any proposition is a "W" proposition. 
Wvi) It is nonsense to say that a proposition 
is a picture whether or not it is thought. 
Wvii) A proposition is a configuration of 
objects; the relations these (obj ects ) 
have to one another show what the 
proposition pictures. 1 
Favrholdt's intent is to have us compare the above 
series of "W" -- labeled remarks to the views of Stenius. 
On Stenius' reading, argues Favrholdt, an elementary Satz 
is a picture "that represents something , wh e ther it is 
1 Ibid., p. 89. 
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thought of, perceived or in some other way experienced, by 
a conscious person or not." 1 Using Favrholdt's labels, 
Stenius subscribes to the "O propositional" position ---
( "0," I take it, emphasizes there being an "~bj ect " of the 
Satz rather than the expressing of the Satz emphasized by 
the "W" view) . The "O interpretation" involves the fol-
lowing ideas: 
Oi) We picture facts to ourselves. 
Oii) The logical picture of a f act is a prop-
osition, whether or not it is thought. 
Oiii) A "thought p" and corresponding "proposi-
tion p" differ from each other in respect 
to constitutive elements. 
Oiv) The thought "p" and proposition "p" 
exemplify the same structure. 
Ov) Any proposition is an "O" proposition 
Any proposition is a picture, or has 
sense, no matter whether or not it is 
thought. 
Ovi) A proposition ("O" proposition) is a con-
figuration of objects to which a key of 
interpretation , which enables indication 
of what the e l ements of the proposition 
represent, i s attached. 2 
We can, I think,aappreciate Favrholdt's subsequent 
arguments without having to explicate any special termi-
nology. Wittgenstein began with an "O" view of Satze.3 
1 rbid., p. 78. 
2 rbid., p. 89. 
3While he does not call it to our attention, .19e 






But, Favrholdt contends, by the time of the Tractatus, 
Wittge nstein's position was clearly that of the "W" view. 
Any commentator who fails to notice this transition 
Stenius' is a paradigm of such a commentary, argues 
Favrholdt -- presents to his readers a mistaken interpreta-
tion of what Wittgenstein was holding in the Tractatus. 1 
Favrholdt is right to this extent: a proposition 
is an expressed propositional sign (3.5); a necessary 
condition for a thought is tha t a sign be "applied and 
thought out"; and a picture is a Satz only insofar as it 
is an expressed picture. There can be no Satze which are 
not expressed (articulated ), and there can be no unthought 
thoughts. 
Stenius (or any holder of the 11 0 11 view) is mistaken. 
He is mistaken because h e has committed Wittgenstein to a 
"key" of interpretation (see Ovi above) which is necessary, 
on Stenius' view~ in order to enab l e one to see that an 
unthought picture represents some possible fact. But in 
point of fact, there is no textual evidence in the 
Tractatus indicating that Wittgenstein wished to introduce 
there the notion of a "key of interpretation." On the 
contrary, at 2.14 Wittgenstein claims that "wha t consti-
tutes a picture is that its elements are related to one 
another in a determinate way." As Favrholdt puts it, 
1Favrholdt, An Interpretation, p . 89. 
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using the t ermi nology of Stenius , which has been exp l ained : 
2 .15 reinforces 2 .14: "'l'he fact that the elements of 
a picture are r e l ated to one another in a d e t erminate 
way represents tha t things are related to one another 
in the same way .... " Here it is clear ly sta t ed tha t 
a picture consists of e l ement s only and that it i s a 
picture by virtue of the fixed re l at ions of these 
elements only . If we conce ive of "picture " as the same 
as "0-proposition" we are led into the line of thought 
which Sten iu s h as developed. We are l e d to distingui s h 
b etween an "internal " and an "external " structure , 
since an articulated field c a n be correlated with 
another possessing the same "internal " s tructure in 
mor e than one way. Conseque ntly, it is necessary to 
speak of a k e y of interpr etation in conne cti~n with 
the fi e ld, and , instead of 2.14, we should r a ther say 
tha t "the fact that the elements of a picture are 
rela t ed to one another in a d e t e rmina te way does not 
r e present anything ." It is only in connection with a 
key of interpretation, (whi ch es t ablishes a r e lation 
b etween n a mes a nd objects ), that the e l ement of a 
picture represent that "things are r e l ated to one 
another in a d e terminate wa y." The r eason that 
Wittgenstein did not formulate 2.15 in thi s way is not 
that h e forgot to do so . 1 
According to Favrholdt's interpretation of the 
Tractatus , a Satz is an expressed picture . In agreement 
with Wittgenstein ' s r ema rks at 4.022, a Satz both shows 
and says how things are . It says insofar as it is 
expressed (its sense i s articul ated ); it shows how things 
are insofar a s it is a picture. There i s no need, the n, 
on Favrholdt' s reading, to spea k cf s·atze as pictures 
which must b e inte rprete d. It is a mi s take to cons ider 
that certain items wh i ch are u ~interpreted until some "key 
of interpretat i on '' is emp loyed ar~ what Wittge nste in me a n s 
by an expressed picture in the Trac t a tu s . This i s a 
1 rbid ., p. 83. 
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mistake (in Favrholdt's opinion) because this position 
fails to present an accurate inte rpretation of 
Wittgenste in's theory of pictures a nd propositions. 
Favrholdt's argument rests on there being no evidence for 
either a "key of interpretation" or uninterpreted thoughts 
and pictures in the Tractatus. Moreover, he has presented 
a reading of Wittgenstein's theory of S~tze which does 
have textual suppor t and i s consistent with Wittgenstein's 
r emarks in the Tractatus regarding the natur e of thought. 
Favrholdt has suggested a challenge to the Stenius 
interpretation of the nature of a Satz and of a picture in 
the Tractatus . Perhaps there is no need to adjust dif-
ferences between internal and external showings etc., as 
Stenius did, if Favrholdt and others are correct in claim-
ing that the Stenius interpretation has misread what 
Wittgenstein meant by a Satz and by a picture. 
Before it is possible to evaluate the adequacy of 
this criticism of Stenius -- in which the activity of 
asserting a Satz is emphasized -- we must analyze the 
contributions of two commentators: H. R. G. Schwyzer 
and D. S. Shwayder. Both of these commentators will be 
us ed to articulate our fundamental disagreement with the 
Stenius r eading of the Tractatus . 
CHAPTER II 
The Ana lys e s of Schwyz e r and Shwayder 
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The Favrholdt conunentary, briefly formulated in 
the previous chapter, is, as I indicated, characteristic 
of a recent series of discussions challenging the plausi-
bility of what many commentators have suggested as a 
proper analysis of Wittgenstein's theories of picturing 
and of the difference between showing and saying. The 
most promising of these discussions first occurred in a 
1954 manuscript of D. S. Shwayder. 1 Since then, Shwayder 
has formulated an abbreviated version of his position in 
Mind, 1963. 2 · In 1962, H. R. G. Schwyzer argued for a very 
similar position, 3 and elicited a response from Stenius. 4 
We shall here examine the Shwayder-Schwyzer way of 
meeting the problems outlined in the previous chapter. We 
will be purticularly interested in the question whether or 
lD. S. Shwayder, Wittgenstein's Tractatus, A 
Historical and Critical Commentary, deposited in Bodleian 
Library, Oxford, 1954. 
2D. S. Shwayder, "Review of Stenius," Mind 7 2, 
1963, pp. 275-288. Reprinted in Copi and Beard(editors ), 
Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, New York, 19 66 , 
pp. 305-312. 
3H. R. G. Schwyzer, "Wittgenstein ' s Picture Theory 
of Languacre," Inquiry 5, 1962, pp. 46-64. Reprinted in 
Copi and Beard-reditors ) pp. 271-288. 
4 Erik Stenius, "Wittgenstein ' s Picture Theory: A 
Reply to Schwyzer," Inquiry 6, 1963, pp . 184..:195. 
Reprinted in Copi andffoard (editors ) pp. 313-324. 
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not the Shwayde r-Schwyzer position offers a tena ble rea d-
ing of Wittgenstein 's showing and saying doctririe s , and in 
their application of their interpretation to his ana lysis 
of sensible propositions. 
Both Schwyzer and Shwayder f ind that the saying 
and showing dist inctions for me aningfu l propositions are 
unintelligible unless they are understood in light of a 
close appreciation of Wittgenstein's picture theory. What 
follows from such an analysis, they c l aim , is that for 
Wittgenstein all pictures and S~tze are to be understood 
as activities performed by conscious agents. S~tze are 
not objects. For example , they are not objects in relation 
with some prototype -- they are not objects in some 
i somorphic relation with reality. On the contrary, they 
are conscious presentations , (Darstellung ), conscious 
activities. These presentations are to be considered as 
overt acts of asserting; and asserting i s an activity 
which has both saying and showing aspects . In addition, 
the following are h e ld to be true, on thi s interpretation 
of the Tractatus: a) when I present that some stat e of 
affairs i s the case, I am , in part, at leas t thinking that 
this state of affairs is the c as e ; and b) the thought, 
itse lf, i s a picture, and as a picture it i s an overt 
conscious act of asserting or presenting . 1 
1 Shwayde r , "Review ," p. 306. 
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Part I 
A major aspect of Schwyzer's essay is his conten-
tion that most commentators on the Tractatus (at least 
Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900, page 65; Anscornbe, 
An Introduc-!=-ion to Wi ttg~enste_in' s Tractatus, page 67; and 
Stenius, Wittgenstein's "Tractatus," pages 95 f) have mis-
takenly attributed to Wittgenstein the view that an 
assertion has meaning in virtue of an isomorphic relation 
it has to the way things are. Schwyzer, however, is con-
vinced that Wittgenstein did not hold such a view. 
Rather, Schwyzer argues, there has been a general confu-
sion regarding how the terms ·'satz'; "Bild'~ ''sachverho.LJ:'~ and 
"Tatsache 11 are to be understood in the Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein's theory is not about sentences [i.e., it is not 
about how sentences relate to the world or to a prototype]. 
Rather, it is about talking sense. 1 In the first move to 
explain his view Schwyzer reminds us that Stenius argues, 
as do many others, that for Wittgenstein a picture is 
representational, and has a prototype which it represents. 
Pictures, then, are replicas of, or reproductions of, 
prototypes (originals) -- and these originals are held to 
be facts (Tat ~sachen) . 2 Against Stenius, Schwyzer argue s 
that this view is false. "There are no prototypes 
1 Schwyzer, "_Picture Theory," p. 271. 
2 stenius, Wittgens tein's, Tractatus , p. 95. 
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(pr o t o t ype fac t s ) in the Trac t a tu s ; rather , the e l ements 
of the p i cture corresp ond t o obj e ctives,not to e l eme nts o f 
a f act ... the picture is a mod e l of reality (2.1), [and it 
i s ] not of a ny fa c t." 1 With thi s a s s e rte d · d e ni a l of 
prototypes and the representa tiona l (i s omor phi s m) view, 
Schwyz e r g oes a h ead to r e cons t r u c t wha t appea r s to him 
the proper inte r p r e tation of pic t uring in the Trac t a tu s : 
... To s a y that a Sa tz i s a picture is not, I s hall 
argue , to expla in wha t sente nces or propos itions mu s t 
b e like i f they are to b e the kind s of things tha t can 
b e u sed to ma k e sta t ements ; rathe r it i s to explain 
wha t ~=-t is to ma k e sta t e me nts , to mean some thing, to 
" express a s e nse ." The "re lation," if you wish to 
c a ll it a r e latio n, b etween l a ngua ge and the world 
is a s ynm1e trica l -- and this in virtue of the "internal" 
fe a tures o f the Satz -- if you wish to call the m 
f e atures . For a Satz is an a s s e rtion; it is not the 
kind of thing that can b e u sed, held up in speaking; 
for it i s its elf an act of spe aking. 2 
The r e i s thu s no diffe r e nc e on Schwyz e r's r eading, amo ng 
what we do wh e n we ma k e pictures (have thoughts), what the 
picture does whe n it pre s e nt s that some thing i s the cas e , 
and wha t the picture is (T. 2.15-2.1515). 
"For the picture is the pre senting tha t some thing 
is the c ase , and we do the presenting -- i.e. the picture 
is the a ct of pre s e nting tha t some thing i s the c ase ." 3 
1 schwyz e r, "Picture Theory," p. 276. 
2 Ibid., p. 273. 
3 rbid., p. 278. At this point, Schwy ze r appea r s 
not to di s ting ui s h b e t ween the picture doing the p resent-
ing and our d o ing the presen t ing -- h e c e rta inly wi s h es t o 
ma k e tha t d i s tinc t ion l a t er . 
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Wha t might seem spe culativ~ in this account, 
Schwyz e r says, is how facts can be acts, i.e., "How can the 
fact tha t the picture elements are combined in a certain 
way be itse lf the act of presenting that the objects are 
so combine d?"l The answer he gives is that the fact of 
relating reality to the picture is in the picture; indeed, 
the relating feature is what makes a picture into a 
picture. The elements of the picture stand for things ; 
and this "standing for" is not something beyond what a 
picture is: "their being picture elements is their 
standing for things": 2 
So a picture is this sort of fact. It is the fact 
that elements standing-for-things are connected in 
a certain way, and this fact is the presenting-that 
the things which the elements stand for are combined 
in the same way . 3 
Schwyzer remarks that on the traditional (e.g. 
Stenius) reading there are two features which must be 
ascribed to a picture: (a) a certain relation between 
the pictorial elements and (b) the correlating of the 
pictorial elements wi th things (prototypes) outside the 
pictures. Regarding the second relating feature, (b) , on 
the traditional reading, it is we who do the correlating . 
That is, for the traditional reading , feature (b) does not 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid . 
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belong to the picture itself, but to us as languag e users. 
Schwyzer argues vigorously against this interpreta-
tion of the Tractatus. According to Schwyzer, the feature, 
(b), belongs to the v ery nature of a picture, and must b e 
ascribed to the picture itself. Against the view tha t a 
picture need not be e ither true or false but tha t we as 
language u sers use the picture in making true or false 
assertions ,! Schwyzer argues that a picture must be true 
or false in itself since the picture, according to 
Schwyzer , is a "presenting that" something is the case. 
It is plain that a Wittgenstein picture must be 
either t't\ge or false. 2 
This does not mean that we h ave already d e t ermined that it 
is true or that it is fal se , only that the presenting 
picture must h ave a truth value, since it is presenting 
what is or is not the case. 
A third aspect of Schwyzer's thesis is his effort 
to relate the picture theory to an account of significant 
sentences -- and it is here , particularly, that we dis-
cover the relevance of his interpretation of Wittge nstein's 
picture theory to our interes t in the showing and saying 
dichotomy. Wittgenstein does not, according to Schwyzer, 
make a distinction between the sentence and what it 
1 G. E. M. Anscombe, Introduction to Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus , Londo n, 1963, p. 62. 
2 Schwyzer , "Picture Theory," p. 280. 
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expresses (normally referred to as its sense). Rather, if 
we ar e to nake claims of identity, then a thought is the 
sense of a Satz; or the sensible thought is the Satz. A 
thought is_ the expression of sense -- for to think is to 
mean something. 1 It (the Satz) is a thinking that, and as 
a Satz it is also a saying that things are in a certain 
fashion. A Satz should not be interpreted as a proposi-
tion (or a sentence ) but as a language activity we perform. 
However , a "sentence " as we normally use that term, is for 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus a synonym for "sentence 
sign'' (Satzzeichen ) -- a sign that can be interpreted ; 
that is, it can be used in the activity of saying and 
showing how things are. 
The "Satz" is the use of the "Satzzeichen"; it is the 
"Satzzeichen " being used as a projection of the sense, 
the "Satzzeichen" with the sense thought into it. 
From this point on , when Wittgenstein speaks of the 
"Satzzeiche n " he often means just the sign, not just 
the written or spoken sentence , but the sign in use. 
Like the picture , the sentence-in-use is a fact =-=-it 
i s that the words are combined in a certain way 
(3.14 ). These words are "names " (3.202) ; names "mean" 
( "bedeute n ") objects; they refer to them, name them 
(3. 203i-:-- Like the picture element , the name deputizes, 
stands for (vertritt ) the object (3.22 ) . 2 
We are warned however, not to be misled by this position: 
Wittgenste in is not saying that naming is a purpose 
(even the purpose ) for which names can be used , any 
more than h e is saying that thinking (presenting ) is 
something that thoughts (pictures) are used to do .... 
To sav " the t hought thinks the Sachlage" is to explain 
not what thoughts do or can be used to do , but what 
1 rbid. , p . 281. 
2 Ibid., p. 282. 
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they are . The case of n ames is e xactly analogous .... A 
Satz i s not a n ame (3.143), a complex word in use, it 
is a sentence in use ... the act of thinking ciut loud, 
of speaking. A Satz is an ... assertion and assertions 
are "embodi e d" in sente nce s , [sentence signs ]. 1 
If it is the cas e that to make a statement, to us e 
a sente nce (i. e . "to Satz") is to think aloud or assert a 
sense, the n the next issue, as Schwyzer pre sent s it, is 
how this thinking aloud or asserting conveys or carries 
any sense to a li stener . 
The answer i s , of course, that a Satz is a picture 
(e.g. 4.021); asserting is presenting. Now "present-
ing" ( "vorstellen," "darstellen") has important over-
tones which me r e "asserting" ("behaupten ") might not 
seem to have. When we present a state-of-affairs, we 
are at the same time showing what state of affairs it 
is that we are prese nting. And it is only because 
saying in this way involves showing, that other people 
can immediate ly understand what we are saying --
provide d they know what obj e cts we are ref e rring to 
in our asser tion (e.g. 4.024) . 2 
In a somewhat delibe rate style Schwyzer's position 
can, I think, be organized in the following manner. 
i) Showing is not identical with presenting but 
presenting does include showing. The presenting of a 
state of affairs is both our showing what state of affairs 
it is that we are asserting to hold, and our saying that 
it does so hold. 
ii) A picture and a Satz are used to present 
what is take n to be the case not what necessarily is the 
case. 
1 Ibid., pp. 282-283. 
2 Ibi.d., p. 284. 
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iii) When we present a state of affairs, we show, 
by the presenting , what state of affairs it is we are 
presenting. In this manner we conmmnicate the sense of 
an expression; someone can inunediately understand what we 
are presenting. 
iv) Showing cannot be identical ~,th presenting. 
In fact, presenting is saying . 
v) The connecting of showing to presenting 
does not violate the Tractatus at 4.1212: "What can be 
shown, cannot be said." 
Schwyzer's arguments for these points should be 
put in his own words: 
What I have said must not be taken to mean that 
"presenting " is to be identified with "showing." 
For as we have seen, a picture presents what it 
presents independently of its truth or falsehood; 
and what it presents is that things are combined in 
such-and-such-a-way. This ... is the explanat ion of 
what a picture is; it is what makes the picture into 
a picture. Now it is clear that the only circum-
stances under which we can say of a picture that it 
shows that such-and-such is the ca~e are those in 
which we have prior knowledge of the picture's truth. 
We could not say this of pictures in general. Only 
if pictures were a priori true, could they be said, 
in general, to show th~such-and-such is the case. 
But pictures must be true-or-false; "presenting " is 
"say ing," not "showing ." 1 
Showing is linked to presenting (asserting ) in 
the following way. When we present that something is the 
case, we thereby show not what is the case, but what it 
is that we are present!ng as the case. In this way 
1 Ibii., p. 284. 
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Wittgens tein can say, somewhat misleadingly, both that we 
assert, prese nt, the sense (2.221, 4.064) -- and that we 
show the sense (4.022). And in saying this h e is not 
undermining his principle that "what can be shown cannot 
b e said'' (4.1212). For when we say something we show what 
it is tha t we are saying, and this we cannot say; that i s , 
we cannot say what it is that we are saying. We cannot 
even say that we are saying anything, for this too is 
shown. 1 
Showing, not saying, is the clue to unders tanding. 
To say that something is the case is to show what is the 
case when what we say is true (4.022) and to understand an 
assertion is to know what is the case whe n it is true 
(4.024). We , as it were, grasp what is shown, and thereby 
understand what is said. 2 
On Schwyzer ' s interpretation, to assert that some-
thing is the case is, among other things , to show what is 
the case if the proposition is true and to understand a 
Satz is to know what would be the case if this Satz were 
true. Therefore, to unders tand a Satz we must grasp what 
is shown. Showing is the "clue," according to Schwyzer , 
because Wittgenstein felt that an account of only the 
saying in ma~ing an assertion could not explain how it is 
1 rbid., pp. 284 -285 . 
2 Ibid., p . 285. 
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that people can communicate. An assertion must show , it 
must exhibit what its sense is, if we are to under s tand 
it: a) the sense of a Satz must be publicly available; 
b) the asserting of a Satz shows the sense (what is 
affirmed); and c) what is communicated publicly is the 
sense of the Satz, and not just the fact that the Satz 
does have sense. 
Throughout his essay Schwyzer argues that the 
notion of showing is derived from that of picturing and 
from that of presenting-that. 1 This, I think, cannot be 
construed as an exp l anation of the genesis of Wittgenstein's 
theory of showing , but must be viewed as a re-assertion 
of Schwyzer's primary thesis: that Satz is an activity! 
If Schwyzer's claim were to be taken as an explanat ion of 
the origin of showing then he would be misleading us. As 
we will attempt to establish in Chapter Five, Wittgenstein's 
theory of showing and saying appears earlier than did his 
picturing theories. 
On Schwyzer's interpretation , among the items 
shown through the act of asserting is the existence and 
1 Ibid. , p. 2 8 5. "But Wittgenstein appears to have 
felt thatanaccount of assertion alone would not explain 
how it i s that people can conununicate. An assertion must 
show, must exhibit what its sense is, if we are to under-
stand it. And the notion of " showing" is derived from that 
of "picturing ," of "presenting-that. " 
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identity of the asserter or the shower . I do not say "I 
say p , 11 for that I do say p will be shown by my asserting 
p. On Wittgenstein ' s theory of language , according to 
Schwyzer, any mention of the speaker is redundant. If a 
Satz is an act of making a statement , and if language con-
sists of such acts , then there is no need to search for 
something " behind " what shows . There i s no agent doing the 
referring who must be sought out independent l y of grasping 
the sense of a Satz. The analysis of Satz as an activity 
makes saying and showi ng intelligible by conceiving both 
the sense and the speaker (the actor ) of the Satz as 
visibly figuring in the activity itself . 
Th is is why Bi l d , Gedanke , Satz appear to have l ives 
of their own~-Th e name means the object " ... " the 
thought thinks the state of affairs ," ... " the picture 
presents a sense" are ... disguised explanations . 1 
There is no such thing as a "relat ion " between 
l anguage and the world; l anguage is, if you wish, 
one of the ways in which we are related to the world . 
We speak, we assert that things are conne cted in 
particular ways , and that is al l there is to it . 2 
For example , on Schwyzer ' s interpretation , Wittgenstein ' s 
remark at 4 . 022. 
A proposition shows its sense. 
how things stand if it is true. 
they do so stand. 
A proposition shows 
And it says that 
i s a "disguised explanation" in the respect that it should 
be properly understood as: "we show the sense , we show 
h ow things stand . . .. " 
1 Ib i~ . , p . 2 8 6 . 
2 rbid ., p. 288. 
55 
Schwyzer appears to confuse, in his argument for 
the separation of shmjing and presenting , the showing of 
the sense (a possible state of affairs ) by a picture or a 
Satz and the showing that the poss ible state of affair s 
pres e nted does , in fact , obtain. Schwyzer ' s remark; 
"presenting is not the same as showing ," is misleading . 
Schwyzer is correct in holding that only in special cases 
(e.g. thos e known to be true a priori ) can we say of a 
pictur e or Satz that it shows thRt what it presents ---
actually obtains. It is also true that pictures or Satze 
must be true-or-false, even though we may not be in a 
position to determine their truth. What does not follow 
from these two statements is Schwyzer ' s c l aim that pre-
senting is not the same as showing. What does follow i s 
that pres e nting is not the same as " showing that the sens e 
presente d does obtain " ; i . e., presenting pis not the same 
as demonstrating that pis true . It seems to me that we 
h ave not been given , by Schwyzer , any reason for dis-
tinguishing present i ng from the showing of sense. 
I am also distressed with the argument Schwyzer 
uses to reconcile his interpretation of 4 . 022 (" A proposi-
tion shows its sense" ) with Wittgenstein ' s remark at 
4.1212 : "What can be shown cannot be said . " Schwyzer ' s 
argument r ests on the following theses : prese nting is 
rea l ly a sort of saying and not a sort of showing; 1 "A 
1We criticized Schwyzer's argument for this thes is 
imme diate ly above. 
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proposition shows its sense 11 is a disguised rerna:ck, and 
should be understood as "we show the sense of the proposi-
tion"; what we present, we show in presenting; that we 
present, we show in presenting; 4.1212 is to be taken as 
undisguised, as literally true; therefore, neither what 
we present (say ) nor that we present (say) can be said. 
In Schwyzer's terms: "We cannot say what it i s that we 
are saying. We cannot even say that we are saying any -
th ' 111 ing .... 
I do not think I am alone in finding Schwyzer's 
remark difficult to understand. "We cannot say what we 
are saying" appears to be a contradiction. Unless some 
distinction is made between the various uses of " saying" 
is the Tractatus, then Schwyzer's analysis has not 
adequately reconciled the remarks at 4.022 and at 4.1212. 
In 1963, Stenius, defending the "traditional 
view," responded to Schwyzer's interpretation by pointing 
. out the historical inaccuracies and the inadequate textual 
evidence for Schwyzer's analysis of picturing and Satz. 2 
Stenius briefly formulated what he took to be Schwyzer's 
argument as follows: 
Mr. Schwyzer seems to arrive at the interpretation 
in the fcillowing way: (1) According to the Tractatus 
a picture "presents " a (possible ) state of affairs.-
1 Ibid., p. 285. 
2 Stenius , "Wi ttgenstein's Picture Theory," p. 318. 
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(2) According to the Tractatus it is an essential 
feature in thinking or speaking that we form 
pictures. ( 3 ) A picture cannot do anything . 
(4) The sta t e of affairs "presented" by the 
picture or sentence is thus pres e nted by us, by 
our making a picture . (5) Therefore a picture 
or a sentence is the act of ~resenting a state 
of affairs. 1 
Stenius pointed out a special difficulty in Schwyz er 's 
position, viz., the apparent vacillation between at l east 
two uses of "presents ": 
One could b e lieve one was reading Heidegger. First 
"present " is taken in the meaning of "depict " or 
something like this- as the words "vorstel l en " and 
"darstellen " are us ed in the Tractatus. Then 
"present" is taken as an activity, i. e . the picture 
is identified with the activ1 ty of making thi s 
picture. (By the way, Mr. Schwyzer s eems to find a 
support for this identification in the fact that 
some words, and in particular the word "thought" can 
be used as referring both to an activity (the activity 
of thinking) and to the product of this activity). 
Therefore pictures are acts. Q.E.D. 2 
But in explication of what Schwyz e r has done, this criti-
cism of Stenius' is particularly unhappy; for Schwyzer ha s 
claimed that there is only an apparent or dis~uis , e d dis-
tinction b e tween the two uses of "present " suggested by 
Stenius. What Stenius i s obliged to do is not to claim 
that Schwyzer misses the distinction (for that is 
Schwyzer's intent ) but to demonstrate that that distinc-
tion is a "rea l," "non-disguised" one which is important 
to Wittgenstein, and thereby defeat Schwyzer's position. 
1 rbid., p. 323. 
2 Ibid. 
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,vhat follows is an effort to do just that. For 
what appears to me to be the root difficulty in Schwyzer's 
progranm1e is his failure to find some defendable way of 
rendering 4.022 [" A proposition shows it s sense. A pro-
position shows how things are if it is true. And it says 
that they do so stand."] that would be consistent with his 
appraisal of Satz~ as acts. In order to defend the theory 
of Satze as acts, Schwyzer construes 4.022 as a "disguised " 
remark. What Wittgenstein really means at 4.022, argues 
Schwyzer, is that we show (by engaging in the activity of 
"Satzing ") the sense of a Satze. 
interpretation can be supported. 
I do not think that this 
First, nowhere is there clear textua l support for 
the Schwyzer interpretation (what he would take to be the 
undisguised reading) of 4.022, that it i s we who show the 
sense of a Satz when we say the Satz. On the contrary, 
4.461 reasserts that it is the proposition which does the 
showing. 
Propositions show what they say: tautologies and 
contradictions show that they say nothing. 
To justify his interpretation, Schwyzer must find evidence 
for "the proposition showing" being equivalent to "my 
engaging in the activity of showing [and saying ] a 
sensible proposition." Th e assertions at 4.461 must be 
viewed as damaging to the Schwyzer position unless he can 
suggest some independent warrant for applying to them his 
., 
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reading of s;tze as ac ts. He needs to give u s some 
r easons for holding his interpretation other than an 
appeal to that interpretation. 
Now it may be supposed that Wittgens t e in does 
d eve lop some explanation of what it means for a proposi-
tion to show its sense when at 4.0311 h e writes that a 
Satz presents, "like a living picture," a state of affairs: 
One n a me stands for one thing, another for another 
thing, and they are combine d with one another. In 
this way the whole group -- like a table a u vivant --
presents a state of affairs. 
This remark may be construed as the evide nce Schwyzer 
needs. For Wittgenstein may mean here by a "living 
picture" that it is we who are living pictures, engaging 
in the activity of "Satzing." Nevertheless, several 
points count against 4.0311 being so cons trued. The 
German phrase "wie e in lebe ndes Bild" means explicitly 
"as though a living picture," or "as if a living picture" 
or ''like a living picture." Making an analogy is not the 
same as asserting an identity. Satze are not said to be 
identical with living pictures ; if Wittge nste in had wished 
to clearly note identity he would have done so -- as h e 
does in 4.03: 
A propos ition states something only in so far as it 
is a picture [my e mphas is]. 
What Wittgenstein appears to me to be saying at 4.0311 i s 
tha t the Satz is a group, a set, of name in some form; 
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and what the Satz does is to prese~t (both say and show) a 
state of affairs. To understand Wittgenstein here we 
should remember that a Satz i s to be distinguished from a 
Satz--sign. The latter is an unorganized or non-formed 
series of name signs . The forme r , the Satz , is a series 
of name signs which are in a form, and because they are in 
some specifiable form or arrangement , they have a sense , 
they mirror some possible arrangement of things; and they 
show that sense. Therefore, the whole group [of arranged 
signs] presents a state of affairs . To the question 
"In what manner does this formed group of n ame signs 
present or show? " the answer is that they show as though 
or as if they were animated. The signs are arranged in 
such a way that it is as though they were comparable to 
the little cars moving in the modeled accident scene that 
Wittgenstein i s reported to have seen d e picted in a 
magazine article . 1 Wittgenstein is suggesting in the 
separate~ (and it i s interesting to notice that it is set 
off as an explanatory phrase and not an essential part of 
the remark) phrase at 4.0311 a way of understanding the 
entire remark. We are to think of the Satze as thoug_h 
they were a series of signs "come alive." 
1 r,. H. von Wright, "BiograJ?hical Sketch," 
reprinte d in Malcolm, Memoir, pp . 7- 8. The following 
entry occurs in the Note books 1914-1916: "In th e propo s i-
tion a world is as it we r e put togethe r expe rimenta lly. 
(As when in the l awcourt in Pari s a motor-car accide nt is 
represented by means of dolls, etc .)'' (29.9.14). 
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One name stands for one thing, another for another 
thing, and they are combined with one another. In 
this way the who l e group -- like a tableau ~ivant 
[wi e ein l e~endes Bild] -- presents a state of 
affairs-( 4,0311 ) , 
I do not think that Wittgenstein intended for us to accept 
such a metaphor as litera lly true . 'rhe Satz i s a "l iving 
picture '' in the sense that as an item indepe ndent of me , 
it performs a feat -- it shows how thing s are. Like a 
scale mode l, the Satz "comes alive " and shows how things 
are or were or will be. 
The defender of Schwyzer ' s interpretation, however, 
may insist that the Satz is a "living picture " because 
S~tze really are acts -- acts of living human beings . 
But I would think that this is not a likely interpretation 
of what Wittgenstein means . If I am correct, then what we 
need to understand i s why Wittgenstein would speak of 
s 'atze or pictures as "living " i terns . at all . The explana-
tion rests, I think, in Wittgenste in's analysis of the 
form of the Satz. It is form which distingui s hes 
Satzeze ichen from Satze ; that is, it is form which permits 
the signs to "come a live " and show some sense . 
The issue is what kind of form makes the signs "as 
if animated ," and why would Wittgenstein th ink that such 
an explana tion i s satisfactory? Regarding the nature of 
pictures (and of Satze , iater in the Tr actatus ), 
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Wittgenstein distinguishes three sorts of form: the 
"pictori a l form" (Form der abbildung , 2 .15) which the 
picture or Satz has in common with what it represents; 
"representational form" (Form der Da rste llung, 2.1 73 ) which 
characterizes only the picture by "giving it a point of 
view'' and does not attr i bute anything t o the object of the 
picture ; and " the form of r e ality" (Form der Wirklichke it, 
2.1 8 ) which is the necessary condition for any set of 
s igns b ecoming a s ign i ficant picture. In order for a 
picture or Satz to presen t some state of affairs it must 
"touch reality ," it must have something in common with 
reality. The form of reality is what permits a series of 
signs to " come alive. " It " animates " a Satz in the 
respect that the form of reality (a l so called "logica l 
form'' by Wittgenstein) permits the series of signs to 
"reach out and touch reality." Wittgenstein does not say 
that the signs are used (by us) to touch reality; rather 
the Satz i s essentially connected to the way things are , 
independent of l anguage u sers. 
Pictorial form is the possibil ity that thing s are 
related to one another in the same way as the elements 
o f the picture (2.1 51 ). 
That i s how a picture i s attached to reality ; it 
reaches r i ght out to it (2.1511). 
These correlations are , as it were, the feelers 
of the picture ' s elements , wilh which the picture 
touches reality ( 2 .1 515 ). 
Thi s c apac ity of the group of signs to touch reality and 
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in so doing to show sense is what Wittgenstein calls the 
logical form of the Sa tz -- it is in fact the defining 
prope rty of a Satz: "a series of signs come alive." As 
we spe ak of c e rtain representational paintings in a gallery 
or of scale models on exhibit, we can speak of Satze as 
though the y were alive -- for they show us a possible 
world. 
The correct reading of 4.0311 has, I think, been 
structure d in the comments above. Because names (na.me -
signs which do refer) a.re in some form or arrangement, 
they are , as~ proposition, capable of presenting their 
sense -- a presenting which includes their both showing 
and saying: 
A proposition corrununica.tes a situation to us, and so 
it must be essentially connected with the situation. 
And the connection is precisely that it is it s logical 
picture (4.03). 
The la.st quotation suggests a further difficulty 
with Schwyzer's position; namely, there are a number of 
claims which appear to constitute firm evidence for the 
position that Wittgenstein does hold some form of 
isomorphism -- i.e. that he does wish to conside r proposi-
tions as items whose structure or for~ etc ., is to be com-
pared to that of the way things are . For instance the 
remarks between 4.001 and 4.016 are particularly difficult 
for Schwyzer's thesis. 
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4.011: At first sight a proposition -- one set out on 
the printed page , for example -- does not seem 
to be a picture of the reality with ~hich it 
is concerned. But no more does musical nota-
tion at first s ight seem to be a picture of 
music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) 
to be a picture of our speech. 
And yet these s i gn-languages prove to be 
pictures, even in the ordinary s e ns e , of what 
they represent. 
4.012: It is obvious that a proposition of the form 
"aRb" strikes us as a picture. In thi s case 
the sign (zeichen ) is obviously a likeness of 
what is signified. 
4.0141: ... That is what constitutes the inner similar-
ity between these things which seem to be con-
structed in such entirely different ways. And 
that rule is the law of projection which pro-
jects the symphony [reality ] into the language 
of musical notation [pictures] ... 
and finally: 
4.016: In order to unders t and the essential [my 
italics] nature of a proposition, we should 
consider hieroglyphic script, which abbi ldet 
the facts that it describes. 
In each of the above, it does not seem to me misleading to 
say that Wittgenstein was asserting . some isomorphism 
between language and the world. 1 
1stenius , "Wittgenstein 's Picture-Theory," p. 320. 
Stenius makes my point clearly enough : 
Now Mr. Schwyzer must of course admit that there 
are numerous statements in the Tractatus where 
"similarity in structure" is indicated as an essent i al 
concept in Wittgenstein's theory of l anguage . But he 
dismi sses them as "atypical " [p. 287). I am afraid 
that in order to be consistent in his terminology Mr. 
Schwyzer would have to dismiss almost a ll of what is 
said on the subject in the Tractatus as "atypical ." 
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The last difficulty I want to notice in Schwyzer ' s 
thes i s is that while he is appar e ntly obliged to claim that 
a ll similar occurrences of " shm·J " are disguis ed or unclear 
ref erences to our showing , I do not find any arguments in 
the Tractatus that support such a reading . Schwyzer makes 
the following attempt to find support in the t ex t: 
We now [Schwyzer is referring to a discussion of 
T.3.02] have a further confirmation of our thesis that 
the picture is the presenting-that. There can be no 
picture withou t a presenting that, a ny more than we 
can have thoughts without th inking . Wittge nstein's 
theory does not compr ise pictures and thoughts and 
presenting and thinking. There is only thinking . 
Some times we think on canvas. 1 
Regrettably the argument fails. It s weaknesses can be seen 
if it i s unpacked in the following way: 
a) we can't h ave thoughts without thinking; 
b) "thought " can be u sed either for the activity 
of intellection or what we might call the 
product of the inte llection; 2 
c) thoughts are the same as thinking; 
d) we c a n't have a p ic ture without a "presenting 
that" ... 
e) we can't u nderstand "pictures " without under -
standing "presenting that" 
f) pictures are the same as pres e nting that. 
Tha t lines (c ) and (f) do not follow from the lines given 
and d emand further support for their justification is 
apparent. Schwyzer fail s to provide tha t support . 
1 Schwyzer , "Picture The ory," p. 281. 
2 r h ave added , for clarification, lines (b) and 
(e ) to Schwyzer ' s argument . 
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Part II 
D. S. S, hwayder traces what he considers the means 
by which Wittgenstein is led to the showing and saying 
distinction. 1 Regrettably, Shwayder is not as rigorous in 
his account of the distinction itself as he is in the 
material we might consider as a prelude to the theory of 
showing and say ing -- for instance , Wittgenstein's 
theories of judgment and picturing. Nevertheless., in what 
follows we will attempt to reconstruct Wittgenstein's 
distinction between saying and showing in terms of 
Shwayde r's careful and thorough footwork. The result 
will, I think, be one of the most plausible and textually 
defendable explications of the showing and related doc-
trines heretofore developed. If the full-blown Shwayder 
account does falter, it will be at just the point at which 
we found Schwyzer's account weak -- namely, an inadequate 
handling of 4.022 and its implied corollaries. 
The main tenets of Shwayder's interpretation of 
the development of the showing doctrine in the Tractatus 
are these: 
a. Wittgenstein restricts the uses of 
language to those involved in asserting; 
b. for Wittgenstein, sentences (S ~tze ) are 
acts of asserting; 
1 Shwayder, "Critical Commentary," p. 14 5 f. 
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c. we cannot talk about significant signs ; 
d. no sentence (Satz ) can say anything 
about itself ;--
e. when we make a statement (when we assert, 
or "when we Satz"), the statement i s 
compl e t e , determinate; 
f. a language composed of such complete and 
d eterminate statements is itse l f complete 
and determinate ; 
g. a closed , determinate and complete, 
language excludes the possibility of a 
meta-language ; 
h. the rules of (the only) language cannot 
be formulated in the language ; 
i. within the closed and complete language 
we must be able to say all that is 
sensible. 
Shwa yder is also aware that, regarding the logic 
of our language , an adequate interpreta tion of the 
Tractatus must permit: 
a. the relation of logical entai lment to 
show itself ; 
b. the d eterminacy and completeness of 
language to show itself; 
c. the statement maker to show himse lf; 
d. the pictorial character of language to 
show; 
e. the truth-functiona l character of 
language to show; and 
f. the psychological and physical condi-
tion s of langua~e to show themselves. 
The determinate sense of a Satz must show both: 
that the Satz is sensible; and what the sense of the Satz 
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is. Shwayder must be able to explain how it is that a 
Satz has a determinate sense which can be said , .but with-
out violating Wittgenstein's r es trictions against saying 
what is shown . 
Shwa yd e r stresses Wittgenstein ' s remark that the 
intent of the showing doctrines is not to preclude 
empirical claims about sentence s igns (philology or 
linguistics etc .), but to prohibit the effort of philos-
ophers and logicians to "get behind'' language and say what 
they discover as its logic -- for what they would say 
about language cannot be said, only shown. 
To investigate the logic of language [of my one 
complete l angu age ] (5. 55) requires that we be able 
meaningfully to formulat e the results of our investiga-
tion. But to be able to do this already presumes 
language and so presumes the logic o f language . We 
cannot put ourselves outside of language in order to 
investigate its logic. The logic must already be 
given -- it must prece~ the l angu age . (5.552, 
5.555) .-- tecall we cannot speak or think illogically 
(3.03, 3.0321) ... [W]e cannot ascribe to langu a ge 
propert i es it cannot have, nor does it make sense to 
ascribe properties it must have (4.123, 4.124). 
Rather we see the logi c of languag e in the us e of 
language (4.125). 1 
Now l et us take up sequentially Shwayder's con-
tributions , l abeled (a)-(i) on pp. 66 and 67. 
a. Wittgenstein restricts the uses of 
language h ere , to only those involved 
in asserting sentences (S Jtze ). 
1 Ibid., pp. 149 B - 150. 
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All meaningful (i. e. , assertional ) discourse 
must be true or false. The most elementary parts 
of that discourse -- as products of ana lysis -- are terms 
which refer to objects (3.2). Sentences are compositions 
of these eleme ntary parts in certain forms, and the union 
of names in form allows us to state a fact. More complex 
elements of m..eaningful discourse are reduced to the more 
simple fact-stating ones by means of a truth-functional 
analysis (5.52) -- an analysis which is only possible 
because all of what Wittgenstein recognized as meaningful 
language is either true or false. Apparently convinced 
that the imperatival, emotive, petitional, etc. , uses of 
language could not be discussed in terms of clear truth 
values, Wittgenstein ignored them. 
Two other conditions may be relevant to 
Wittgenstein's restriction to only assertional uses of 
language . 1) The picture theory ass imilates pictures (as 
mode l s or "linguistic topography") to fact making state-
ments and does not appear to be of much assistance in 
determining how, for instance , a c01mnand or exhortation 
might be understood . 1 And 2) Wittgenstein's effort to get 
our symbolism right, avoiding ambiguous and imprecise 
Irhere is, admittedly, much evidence that 
Wittgenstein was committed to a thesis which considered 
only assertional uses of l anguage prio~ to his account of 
a picturing theory. (See our Chapter V.) 
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signs of expression, obliged him to find a correct nota-
tion. Thi s correct notation (what some , following 
Rus se ll , have called Wittgenstein's effort to develop a 
"logica lly perfe ct language ") is not intended for an ideal 
language but evide ntly reveals Wittgenstein ' s conception 
of our actual language. For example , we are told that a 
meaningful assertion does have one and on l y one complete 
ana l ysis; moreover , the sense of that assertion is deter-
minate -- exact and not obscured by the notation. What 
one could rightly think i s "ideal " is not Wittgenstein ' s 
characterization of the assertional use of language , but 
that this characterization is applicable to a ll of those 
other uses of l anguage he ignores in the Tractatus.l 
There i s , it seems , nothing arbitrary about Wittgenstein ' s 
view here . If i t is true that the only way to make clear 
the meaning of words is to use them in fact stating dis-
course; and if it i s t rue that names , as t he resu ltant of 
analysis, make sense only in the context of fact stating 
discourse ; and if t he on l y way to get at the way things 
are , as the refe rents of names and sentences , is by making 
assertions; then Wittgenstein i s obliged to have a world 
consist i ng in facts as the metaphysica l ob j ect of sentences. 
He is committed to a l ogic which , as a study of ass e rtions 
1That even the assertional uses of language do not 
function as character ize d in the Tractatus is of course~ 
central t h eme of Wittge nste in ' s l a ter writings . 
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alone , characterizes both language (a s he restricts it) 
and reality. Moreover, this logic must show in our use of 
fact stating expressions. 
b. Sentences (Satze ) are "overt acts of 
asserting." 1 
This is one of the most debatable tenets of 
Shwayder's analys is, and one we have already discussed 
in connection with Schwyzer. Shwayder's interpretation 
of Sitze as acts of asserting was initia lly constructed in 
his 1954 Oxford dissertation and has been restated in 
Mind, 1963 (a criticism of Stenius), and again in Inquiry, 
1964 (a criticism of Griffin: Wittgenstein's Logical 
Atomism, Oxford, 1964). The following quotations reveal 
Shwayder's position most clearly: 
1) Every picture is a presentation (D arstellung ) that 
such and such is the case; and every presentation 
that such and such is the case is a picture; a 
presentation that such and such is the case is an 
act of thinking that such and such is the case; it 
is an act, whether or not overt, of asserti ng .... 
[A] Satz is an overt picture, an overt act of 
asserting .... A Wittgensteinian Satz is not a 
sentence but a thought made manifest (3, 3.1) .... 
Thoughts are pictures and every Satz is a thought 
(3, 3.5, 4, 4.01, 4.06) .... Every picture is a 
presentation that such and such; in presenting 
such and such it has a sense. Consequently, every 
picture must have a sense and every picture must be 
"adequate " for we do not know what picture it is 
until we know its sense (4.032) .... We may analyze 
a presentation as a presenting that such and such 
truth conditions are fulfilled (4.022, 4.063). We 
fix the identity of the picture by specifying the 
1 shwayder , "Review ," p. 306. 
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truth c o nditions to b e fulfill ed. A presenting 
tha t s u c h and s u c h t r uth-conditio n s a r e fulfill ed 
is a presen ta tion as fact, a s a s t a te of ·a f fa ir s , 
a s r eality (4.01, 4.022, 4.031). If wha t a picture 
presen ts a s f a ct i s f act, the picture i s true 
(2.222, 4.05 ). To b e a picture, i. e . to p resent 
a s f a ct is to r e present the world as b e ing so 
(2.201, 4.022) .... The picture theory the refor e is 
a theory of presenting a s the c ase i.e. it is a 
the ory of a sser tion and not a the o r y of "propo s i-
tiona l conte nt" (3.13, 4.062, 4.063, 4.064) .1 
2) A s ign that i s a pplie d a s a Satz-sign is a Satz 
and a Satz is a picture ; but any picture (e v ery 
picturer-Ts a thought. A thought is a complex of 
me nta l, "inte ntional" eleme nt s , e.g. r e f e r e nc e s to 
obj ec t s . The thought ma y be embodie d or e xpre s sed 
in signs , and the n the thought is a Sa tz, and the 
signs take n toge the r c o ns titute a Sa t z -sign. 
Acc ording to thi s , thoughts and picture s and al s o 
Satze a r e me nta l complexes . But thi s doe s not 
imply the p s ychologi s tic the ory tha t logic is part 
of p s ychology any more tha n the othe r view that 
Satz e are inscriptions of carbon implie s the 
mine ralogistic the or? tha t logic is part of the 
study of mine ralogy. 
3) In the Tr a cta tu s , the idea of a picture is intro-
duce d b e for e the idea of a Sat z . This encoura ges 
[one ] to think tha t the notion of a Satz is a 
spe cialization of the notion of a picture . [One 
could] al s o appear [ s ] to think tha t the p a rt of the 
Satz which picture s is the sign and not the Ge d a nke 
embodi e d in the sign. But Wittge n s t e in says tha t 
the logical picture is the Ge dank e , and the Ge d a nke 
is the Satz, and e very pictur~.rs- 11 a u c h e in 
logisch~ (T 3. , 4., 2.182). In short,~ think 
that the Tra ctatus notions o f Bild, Sa tz and Ge d a nk e 
are almo st co-exte n s ive . (The only dif fe r e nceis 
that a Satz is a thought or picture emobdie d in 
signs .) Griffin take s the Ans comb e vi ew tha t first 
we form a picture a nd the n we cau se it to r e present 
some thing by a ss igning u ses to the occ urring 
pictorial ele me nts. This some how l e ads him to the 
idea that a picture can have a s e n se without b e ing 
either true or fal se , eve n though, a s Wittge nste in 
1 Ibid. 
2 shwayd e r, "Ge g e n s t a nde a nd Other Ma tte r s ," 
I~ui~ , 7, 1964, pp-:---TIS -396 .-
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explains it, the sense is the truth-conditions of 
the picture. Al lowing that there are intimations 
of such a view in the Notebooks, it seems to me 
perfectly evident that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein 
was holding that a picture is (as I would summarize 
it) an assertional presentation of putative fact. 1 
4) The sense of a statement is not something apart 
from the statement , rather it shows forth when we 
make a statement. It is even misleading to say 
that we assert the sense of the sentence , for the 
assertion or the saying is the sentence (Satz ). 
Therefore that which is judged is not apart from 
the judgment; nor is the judger apart from the act . 
There i s no such entity as the "judging I" (5.5421, 
5.6). At best the judge is just another feature 
(shared with other judgments) of the single 
indivisible act. We see that something is asserted 
to be the case and that someone is asserting in any 
judgment (assertion ) when we understand any 
assertion. 2 
5) So too, the picture as Wittgenstein sometimes but 
not always puts it, in being a presentation of 
sense, is an act of presenting sense , and not the 
sense itself ; but it must s how that it is a pre-
sentation of sense and what sense it i s a presenta-
tion of (4.022). It presents what it shows , if it 
does, not because the showing and the presenting 
are the same , but because it shows that it presents 
such and such; one does not in presentation, p, 
present that this i s presentation, p, i.e., in 
asserting pone does not asser t that he is assert-
ing p (4.1212) .... A picture is a thought (Gedanke) 
and a thought is a thinking that such and sucl_1 __ 
(3.02). It is not, as with Frege, the Sinn thought. 
Nor is it what Moore calls a "proposition ," and 
even l ess is it a sentence . Wittgenstein, in a 
letter to Russell, made it entirely explicit that 
a thought was something psychological. A picture 
is a mental act, whether or not overt, of thinking 
that such andsuch is the case. A picture i s a 
presentation of such and such by being a presenting 
of such and such. This is why I equate pictures 
with assertions , for these are acts of saying (out-
ward thinking) that such and such is the case. 
1 Ibid., p. 393. 
2 shwayder , "Critical Commentary," p . 118. 
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Satze, in the full sense, seem to be such overt 
presentations (3.1, 4) . 1 
The textu a l basis for Shwayder's position here i s 
impressive. That in the 'l,r acta tu s every Satz is an 
assertion gains support from at l eas t the following: 
i) a Satz is an expression of sense (4.4); 
ii) a Satz is a thought out and applied sign 
(3-:s;-3.262); -
iii) in making a statement ["Satzing"J we 
arrange the signs (3.1432, 4.031); 
iv) we use Sa t z to say things stand in a 
certain way (4,062); 
and v) a Satz "states ," it "communicates" (4.03) 
If we reca ll that a Satz is a thought (4) and it is a 
"picture of reality" (4.01) the n we are close to under-
standing why we cannot consider a Satz apart from its 
sense -- as we could not cons ider a picture ap~rt from 
picturing something, nor a thought apart from thinking 
something. To be a picture is to d e pict some thing; nor 
would it make sense to talk of a thought without thinking; 
hence the Satz as the act of asserting sense, c a nnot be 
separated from that asserting. However, to infer that the 
Satz is ide ntical with the assertion tha t some state of 
affair s hold s is to do what we criticized Schwyzer for doing. 
Shwayder h as not suppli e d an argume nt capable of d emon-
strating t.he ide ntity of Satze with "asser ting of sens e ." 
1 Shwayder , "Review ," p. 307. 
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The transition (2.1 - 3 - 3.1 - 4 - 4.01), Shwayder 
suggest s , from picture to thought (as mental piciture ) to 
Satz is evidence of Wittgenstein's denial of some type of 
"content" theory of judgment.I As the quoted excerpts (3) 
and (4) indicate, the Satz is not just a Satzzeichen which 
stands in some peculiar relation to the expressing of a 
thought, nor is the Satz some "thing" which is a content 
of some act of denial, or judgm~nt, or assertion, etc.; 
rather, as we have seen, the Satz is the thought -- it is 
the assertion. Since there is no separation of judgment 
or assertion (a s act) from sense (as content), the logic 
of l anguage must show in Satzing. For instance, without 
the act-content separation, we cannot speak of the sense 
apart from the assertion, there is no thing like a 
Moorean proposition waiting to be asserted or denied or 
entertained. 2 
c. We cannot talk ab6ut a significant 
sign by using other signs . 
d. No Satz can say anything about itself . 
To support his interpretation Shwayder cites: 
3.142: 
3.144: 
Only facts can express a sense, a set of 
names cannot. 
Situations can be described but not given 
names . Names are like points; propositions 
like -arrows -- they have sense. 
1 Shwayder, "Critical Commentary," p. 123. 
2 G. E. Moore, "Propositions ," Some Main Problems 
of Philosophy, New York, 1953, p. 66 f. 
3.221: 
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Objects can only be named . Signs are their 
representatives. I c an only speak about them: 
I c annot put them into words . Propositions 
can only say how things are , not what the y are. 
In the context of the Tractatus , i f we are to consider 
what sort of thing a Satz is, then Wittgenstein provides 
us with two categories of classifica tion: "facts " or 
"obj ec ts." We are e nti t l ed , Shwayder c l aims , to infe r 
from 3.142, 3.144, 3.221, t ogether with these (a ) and (b), 
above tha t Satze themselves a r e facts, a nd as facts they 
are asserted but not named (an object would be name d but 
not asserted ). Therefore , if "ta lk about" is understood 
in (c ) to mean "refers to" (in the manner in which a n ame 
i s s a id to refer to an obj e ct), then, Shwayder argues , 
Wittgens t e in prohibits "ta lking abou t s·atze " by u sing 
other signs (e.g ., n ames ) . 1 
The remark (d) i s not an inference on Shwayder's 
part but is wholly textually bas ed. Wittgenstein h e ld the 
truth of 3.33 2 as the only reason for t aking seriously a 
theory of types . 
1Shwayder , "Critica l Commentary," p . 144. In 19 54 
Shwayder argued that Wittgenste in also prohibited us from 
"talking about " sen t e nce signs (Satzzeichen). One would 
have assumed that Satzzeichen were "objects ," in the 
Wittgens t eini an sense , and could be name d ("talked about"). 
Shwayder argued , h owever , that what is meant by Satzzeichen 
in the Tractatu~-; are signs us ed in a l anguage . As u sed in 
a lang u age , •:fractatean Satzzeichen were significant signs 
and therefor e could not be "ta l ked about ." Shwayder does 
not repeat this argument in his more r ecent essays. 
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3.332: No proposition (Satz ) c a n make a statement 
about it s~_lf , b ecause a propos itiona l sign 
(S a tzz e ichen ) cannot be conta ined iri itse lf. 
The di scussion o f the inadequac i es of a theory of types 
was d eve l oped ear ly in the pre-Tractatean mate rials; 
however , that type diff erences do hold is consistently 
supported in the early Wittgenstein writings . 1 When we 
assume that the sense of a Sa tz is part of, or an aspect 
of the Satz itself the n (c) and (d), if true, h ave the 
effect of guarantee ing that the sense of any Sa tz, if it 
is to b e communicated at all, must be conununica ted by some 
other means than by being said , whether by itself or by 
any othe r Satz. The a lte rnatives which seem poss ible for 
Wittge n stein in order to account for the communication of 
a sensible propo s ition are the u se of a me ta-language to 
say the Sat~1 or a doctrine of showing in which the s ense 
of a Satz shows (publicly) . Before r emoving as an al t erna-
ti ve the meta-language route , the d e terminate character 
and comp l e t e ness of any Satz must be mentioned . 
e. A Satz has a complete a nd determin a t e 
sens e . 
The arguments needed here break down into those 
supporting the truth of (e ) for e l eme ntary propos itions 
and those for complex proposi tions. Regarding e l ementary 
1 see Ch ap t e r V. 
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propositions the argument can be presented as follows:l 
i) Satzze ichen have as composing elements names, 
which are related in a definite way. 
3.14: What constitutes a propositional 
sign is that in it its elements 
(the words) stand in a determinate 
relation to one another. 
ii) S~tze (even elementary ones) are expressed 
thoughts. 
iii) The objects of the expressed thought have 
a determinate relationship to the organized 
Satzzeichen. 
3.2: In a proposition a thought can be 
expressed in such a way that elements 
of the propos i tional sign correspond 
to the objects of the thought. 
iv) Each Satz is a picture, and as a picture 
is definite; it is of something and it is 
a complete picture. Moreover, the elements 
of a picture represent objects. 
2.131: In a picture the elements of the 
picture are the representatives of 
objects. 
2.14: What constitutes a picture is that 
its elements are related to one 
another in a determinate way. 
v) Names, as the elements of a Satzzeichen 
stand for things, one name for one thing 
4.0311: One name stands for one thing, 
another for another thing, and 
they are combined with one 
another. 
vi) From i), iv), and v) we are to understand 
that names are connected together in a 
particular manner in order to present 
like a "living picture" -- some state of 
lshwayder's general account of this material occurs 
in "Critical Commentary," pp. 183-200. 
79 
affairs. In the case of elementary pro-
positions, an atomic fact is presented. 
4.0311: 
2.15: 
In this way the whole group --
like a tableau vivant -- presents 
a state of affairs . 
The fact that the e l ements of a 
picture are related to one another 
in a determinate way represents 
that things are related to one 
another in the same way. 
vii) A picture represents (darstellf - ), its 
sense; so from vii) and vifapicture 
presents an atomic fact as the sense of 
an elementary Satz. 
2.221: What a picture represents is its 
sense . 
viii) The components of elementary situations 
are objects which have a determinate 
relationship to one another. 
2.031: In a state of affairs objects 
stand in a determinate relation 
to one another. 
We may conclude that a sentence sign is a definite connec-
tion of names; and the Satz presents something perfectly 
definite : viz., the particular combination of objects 
correspond ing to its constituent n ames . Moreover, the 
elementary Satz can have only one sense -- can present 
only one combination of objects -- because, each Satz must 
have only one determinate and complete analysis. That is, 
there is only one completely truth functional interpreta-
tion of the Satz sign, and this analysis shows what must 
obtain. Since each Satz must be true or false, a truth 
table will show the complete range of truth functional 
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interpretation of the Satz sign. One linear . column in 
that tabl e will show what actual l y does obtain. 
3.23: 
3. 25: 
The requirement that simple signs 
be possible is the r equirement 
that sense be determinate. 
A proposition h as one and only one 
complete analysis . 
3.3442: Nor does analysis resolve the sign 
for a complex in an arbitrary way: 
for instance it would not h ave a 
different resolution every time that 
it was incorporated in a different 
proposition. 
f. Complex propositions may be analyzed in 
a similar way: 1 
i) All propositions (S~tz e ) are in some 
specifiable way based totally on 
elementary ones such that, in the 
Tracta tus, all S~tze are truth functions 
of the elementary ones. 
4.51: Suppose that I am given all 
elementary propositions: then I 
can simply ask what propositions 
I can construct out of them. And 
then I have all propositions and 
that fixes their limit s . 
4.52: Propositions comprise all that 
follows from the totality of all 
elementary propositions ... (Thu s , 
in a c er tain sense, it could be 
said that all propositions were 
gener a lizations of eleme ntary pro-
positions ). 
5.: A proposition is a truth-function 
of elementary propositions. 
1There are leve ls of complex ity not here discussed. 
For instance "generalized propositions" or what 
Wittgenstein calls "entire ly general propositions," are 
mentione d at 5.5262 and 4.411 but are not being considered 
here. 
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ii) Because every proposition can be written 
in terms of elementary ones , then from 
the given of all elementary propositions 
all other propositions can be constructe d. 
6.001: What this says is just that every 
proposition is a result of suc-
cessive applications to elementary 
propositions of the operation 
N ( f ). 
iii) The sense of a proposition is its agree -
ment or disagreement with the possible 
existent or non-existent state of affairs . 
This agreement or disagreement dictates 
the truth conditions of the proposition, 
the possible worlds in which the proposi-
tion would b e true or false; the sense of 
any proposition is its truth conditions. 
4.2: The sense of a proposition is its 
agreement and disagreeme nt with 
possibilities of existence and non-
existence of states of affairs. 
4.3: Truth-possibilities of elementary 
propositions mean possibilities of 
existence and non-existence of 
states of affairs . 
4.4: A proposition is an expression of 
agreement and disagreeme nt with 
truth possibilities of elementary 
propositions. 
From i), ii) and iii), and given al l elementary 
propositions, then the truth conditions of any proposition 
can be established . It is possible to pres e nt a truth-
table which would ensure that every proposition has a 
definite, specifiab le sense (truth value). 
Tne three remaining tenets of Shwayder's inter-
pretation are these: 
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g. A closed and complete language excludes 
the possibility of meta-language. 
h. The rules of a closed and complete 
language cannot be formulated in the 
language. 
i. The closed and complete language must 
make clear all that "lies behind" every 
assertion in the language. 
All of these last tenets of Shwayder's interpretation 
of Wittgenstein's showing doctrine speak to much the same 
point. The whole of meaningful (assertional, truth-
functional) discourse is closed, and complete. There is 
only one language for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. 
As we saw above, the whole of language (the language) can 
be built from the set of elementary propositions. To this 
extent, language is rigorously limited. It is limited to 
what can be meaningfully asserted or to what has a truth 
value. That it has these limits, and the limits them-
selves, cannot be formulated in language. 
In order that you should have a language which can 
express or say everything that can be said, this 
language musr-have certain properties [limits]; 
and when this is the case, that it has them can no 
longer be said in that language or in any language. 1 
We can, therefore, never be in a position to devise a 
theory encompassing all of language, for such a theory can-
not be said (asserted) in the language, since there is 
only one ianguage. Moreover, if the effort is made to 
1 L. Wittgenstein, "Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore," 
in Notebooks 1914-1916, p. 107. 
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distinguish levels of language, so as to say 
something of 
the whole of the logic of language from some 
meta-level, 
_1 is some cons rue e language, in 
then what would be needecJ · t t d 
0rder to make that assertion. But all such "constructed 
languages" would be illogical, i.e., impossible to con-
struct. 
For what the construction must go beyond,or be 
about, is all language. 
It seems that Wittgenstein must rely on a doctrine 
of showing, rather than on meta-levels of language , ideal 
languages, etc., to give an adequate account of both the 
conditions which must be met in order to make an assertion 
in language and the possibility of corrununicating the sense 
of an assertion. 
Shwayder has no difficulty explaining Wittgenstein's 
th
e sis regarding how the formal features of language show. 
[T)o investigate the logic of language -- of my one 
complete l anguage -- requires that we be able mean-
ingfully to formulate the results of our investiga-
tions. But to be able to do this already presumes 
language and so presumes the logic of l an~uage-.-~ 
~annot put ourselves outside of l anguage in order to 
investigate its logic -- the logic must be already 
given. It must prece(691 the language .
1 
In this context, ''i s given" is a synonym for "shows itself." 
What shows includes : the pictorial character of language, 
it s truth functional character, its determinacy and com-
pleteness, and even some of it• psychological and physical 
--------------------------------------
1 shwayder, "Critical commentary," P· 149 B. 
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pre-conditions, e.g., the identity of the statement maker. 
Regarding these aspects, it is clear that they cannot be 
said, according to the Tractatus. 
Shwayder does see some serious objections to this 
position of Wittgenstein's: 
The showing doctrine is false, for we obviously 
can and do talk about the logic of language. What 
shows may also be said to hold or not ... What 
Wittgenstein wants to show and not be said are usually 
just those items we would want only to show, e.g.: 
logical entailment, that a given name refers to a 
certain object, who the statement maker is ... The 
purpose of a showing doctrine would apparently be to 
avoid: platonizing logical objects, or introducing 
mysteriously indefinable "comcepts," or talking about 
"ideal" objects, or appealing to transcendental 
principles ... The major argument against "showing" 
would be to recognize that language is not a closed 
and determinate system ... [a further objection would be 
to see that] what can be said, can be shown, e.g. we 
can say (as well as show) who's making the staternent. 1 
However, like other conunentators, Shwayder does have dif-
ficulty in getting clear on the application of the showing 
thesis to statements with sense. As we have indicated at 
several places the center of the difficulty is in giving 
an exposition of 4.022 ("A proposition shows how things 
are if it is true. And it says tha1=_ they do so stand") 
an exposition that must be understandable in light of a 
number of other assertions, including 4.1212 ("What can be 
shown, cannot be said"). 
An analysis of Shwayder's position reveals that he 
1 rbid., pp. 303-305. 
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assumes that at 4.022."presents" is an adequate translation 
of sag1=_; he also assumes that there is no real difference 
in meaning between "I say" and "the Satz says." A third 
assumption made by Shwayder is that one can't "present 
that" without "presenting what." Shwayder states his 
position in the following way: 
We may analyze a presentation as a presenting that 
such and such truth-conditions are fulfilled. 1 
So too, the picture, as Wittgenstein sometimes but not 
always puts it, in being a presentation of sense, is 
an act of presenting sense, and not the sense itself; 
but it must show that it is a presentation of sense 
and what sense it is a presentation of (4.022). It 
presents what it shows, if it does, not because the 
showing and the presenting are the same (as some have 
interpreted Wittgenstein to be saying), but because 
it shows that it presents such and such; one does not 
in presentation, p, present that this is presentation, 
p, i.e., in asserting pone does not assert that he is 
asserting p (4.1212) . 2 
Wittgenstein's position at 4.022 ("A proposition 
shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if 
it is true. And it says that they do so stand") would be 
given the following interpretation by Shwayder: "Says 
that" is to be understood as "presents," and "presents" 
is to be understood as a synonym for "asserts." Therefore, 
the Satz asserts that things do stand in just the way the 
Satz shows things would stand if it were true. Since there 
is little difference between the meaning of "my saying" 
1 Shwayder, "Review," p. 306. 
2 rbid., p. 307. 
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and "the Satz saying" then we could also conclude that we 
asser'l::_ that things do stand in just the way the Satz shows 
they would stand, if true. Whether it is the Satz saying 
or our saying, Shwayder appears to think that S~tze are 
assertional acts. 
Shwayder, unlike Schwyzer, does admit that 
Wittgenstein is not wholly rigorous regarding the view 
that a Satz is an act or assertion. 1 What the analysis 
of S~tze as assertions does represent, Shwayder claims, 
is the most defensible alternative for explicating several 
difficulties in Wittgenstein's showing thesis. 
The showing of sense mentioned at 4.022 was in 
Schwyzer's reading a matter of our showing; while for 
Shwayder, the showing of sense is a characteristic of the 
Satz its elf. The Satz_ shows its sense by showing how 
things would stand if it is true -- by showing itself, as 
it were, as a line in a truth table. 
"A proposition is the expression of its truth-
conditions'' {4.431). The saying at 4.022 is discussed as 
an instance of our saying by Schwyzer; for Shwayder, the 




Schwyzer adjusted 4.022 to 4.1212 by arguing that 
4.022 was "disguised " and needed proper reformulation. 
The r e formulation of 4.022 would make it clear that we 
show with a Sat:2'._ , and , thought Schwyzer, the incompat-
ibility of 4.022 and 4.1212 would then be avoided. 
Shwayde r ' s solution take s a very different route: 
is simply false, Shwayder writes, if Wittgenstein 
intende d it to refer to Satz.l 
4.1212 
Finally, we h ave seen that both Shwayder and 
Schwyzer agree that the showing involved in the showing 
that a Satz is sensible is not a case which violates the 
general restriction at 4.1212. The Satz shows that it 
says that things stand in such and such a way, and what 
is thus shown cannot be said. 
lshwayder, "Critical Comme ntary," p. 303. 
CHAPTER III 
The Doctrine of Showing in the Tractatus 
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The program of this chapter will be to develop 
and justify the contentions that there is more than one 
doctrine of showing and saying at work in the Tractatus; 
and that the structure of at least one of the theses about 
showing and saying entails that certain important demands 
be made of language. Moreover, with appeal only to 
Wittge nstein's own remarks, this chapter will consist of 
an exposition and analysis of the saying arid showing 
materials which responds to the difficulties we structured 
in the first chapter (pages 2-6). As will be recalled, 
the major difficulties in formulating an adequate inter-
pretation included these: 
a) The interpretation must reconcile the assertions 
that a Satz both shows :a."'c\ so..'/,; some_+~;"'i (4.022) with the 
restriction at 4.1212 that what shows cannot be said. 
b) We must be ab l e to understand Wittgenstein's 
assertion that propositions show logical form (4.121) and 
understand his claim that only some (the sensible ) prop-
ositions show their sense (4.022 and 4.461). These 
remarks of Wittgenstein lead us to believe that two dif-
ferent kinds of things are being shown. If so , then we 
need to understand how a proposition shows that difference. 
c) Both 4.022 and 4.1212 must be reconciled with 
the assertion that the sense of a Satz is affirmed . We 
must b e able to reconcile the assertion that a proposition 
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say s that they do 
shows h ow thing s stand if it is true and 
so stand (4.022) with the assertion tha t 
every propositio n 
it cannot be give n a sense by 
must already have a sense: 
affirmation ( 4.064). 
By ma king the interpre tation and ana lysis in the 
ma nner to follow , I think the problems we di scove r e d 
in the inte rpretations of Pitcher , Black, Ste nius, schwyzer 
and Shwayder will not arise. 
Part I 
With "show" or "showi ng" , as with many philosophi-
cally relevant terms, it may be h e lpful to remind our-
s e lve s tha t the re is often avai l able more than one group-
ing or cate gory of its use. Wha t follows is an elucidation 
of two such groupings. Most uses of "show" will fall 
under one or the other of them. The purpose of classify-
ing the u ses of " show " will be to uncover a distinction 
which I think Wittgenstein does make in the Tractatus, but 
not carefully. The distinction is borne out in the 
textual examples of " showing " for it is as easily ma d e in 
Germa n as it is in English; and the distinction is one 
which makes a conside rable differe nce to any appreciation 















to y " 
to y by of II means u 
how to s II 
that Q ;.,, i3 II 
Bl· " a shows its B" or "the B of L'( s h ows " 
B2. "tl1at th· · l f " is i s an Eng li sh phrase shows i tse · 
B3. ntha t x cannot pronounce ' Missis s ippi' s hows ." 
The fo ur "A" expressions are examp l es of what 
might be called the demons t rat i ve uses of " s how." To call 
them " demonstrative" amounts to indicat ing , on l y , tha t 
these uses usually function to refer to presenting some -
thing. Secondly, with any of the A forms an agent i s per-
forming or doing the showing. Th ird l y , there is built 
i nto these demonstrativ e uses some not i on of an audience 
wh ich rece i v e s the pres e ntation . Fina lly, in a ll four A 
uses there is no restriction on saying what i s shown. In 
each case we h ave no reason to think that what x shows can 
not a l so be told or told about or t augh t 
or demonstra t ed by x. 
b y exp l aining 
When the examp l es are considered independently, 
additiona l clarificati on can be made . 
Re A l: "x shows a toy" 
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i) There is no necessary condition of a 
conscious agent (x ) t6 do the showing. 
E.g. "the map shows the e l evation of Mt. 
Everest to its reader." 
2) The aud i ence (y) need not be deter -
minate -- i.e., no individual need be s ingled out by x. 
3) There may be no need for the audience 
(y) to be a conscious agent . It is not necessary , for 
example, to render (s 1 ) "the reflected light of our moon 
shows toward Venus " as equivalent to (s
2
): "if one (a 
conscious agent) were on Venus h e would see the reflec t ed 
light of our moon." All tha t is demanded here is that 
the showing be directed to some obj ect. 
Re A2: "x shows (3 toy by means of a " 
This use of "show" might be t ermed the "pedagog-
ica l" u se for there does u s u a lly appear to b e some intent 
on b e h a lf of x to instruct y by u s ing a. The u se of a is, 
however , as a means -- (for instance , as a mode l) to make 
clear some point (or object) (3 . Usu a lly, both the 
audi e nce and the age nt in this c ase are obliged to b e c o n -
scious agents though not necessarily human. (See the 
exampl e b e low.) If both x and y were not consciou s it 
would not nake sen se to t a lk of the intention of x to have 
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y see the instructional "point," t · 
e-c. , of using a to 
illus t rates. 
E.g. "The go shows , with the f(\OVing of the 
ground, his impatience to the man ." 
Re A3: "x h h sows y ow to S" 
1) Like Al, there i s no need here for x to be an 
intellige nt agent. 
E.g. "The diagram shows you how to sew that 
stitch." 
2) This use of show does appear to demand that it be 
possible that y can dos. That is, it must be more than 
possible for (logica lly possible) y to do S; rather, there 
must be generally adrniss .i ble evidence -- some reason to 
think y can dos. We do not for example, say "Smith 
showed the wall how to play the flute"; nor for the 
reason above, do we al low, "Smith showed his infant son 
how to play the flute." When asked, "What are you doing, 
Smith?" it is inappropriate for Smith to respond " showing 
my infant son how to play the flute," even though what 
Smith is doing may be just what he does when, with the 
student in his studio, he appropriately says, "showing my 
student how to play the flute." What all that is presup-
posed is the capacity to take instruction , to be able to 
follow x's example. 
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Re A4: 
11x shows y that ... :.a is. B, ." 
1) With this use of the word "showing," we are to under-
stand the showing of facts, which is the most central of 
uses for our interests. There is no need for an intelli-
gent agent (x); e.g., "the experiment can show th t 
y - a •••• " 
But that y be conscious (i. e., be capable of taking 
instruction) does seem to be demanded. 
"The picture 
showed him that the treasure was under the rock." "Her 
remark showed him that she no longer cared." "The argu-
ment shows us that no even integer preceeds '2' ." 
The second set of expressions , Bl - B3, could be 
called the "reflexive" or "show itself " uses. These uses 
need not involve either agent or audience. The general 
form of Bl - B3 is " a shows its 13" or "the B of a shows 
itself." rt shows itself regardless of any x or y 
"The 13 of a shows itself," 
either showing or being shown. 
is not equivalent to any showing use of form Al - A4; for 
example, "the 
13 
of a shows itself" (Bl) is not equivalent 
For instance, consider the 
to" , x shows y that a is B·' 
case where B = validity of an argument, and a= the argu-
ment. we certainly don't mean by, "the validity of the 
argument shows (is apparent ~ that some agent shows that 
Validity to some Y· For the former could be true even if 
no one did what is demanded by the latter. Moreover, as 
uses do demand audiences and more often 
W'e have noted , A 
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than not,audi e nces cap~J)le off 11 · 
u. ·o owing rules or programs. 
But "B" us e s do no make such a demand. B showing s are 
succe ssful regardless of audiences . 
82 and B3 are cited not because they characterize 
independent forms of B; rather, their purpose is to shed 
some light on whe ther or not the "showing itself" use 
marks a prohibition against saying what shows itself. 
The remark at B2 , "'I'hat this is an English phrase shows 
itsel~' shows itself as true. For us to say it is true 
would appear redundant, but it i s not impossible for us to 
do it. The remark at B3 ("That x can't pronounce 
'Mississippi' shows 11 ), has I think, the structure of showing 
itself as true when it is true,with the odd condition that 
x cannot say B3 correctly. So in this case B3 cannot be 
said by x but only shown, although B3 could be said by 
some y. We will have to find a sound example of B which 
cannot be said by either x or y, though -it does show itself 
to x and y; such a case may be necessary to clarify the 
intent of Wittgenstein's remark at 4.1212: "What can be 
shown, cannot be said." 
The purpose of the above distinction between what 
we have labeled " demonstrative" and "reflexive" uses of 
"show" is to make possible a consistent reading of the 
various sorts of things Wittgenstein hims e lf says about 
· l We w1· 11 be ob].1' ged to talk of showing and what is s1own . 
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two showing doctrines or at l east of a doctrine of two 
showing s ; for we have noticed that what we say by means of 
one set of showing uses i s not what we say by means of the 
other. If you like, we have at l east two categories of 
showing. We have at least two senses of " show" reflecti"q 
differences in what is shown. 
Two tables follow. I shall explain each. The 
first table indicates other German expressions than zeigen 
(whi ch is, in the Tractatu~ , the most prominent of terms 
u sed to express "show") occasionally used by Wi ttgen s t ein 
for apparently no other reasons than styl .istic ones. 
There is no evidence that Wittgenstein's choice among 
these alternatives reflects an intention to distinguish 
between the two showing uses. The second table arranges 
the textual examples of the different uses of " show " which 
we have ear lier indicated could be found in the Tractatus. 
Tab l e l German expressions for "show": 
a. anzeigen ("indicated" ) 6.124 
b • spiege-ln ( "mirror I II II reflect II) 4 .121 
c. speigel f\ -sich ("mirrors itself") 4.121 
d. Spiegelbild ("mirror image ") 6.13 
e. aufwelzen("display, 11 "show forth") 2.172, 4.121 
f. nachzuweisen (we "demonstrate, " "show ") 6. 53 
g. darstellen ("represent" ) 6.124 
h. ansehen ([by] "inspection ") 6.122 
i. sichausdrucken (" expresses itself" [in l anguage ]) 
4.121 
j. aus sag~n (" speaks " [for itself]) 6.124 
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Table 2 
A uses, or d emonstrative uses, of " show"-related· 
terms. 
1) (4. 0621) "But it is important that th . · 
'p' and • - p• can say the same thing For i't h e sigr:is 
. . -. - . · • s ow s [ z e 1 gt ] that nothing i n reality corresponds to the sign ,-,.~,,-~-
2) (5. 5421) "'This shows [ zeigt] too th t th -
1
· s 
l . tl 1 l ~- a ere no such t11ng as -1e sou -- t1e subject , etc. __ as it is 
conceived in the superficial psychology of the present 
day. II 
3) (6.126) "Of course this way of showing 
[zeigen] that the.propositi?ns ?f logic are tautologies is 
not at all essential to logic, if only because t~e prop-
o sitions from which the proof starts must show [&~~-~ ] ze1.gen_ without any proof that they are tautologies." 
4) (6.1264) "A proposition that has sense states 
something, which is shown [ zeig ·-t .  ] by its proof to be so . 
In logic every proposition i s the form of a proof. 
Buses, or reflexive uses, of "show" -re lated verb: 
1) 
be said. " 
( 4 12 12 ) 11 What b h [ . ~ es own gezeigt] cannot 
2) (5.24) "An operation manifests itself in a 
variablei it shows [zeigt ] how we can get from one form 
of proposition to another." 
3) (5.5561) "Empirical reality is limited by the 
totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest 
[zeigt sich] in the totality of elementary propositions." 
4) (5.62) "For what the solipsist means is quite 
correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest 
[ zeigt sich] 11 
5) ( 6. 23) "If two expressions are combined by 
means of the sign of equality , that means that they can be 
substituted for one another. But it must be manifest 
[sich zeigen] in the two expressions themselves whether 
this is the case or not." 
6) (6.36) "If there were a l aw of causality, it 
might be put in the following way: There are laws of 
B t f Cou rse that cannot be said : it make s nature. u- o _ 










) "There are, indeed, things that cannot 
into words. They make themselves manifest [zeigt 
They are what is mystical." 
8
) (6 . 127) "All the propositions of logic are of 
equal ~tatus: it is not the cas~ that some of them are 
essentially primitive propositions and others essenti a lly 
der ~ved propo~it ~ons. Ev~ry tautology itself s hows 
[ze1gt ] that 1t 1s a tautology." 
form: . 
9
). ( 4: 121) "Propos i t i ons cannot represent l ogica l 
it is mirrored [ sp i ege lt sich ] in them. " 
10 ) (4 . 1211) "Thus one propos ition ' fa' shows 
[zeigt] that the object 'a' occurs in it s sense , two prop-
ositions 'fa' and 'ga' show [ze i gt ] that the same object 
is mentioned in both of them. If two propos it ions contra-
dict one another , then their structure- shows [zeigt] i t; 
the same i s true if one of them follows from the other, and so on." 
11) ( 4 .126 ) "When something falls under a formal 
concept as one of its ob j ects , th i s cannot be expressed by 
means of a proposition. Instead it is shown [z Aiqt] by ~he 
very sign for this ob ject. (A name s hows that it . . ,. 
slgnilies an object, a s ign for a number that it signifies 
a number, etc. ) . " 
12) (5.5 1 5 ) "It must be manifes t [ s ich zeigen ] i n 
our symbo l s that it can only be proposit i ons that are com-
b ined with one another by 'v' , ' , e tc . " 
Prob l emat ic cases, which will be central objects 
of analysis for any adequate interpretation, include: 
say: 
they 
1) (4 .46 1) "Propos itions show [ zeigt ] wha t they 
tautologies and coniradict i ons show [ zeigt ] that 
say noth i ng." 
2) (4 . 023) "A proposi tion cons t r ucts a world 
W ith the help of a l ogical scaffolding , so that one can 
· · h ow every-actual l y see [auch sehen ] from the proposition 
thing s:-tands i n logic i f it i s true. One can draw 
inferences from a false proposition. " 
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3) (4.022) "A propos ition shows 
A proposi ·tion shows [~_e igtJ how thing s 
And it says that they do so stand." 
[~eigt ] its sense. 
st a nd if it is true. 
Part II 
If we have been careful in utilizing Wittgenstein's 
contention that: "[i]n philosophy th - e question 'what do 
we actually use this word or this proposition for?' 
. repeat-
edly leads to valuable insights'' (6.211), then the insight 
we have gained amounts to making clear the distinction 
between our using language to show that such and such or 
show how such and such , etc ., (reflected in the A uses ), 
and the showing which is not something we do (as r ef lected 
in the Buses). The latter showing, which is character-
istic of the formal aspects of l anguage , shows itself 
regardless of anything we say or attempt to show in sense 
A. Thus it i s false or at least misleading to claim: 
i) "that whatever is shown , shows itself " (for this ignores 
the distinction between types A and B); or ii) "that what 
is shown is not something we can ' express '" (for this is 
only applicable to some Buses). Moreover, the reporte d 
schism between saying and showing, such that the re can be 
no case of both showing and saying , may be misleading. 
Most if n0t all of the commentators on the Tractatus pre -
sume that this schism is proclaimed by Wittge nste in's 
assertion that "what can be shown c a nnot b e said " (4.121 2 ) 
Howe ver, a careful look at the r emark r eveals that it i s a 
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reasser tion of the preced ing proposition that "what 
expres ses itse lf in language ,~ cannot express by means 
of language '' (4.121) · There is a use of showing which 
prohibits b e ing said -- the "show itself" uses in the 
Tractatu s . But the re are othe r uses of "show," the 
demonstrative , A u ses, which can be said . We must now 
examine the arguments Wittgens tein can muster for the re 
being no case of both saying and showing of the B type; 
we also need to dete rmine whethe r or not what Wittgenstein 
asserts to be both shown and said can properly be con-
strued as shown in the A manne r. In orde r to adequate ly 
analyz e the showing and saying di s tinctions, it is 
necessary to review some of the special terminology and 
major theses of the Tractatus . 
Propositional signs are composed of n ames and have 
meaning (s e n se ) indepe nde ntly of othe r symbols . The com-
posing elements (names ) are simple signs which cannot b e 
furth e r analyzed and which, unlike propositional signs , 
must occur in combination with other names and logical 
constants : "Only propositions have sense , only in the 
nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning" (3.3). 
some prop o s itions are e l ementary , i. e. , the ir truth value 
i s independent of othe r propositions ; non- e leme nta ry prop-
ositions are function s of the elementary ones . Each prop-
osition, e l ementary or not , has a structure , a wa y in 
which the sign elements of the proposition (names , 
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constants, etc.) are connected. u d , d' h' 
n ersLan ing tis con-
nection is funda.mental to understanding the manner in 
which propositions relate to the world. For unlike names, 
which refer to objects, propositions do not denote -- the 
relationship between propositions and states of affairs 
Wittge nstein speaks of as one of mirroring structure 
(4.0311, 4.04). What every proposition has in conunon with 
every other proposition is the general form of a proposi-
tion. Propositions are true or false. Whether they are 
true or false is determined by comparing them to the way 
things are. The sense of the proposition is what we 
affirm as true. Every proposition must already have a 
sense in the respect that the proposition is possibly true 
or possibly false before it has been determined to be true, 
or false. 
To understand a proposition means to know what is 
the case if it is true. (One can understand it, there-
fore, without knowing whether it is true.) It is 
understood by anyone who understands its constituents 
(4.024). 
Significant propositions are true or false of a 
possible state of affairs (4.2). We us e propositional 
signs to make assertions: "With propositions, we make 
ourselves understood" (4.026). Using old expressions (the 
same names, etc .) we can communicate a new sense -- for to 
communicate a new sense i s to picture a new situation , to 
think a n ew thought, to find a new structure with old 
signs. We understand a proposition whe n we know what 
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would be the casci if it were true. And we can understand 
a proposition without .knowing whether it is true or is 
fal se (4.024). 
Now we can return to the doctrine of showing. The 
series of s igns shows itse lf as either a tautology or not 
In doing so it shows iis form, rather, it shows 
(6.1267). 
itself as having such and such a form (4.121). Because 
th
e series of signs may show a tautological form,we under -
stand that the showing of form is not identified with the 
showing of Satz form. If it is not a tautology, but yet a 
proposition, then it shows itself as a~ (as a signif-
icant proposition) by showing itself as a picture. In 
terms of our interpretation of the showing distinctions in 
the Tractatus : for any significant proposition p, p shows 
itself as a significant proposition, P shows its form; it 
(that it is a picture). That p - . shows itself as a picture, 
significant proposition (a~) is 
showing itself as a picture (4,064) 
shows itself as a 
eq . uivalent to p's 
Other commentators have characterized 
Wittgenstein , s position with somewhat different labels, 
For instance "p's shewing itself as a picture" is called 
sh ul or p's "formal features2 
owing p's "internal structure, 
or, p's "essential" features (3.34). Whatever the label , 
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owing use employed here is clearly the Buse. All the c h . 
that Wittgen~ ·tei·n 
~ is pointing out by remarking tha t a 
picture is that the form of 
sensible P shows i·tself as a 
position p shows. He is here not claiming that · the pro . . 
e proposition is about shows. That propos ition p 
Wha t th 
as a picture means on y t1at p shows that it 
shows itself 1 l 
is 
th
e sort of fact (of language ) which is about (is a 
indeterminate state of 
Picture of) some, at this point, 
affair s -- some possible state of affairs. 
Wittge nstein, however , says that the sensible 
proposi· t · 
ion p also shows what it is about, it shows wha t 





and its corollaries so difficult to analyze. At 
•s point Wittgenstein makes no distinctions among signif -
th" 
icant 
propositions. c1earlY, if the s e nse of a proposi-
tion . dd' sh=s (its e lf) then what shows must be in a ition to -- If the showing of 
that form shown as described above. 
sense were not distinct from the showing of sensible form 
th 
en all significant propositions would be logically 
equ· ivalent. 
i
. ts e lf as a picture of "st", 
Proposition p shows 
Where "st" is some specific state of affairs. 
Proposition is about (is a picture ofl shows itse lf in the 
wha t the 
Us e of 
ing as 
the proposition. 
of the B sort. 
we would cha r ac t erize thi s show-
This capacity of p justifies the 
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contention of Wittgenstein's that I (as a language user) 
can understand the se~se of a proposition without having 
the sense explained (said , told) to me. 
(4.021) : "A prop-
osition is a p1cture of reality: for i£ I understand a 
proposition , I know the situation that it represents. 
And 
1 understand the proposition without having had its sense 
explained to me ." Note, it is not merely that I under-
stand that it is a significant proposition , i.e. one cap-
able of picturing some indeterminate "st" , but that I do 
unde rstand what the proposition does picture. In compari-
son to what was characterized as the showing of form, what 
we are now characterizing as the showing of sense has been 
given these labels: the "external structure,"
1 
or the 
a-erial" feature,2 or the "accidental" feature (3.34) of 
"mt 
a proposition. 
That p shows itself as a picture of "st" where "st" 
is some specific state of affairs, entails (but is not 
equivalent to the fact) that p shows that it is a picture. 
Having the form of a significant proposition is a necessary 
condition for that proposition being a picture of some 
possible "st". What has to be further articulated is 
Whether or not every proposition p that shows that it is a 
Picture ( logically) must show itself as a picture of some 
--------------------- ---- - --- -----
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particular state of affairs "st". It seems the entailme nt 
does hold on the grounds that every proposition ~ust have 
a fixed or determinate sense (3.23). For otherwise p 
could have the form of (the essential feature of) a signif-
icant proposition but not be a picture of some particular 
"st" -- i.e., not be a determinate picture. This latter 
possibility, however, is ruled out in Wittgenstein's 
picture theory of language: "What constitutes a .picture 
is that its elements are related to one another in a 
determinate way" (2.14). 
Consequently, 4.022 ["A proposition shows its 
sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it is 
true. And it says that they do so stand."] may be con-
sidered as using two discern ·ible (though admittedly 
closely related) aspects of showing, such that a signif-
icant proposition shows itself as both having the form of 
a significant proposition and as a picture of some partic-
ular possible s tate of affairs. It must be remarked, 
however, that while the showing itself as a picture of 
some specific "st" is determinate, the proposition as a 
picture does not show that it is a true picture of "st". 
We show (an A use of "show" ) that a proposition is true 
that task is not a function of the proposition itself 
(6.1264). 
A further difficulty in understanding Wittgenste in 
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at 4 .022 appears when we notice that while proposition p 
l se fas a picture of some specific stat~ of shows 't 1 . 
affairs "st," Wittgenstein does not argue that p cannot 
sa.y that "st" is pictured. Rather, the sense of p (what 
p pictures as being a possible state of affairs) i s shown 
by P and p says that that state of affairs "st" does so 
We have here a case of a proposition's saying 
stand. 
something which Wittgenstein believes it can also show. 
As we have remarked at a number of places, how we 
un erstand Wittgenstein at tis point is central to are to d h · · · 
any adequate interpretation of the Tractatus. First, we 
can assume that the saying which is done by the proposi-
t· ion P could be understood to mean a saying done by 
We .are justified in making such an 
langu age users. 
assumption since nothing is lost by interpreting "the Satz 
In fact, Wittgenstein 
saying" as . l S t " "my saying w1 t 1 a ~- . 
appears to treat these phrases as synonymous in the 
as both pitcher and Black discovered. 
Secondly, 
Tractat -- us, 
We can lay out the uses of "say" (and synonyms for "say ") 
in the Tractitus and see whether we find some pattern as 
------' 
we did in Wittgenstein's uses of "show." When this is 
accomplished, we will be in a position to fully appreciate 
an adequate interpretation of Wittgenstein at 4.022 and 
4 .212. 
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Ta ble 3 
1. s a y (sagen): 
(A ) 
( B ) 
Examp l e o f u ses wh e~e we (1 
L a nguage u ser s ) say: 
(1 ) 
( 2) 
( 3 ) 
( 5. 61 ) 
(3.0 31) 
(6.53) 
"We c a nnot say wha t we canno t think. " 
"W 1 e cou d no t say what an illogica l 
world wou ld loo k like . " 
" 'rh e c orrec t me thod i o philosophy 
would r eally b e the f o llowing : fo r 
us to s a y no t hing except wh a t c a n b e 
s a id . ... " . 
\J..se s in the Tra cta tu s where the propos i-
tion says : 
(1 ) ( 4 .0 22 ) "And it (the propos ition ) says tha t 
they do so sta nd ." 
( 2) ( 3 . 221 ) "Propos itions c a n only s a y h ow 
thing s a r e , not wh a t the y a re ." 
(3 ) (6 . 1 264 ) "A propos ition tha t has sense s t a t es 
( sag f ) s ome thing." 
( 4 ) ( 4. 0 3 ) "A propos ition sta t es (s a g+ ,) 
some thing ... . " 
2. e x p res s ( a u s drucke n ) : With the v e rb au s drucke n we 
ought to ma k e a further di s tinction than jus t b e t ween 
ca s e s of our saying and those of the propos itio n s aying. 
Pair e d with that distinction i s Wittge n s t e in ' s u se o f 
au s drucke n in which it does not mean " show" and c a nno t b e 
so u sed (ca ll it the "a " u s e ), and his u se of au s d r u cken 
in whic h it d oes h a v e app lication in some c ontex t s to mean 
" show" as we ll as " s a y " (c a ll these S c ases ) . Thus the a 
c ase li s t e d b e l ow ough t not b e r ead as a s h owing v e r b ; 
whe r eas , the S c ases a r e to b e r e ndered as c ases whi c h 
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h ave uses compatible with the translation of ausdrucken as 
meaning "show" or " showing". There is a u se of · ausdrucken 
which in part , a t least , can be unders tood to mean s howing 
as well as saying . 
a ) u ses , examp l es which do not translate as " show 
u ses of ausdrucken : 
( 1) ( 6 . 12 64) ;,Modus ponens can 't be expressed 
by a proposition." 
S) uses , examp l es which include a " show" u se of 
ausdrucken (express ) 
(1) ( 4 .1 21 ) "What expresses itself in l anguage , 
we cannot expr ess by means of 
l a nguage. " 
( 2) ( 3. 3 4 ) "Essential features are those with-
out which the proposition could not 
express its sens e ." 
(3) A further 8 u se o f "express " occur s at 3.251: 
"Wha t a proposition expresses , it 
expresses in a d e t erminate ma nner ." 
3. enunciate (aussprechen ): 
(A} Examples of " say " u ses where we do the say ing 
(1) (4.116) "all that can be put into words 
(enunciated ) c a n b e put clear ly" 
(2) (6.4 21 ) " ... It is clear tha t ethics cannot b e 
put into words (enunciated )." 
(B) Th e occas ion of auspr~chen at 3.262 may be an 
example of a different u se : 
"What signs fail to express [ ausdrucken] , the ir 
applic a tion shows [ zeigen ]. What signs s lur over , 
the ir application says clearly [au sprechen ] ." 
With thi s remark , it should be carefully noted that it i s a 
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~ express say or itse l f ") and whose sign whicl1 fai· l e: to (" f · 
. P ic a tion may show something -- i. e ., one may ·use it to ap 1 · . 
s h ow some thing (an A u se of show). Wittge nstein i s not 
arguing at 3.262 that a~ may · so f ail to "say for 
On the contrary, we know from 4.022 that S~tze 
itself." 
do say for themselves~ thing s stand in a ce r t a in way. 
speak (sprechen ): It is remarkable tha t its only 4. 
occurrence in the Tractatus is at 7. 
"What we cannot 
speak about we must consign to silence." 
talk (reden): Like sprechen , there is only one 
occurrence and it is found in the author's preface, page 3: 
5. 
n what we cannot t a lk about we must consign to silence." 
"ad 
6. articulated (artikulier~): one occurrence: 
(3.251) 
"a proposition is articulated." 
7. describe (beschreiben): __ :.::=--
(A) Examples of "describe " which a r e like the us es of 
II say" where we u se propos itions, in thi s case , in order to 
d escribe , include : 
(1) (3.144) 
( 2) (4.26) 
( 3) (S.526) 
( .1 ) (5,634) 
"Situat ions can be described , but 
not given names ," 
"If all true e l ementary propositions 
are listed , the world is completely 
described, " 
"We can describe the world com-
1 
fl 
plete Y,, · 
"Whatever we can des~ri~e :tall 
could be other than it i s . 
(B) uses of "describe " where the describing is not 
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done by some intelligent agent (for instance , a proposi-
tion's describing s uch and such) follow. 
(1) (4.016) 
( 2) (4,023) 
( 3) (6.124) 
"He iroglyphic writing images the 
derivative facts it describes." 
"A proposition describes reality by 
its interna l properties." 
"The propositions of logi c describe 
the scaffolding of the world, or 
rather they represent it." 
In a manner like that supplied in the cases of 
"ausdrucken," the above examples of "describe " would not 
mislead u s if they were read: 
(1) "He iroglyphic writing images the der ivative 
facts it shows." 
(2) "A proposition shows r eality by its internal 
properties ." 
( 3) "'rhe propositions of logic show the scaf-' 
folding .... " 
Of cour se , the reason for making the above demonstration 
is to enforce our view that occasionally Wittge nstein u ses 
"describe" in the same manner he often.uses "assert " and 
"express ": viz., there is a use of these terms which 
includes a sense of show as well as say (we have been call-
ing them B us es ). 
Initially, this resume of us es of "say" serves to 
confirm that there is no real difference between our say-
ing and a Sat~'s saying. From the examination of the A 
and Buses of " say " related terms , it does seem that no 
serious errors of analysis are c01mnitted by ignoring the 
diff erence in "speaker." 
Secondly, we have notice d a u se 
of " sa ," . ~ which cannot 
be understood as a verb meaning show 
or a showing activity; and we have compared such a u se of 
II say" to those cases where an expression used t 
-o mean say 
may a l so be used to mean show . 
An analysis of 4.022 and related remarks can now 
be · give n w~11·c11 · · t t "th · t 1 
is consis en- wi our in erpretation of 
Witt genstein ' s showing and saying doctrines . 
4.022: "A propos ition shows how things stand if 
it is true. And it says~· they do so 
stand." 
4 .11212: "What ca n be shown cannot be said." 
4.121: "What expresses itself in language , we 
cannot express by means of language. -"-
6.1264: "A proposition that has sense state s some-
thing which is shown by its proof to be 
SO• II 
4.03: "A proposit ion states some thing only 
insofar as it is a picture." 
4 . 0 31: "rns tead of ' this propos ition has such 
and such a sense ,' we can simply say : 
'Thi s propos ition represents such a nd 
such a s itua tion.'" 
4.0311: "[The proposition] like a ta~leau vivant 
presents a state of affairs, 
4.027: "It belongs to the essence of a proposi-
tion that it shOuld be able to communicate 
4. 03: 
4.021: 
a new sense to us ." -"A proposition must us e old expressions 
to conununica te a new sense ." 
"And r unders tand the prop'?sition without 
having had its sense expl ained to me ." 
112 
The sense of a Satz shows itself to us (4.0 22 , 
4.03, 4.0311, 4.021). Conmmnication of a Satz does not 
depend on someone sayin9 the sense of the Satz but depends 
on the showing aspect of a Satz itself (4 .021, 4.027). 
When Wittge n s t e in says of a Satz that it "states " ( 4 .0 3 ) 
or "presents" (4.0311), "communicates " (4.03), or 
" expresses" (4.121), he wants us to understand those terms 
to mean both a use of saying and a use of showing. 
When Wittgenstein attributes a " saying" verb to a 
proposition, it makes no real difference to the analysis 
if we think of that "saying " verb being attributed to the 
language user and not the proposition itself. 
When Wittgenstein writes that a Satz presents or 
asserts its sense he is saying that the proposition shows 
and it says . Now the "say " aspect of these uses can be 
attributed to e ither the propositio~ or the asserter. The 
showing, however, in these cases of presentirig or assert-
ing sense, is always attributed to the proposition itself. 
The Satz shows its sense (what it presents) and it says 
(or we say ) that what it presents is so. 'rhe Satz (or 
what seems to be the s ame , the Satz user) says that the 
proposition as a living picture is adequate, that it is 
appropriate, clear, true , etc . of the way things are . 
Just how thing s are is dete rmine d by some inde p e nde nt 
routine (6.1 264 ). The Satz shows its s e nse ; thi s showing 
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is n ecessary for the c01m1mnication of sense ' for the 
public character of languag e . That is , language, as a 
total ity o f propositions, mu s t b e so constituted tha t its 
s e nsible propositions can make p e rfectly clear, or 
obvious , the i r sense to us as u sers of the same set of 
well forme d sentence signs. In this comple te language the 
fact that sensible propositions are communicated is not a 
function of some language user's saying but is due to the 
very nature of S~tze themselves. They show, they display 
their own sense. 
4.064: "Every Satz must already have a sense; 
it cannot b e given a sens e by affirmation. 
By interpre ting 4.022 in the manner described 
above, we can avoid an appa r e nt inconsistency with the 
demand of Wittgenstein's at 4.1212 that what can be shown 
cannot be said. With the inte rpretation here presented, 
there is no one fact which is both ihown and said at 
4.022. The fact shown is the s e nse (the state of affairs) , 
the fact said is the fact that the shown sense cha racter-
izes a possible state of affairs . "It is quite impossibl e 
for a propos ition to state that it itself is true'' (4.442 ) . 
[ I think it is clear that Wittgenstein means "truly state ." ] 
The d e t ermination of what actual state of affairs does 
obtain is done by us independe ntly of being shown , and 
thereby indepe nde ntly of understanding the sense of the 
propos ition. 
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In comparison to the other possibilities we have 
s een for interpre ting 4.022, the so lution given above is 
most suitable. For examp l e , Stenius argues that 4.022 
should be inte rpr e ted as : "the proposition describes 
reality as having the same externa l structure as the prop-
osl. tJ·_on does ." H st · owever , e nius apparently slides between 
his own use of the terms II internal and external structure " 
and those us e d by Wittgenstein. For on Stenius' grounds, 
4.023 (''a proposition describes reality by its internal 
properties ... '') i s clearly incompatible with Stenius' own 
claim that a description compares the external features of 
the proposition to reality. Moreover Stenius fails to 
appreciate how "describe" is used in the Tractatus, for 
if Ste nius were correct about 4.022 -- and "describes " is 
read for "sagt" -- then his interpr etation would fail to 
distinguish what is shown in 4.022 from what is said 
(described). 
A second interpretation, suggested by Wisdom in 
"Logica l Construction," is to claim that 4.022 is 
mistaken.'' 1 It is mistaken unles s Wittgenstein meant: 
"and it expresses a fact which mirrors a possible state of 
affairs." While Wisdom is right in suggesting that we may 
easily be misled by 4.022, he is serving no good end by 
1 John Wisdom, "Logical Constructions," Mind, Vol. 
40, April 19 31 , pp. 188-216. Reprinted in Copi and Beard 
(editors ), p. 58n. 
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rendering the "say" as "express" without revealing how 
Wittg e n ste in uses those terms in the Tractatus. Some con-
trast between say and show is intended by Wittge nstein at 
4.022, but with both Stenius and Wisdom that contrast is 
complete ly hidde n. 
I have argued that the fact that a proposition 
shows its sense presumes that the proposition shows tha t 
it is sensible -- it shows itself as a picture. It shows 
its sense (the state of affairs it depicts) and announces 
that it is a picture of some specific state of affairs. 
That it shows itself as a picture of some specific state 
of affairs is what Wittgenstein means by "a proposition 
shows h ow things stand if it i~ true." Both of these uses 
of " show " are what we have considered as Buses of "show ." 
Finally, " and it says that they do so stand " should be 
read as either propositions can say that things so stand , 
or I can assert that they so stand, and Wittgenstein thinks 
there's no real difference here. However, it i s mistake n 
to think that is the nature of a sensible proposition to 
truly say of itself that what it shows does obtain. The 
truth of a sensible proposition is always to be determine d 
by our comparing it to the actual states of affairs . 
Regarding tautologies (or contradictions), wher e 
they show themse lves as having tautological (or contra-
dictory) form and in doing so show themse lves not as 
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pictures ( 6.127 and 4 . 462 ); we show in the proof in l ogic 
how each of these tautologica l propositions could be pro -
duced out of other l ogica l propositions (6 .126). We are 
warned however that the A use of " show " with regard to 
logical propositions cannot be charac t er i s tic of something 
we do which i s ide ntical to what we do when we show (A 
u se ) a proposit i on (with sense) to be true ; for: "It is 
clear from the star t that a logica l proof of a proposition 
that has sense and a proof in logic must be two entire ly 
different thing s '' (6.1263). While we are told at 4.022 
that '' a proposition shows its sense"; it i s we who s h ow 
(an A u se of show) "that what the proposi tion shows itself 
as a picture of i s e ither true or false of the way things 
are '' (6.12 64 ). This l att er case of showing where we s how 
(A u se ) whether what shows itself (B us e ) is true or fals e 
of the way things a r e , i s a showing whi ch c an be said in 
the Tractatus. Among the items which s h ow themselves but 
can not be said are the necessary conditions of l anguage . 
They cannot be said , for to say them would require their 
being said in a l anguage in which they play no pa rt --
i. e ., what Wittgenstein calls an illog ical l anguage. 1 
Two final points need ·to be made in this section. 
One ,in light of the distinctions we made ear ly in this 
1 · · Notes di' ctated to G. E . Moore in L. Wittge nste in , 
Norway, Appendix II , Notebooks 1 914-1916 , Oxford, 1961, 
p . 107. 
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r, we are not obliged to argue that the reflexive chapte . 
uses of "show" in the Tractatus need be shown by any 
agent to any audience, but we are obliged to maintain that 
emonstrative uses of " show" do require agents (save the d . 
in th 
e one instance we noted on page 92), and in the con-
text f 
o: the Tractatus these agents are the users of prop-
Secondly, while we have repeatedly argued that 
ositions. 
because of the complexity of the showing doctrines in the 
~tatus, we are not committed to the position that all 
w at can be shown cannot be said, nevertheless, we need 
of h 
to reaffirm the view that, for Wittgenstein, there are 
some cases of showing where what shows itse lf does not and 
cannot be said. 
Part Ill 
Wittgenstein considers at 4:124 that "we see the 
logic f 1 " 
The only uses 
of language in the use o anguage . 
w· ittgenstein appears to refer to in the '.f.0.ctatus are 
two -- the making of assertions with significant proposi-
tions, and the role of tautologies in th• formal charac-
terization of a notation. Meaningful or significant prop-
ositions have sense, and as significant signs they are 
complete and determinate. Tautologies have no sense 
(4 461) but they do not thereby become 
· , no significance, 
nonsense (
4 4 




their having no sense is that they show no possible state 
of affairs ; the reason they are not nonsense is tha t " they 
are part of the symbo l ism. " This justification is con-
s i stent with the criterion he employs at 5 .47 3 , where he 
as serts that '' t h e proposition is nonsen s ical because we 
have failed to make an arb itra ry d e t ermination, and not 
b ecause the symbol, i n itse l f , would be illeg itimate." 
Thus there appear to be three l eve l s of as sertions (i f 
we may u se th.is t erm in some neutral way ) in the Tractatus : 
A propositiona l sign can have sense , be s ign i ficant , by 
b e ing us ed t o show a possible state of affairs . A sign 
may h ave no sense but sti ll be arbitrar ily designated to 
play some ro l e in a notation and thus not be nons e nse. 
And thirdly, a sign may be nonsense and be ~either signi f-
icant, nor a senseless sign being assigned some role in a 
notation. 
Wittge nstein's argume nt for his thesis that what 
shows cannot be said invo lves at l east these four premises : 
Premise (i) The truth conditions for every sig-
ni ficant propos i tion can be establ i shed (4.121 3 , 5.4711, 
5. 473 1 , 5.524, 6.124) 
Premise (ii) 
itse l f ( 3 . 332). 
Premis e (iii) 
No Satz can say something about 
No components of a Satzzeichen ever 
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say they only name (3. 221) 1 
Premise (iv) The theory of types and the sub-
sequent e ffort at meta-languages is misbegotten, _ 
i.e., we do not have a hierarchy of languages in which we 
c an say something significant about some sign. 
As these premises go unchallenge d in the Tractatus , 
the following seem to be appropriate infe rences. 
1) Names show themselves as referring to object s 
but they cannot say their function. 
When something falls under a formal concept as one of 
its obj ec ts, this cannot be expressed by means of a 
proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign for 
this object. (A name shows that it signifies an 
object, a sign for a number that it signifies a 
number, etc.) (4.126). 
From the premise labeled above as (ii), only S~tze can say, 
therefore no component (name) of a Satzzeiche n can say. 
2) The fact that propositions of logic are 
tautologies shows what must be the necessary conditions 
for language and the world (6.12). This showing cannot b e 
said either. Because of premises (ii) and (iv) we have no 
way of saying the necessary conditions of language. I 
1Wittgenstein makes what we would consider a type -
token distinction between "sign" and "symbol." 
3.323: In everyd~y language it very fr equently h appens 
that the same word [sign] has different modes 
of signification, and so b e longs to different 
symbols. 
3.321: So one and the s ame sign (written or spoken 
etc.) can be common to two differe nt symbol s ... 
However, Wittgens t e in only speaks of a sign b e ing 
used to assert sense, and never a symbol. 
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can't talk (say them) because there is no language I can 
use other than the on~ which exemplifies the logical 
featur e s in question. 
3) The mystical cannot be said by either prop-
ositions or by us: 
And so it is impossible for there to be propositions 
of ethics. Propositions can ixpress nothing of what 
is higher (6.42). It is clear that ethics cannot b e 
put into words. Ethics is transcendental (6.421 ) . 
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical , 
but that it exists (6.44 ) . There are indeed , t~ings 
that cannot be put into words . They make thefuselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical (6.522 ). 
The conditions for the significance of the mystical are 
not specifiable (6.4-6.522 ). I have said little about 
these remarks and wi ll continue to do so. The notion of 
the mystical is one small part of the doctrine of showing , 
and not vice-versa . It does appear , however , that whi l e 
the expressions of l ogic and necessary conditions of 
l anguage have no sense , they would not count as nonsense; 
yet the expressions of the mystica l are considered by 
Wittgenstein as nonsense , i.e. , they neither present 
possib l e states of affairs nor are they assigned some role 
i n a specific notation. 
Part IV 
Tliere appear to be at least two reasons which 
could be (or have been) given for why Wittge n s t e in does 
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wish to suggest there being a sort of showing which cannot, 
and n eed not, b e said. 
One, the category of showing is used to introduce 
what we might recognize as a synthetic/analytic distinc-
tion. This is argued by claiming of any proposition p 
that if its sense can be said, then pis an empirical prop-
osition; while to say "p shows (its form) but does not say 
anything" is to hold that pis not empirical but 
analyticl it does not have a sense to show. This 
interpretation would allow Wittgenstein to avoid the 
possible charges of self-contradiction in the Tractatus 
(i.e., "he said what can't be said") 2 by claiming that "my 
propositions are nonsense" (6.54) should be read as "my 
propositions are not empirical." Nevertheless, this 
interpretation by itself does not suggest any explication 
of the complexity and structure of the various showing 
these we have already discussed. 
Two, the case of a showing which prohibits saying 
(by ~atze or by us) makes unnecessary the introduction of 
either meta-leve ls of proposition or indefinables. Both 
of these alternatives to showing -- which appear to func-
tion toward the same end of explaining the communication 
1 Black, "Wittgenstein's Tractatus , 11 Ar istol. Soc. 
Proc. 1938-1939; p. 50 ff. 
2 carnap, R., Logical Syntax of Language, New York, 
1937, p. 283. 
122 
of sensible propositions -- are objectiona ble to 
Wittge n s tein. First, the me ta-levels move obli~es you to 
hold that the scope of the language about whose logic you 
were off e ring an analysis was necessarily circums cribed. 
This pos ition was untenable to the author of the Tractatus, 
who argue s that no l anguage was without the bounds of the 
logic, which showe d in the ana l ysis. The second alterna-
tive, using a theory of indefinables, is not directly 
attacke d by Wittgenstein. However, we are reminded quite 
often that what shows (e .g., the logic of language) is due 
to a commit ,nent to a convention. There is nothing sacred 
about the convention. If anyone holding a theory of 
indefinables took "'x' is indefinable" to mean 111 x' h as to 
show no matter what the convention," then Wittgenstein 
would disagree. 
We formulated early in Chapter One the problems 
that must be reconciled for any adequa t e discussion of the 
distinctions between what is said and shown in the 
Tractatus. We can sununarize what has taken place in this 
chapter by reviewing our responses to the most difficult 
of those problems. 
a) We needed to reconcile the assertion that all 
propositions show logical form (4.121) with the claim that 
only some (the sensib l e ) propositions show their sense 
(4.022 and 4.461), which leads us to assume that two 
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different kinds of things are being shown. 
b) The assertions that a proposition shows its 
sense (4.022) and that what shows cannot be said (4.121 2) 
must be reconciled with the assertion that the proposi-
tion's sense is just what is affirmed or said (4.06 4). 
And c) The assertion that a proposition shows how 
things stand if it is true and says that they do so stand 
(4.022) must be reconciled with the assertion that every 
proposition must alread_y_ have a sense : it cannot be given 
a sense by affirmation. 
Regarding (a): We have documented in the 
Tractatus two distinct uses of "show" -- what we have 
called the A and the Buses. These two uses of "show" 
reflect a distinction Wittgenstein makes between what and 
how something is shown. That a proposition shows its 
logical form is a showing which cannot be said. The 
assertion shows itself as having the form of either a 
significant proposition or as having the form of a sense-
less proposition. In more typical terminology, the 
synthetic assertion shows itself as the sort of assertion 
which is about some possible siate of affairs; indeed it 
will show the specific state of affairs; or it shows 
itself as having the form of~ tautology or a contradic-
tion. A proposition does not, nor can it, make a state-
ment ( say something ) about its own synthetic or analytic 
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character. But that it is synthetic or analytic i s 
evident in the respect that it shows itself as being one 
or the other. A synthetic proposition shows its form by 
both saying and showing something in additioi to its 
form - - it both shows and says something about the way 
thing s are or could be. Whereas, a tautology shows its 
form by showing that it cannot say or show anything else. 
Regarding (b): From 4.022 we understand that the 
Satz shows its sense , it shows itself as a picture of some 
possible state of affairs. As a Satz (with all that 
Wittge nstein intends with his doctrine of picturing) it 
shows its sense. A synthetic proposition also says some-
thing, it makes some claim or statement that the world is 
a certain way. Thi s synthetic proposition or Satz shows 
the very situation it says obtains. It shows because it 
is a picture and it says that what it shows does obtain. 
What the Satz shows is called its sense. The Satz can not 
truly state that its sense is true; that the sense of a 
proposition is true or false is said by me (u s ) after 
checking the way things actually are: "It i s quite 
impossible for a proposition to state that it itself,is 
true'' (4.4 42). Wittgenstein's restriction against saying 
what can be shown (4.1212) does not appear to be incon-
sistent with our interpre tation. As we indicated earlier , 
what shows is the s e nse of a Satz , what is being said , 
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although not necessarily truly said, Wittgenstein claims 
at 4.022, is that what shows does obtain. Now I would not 
say tha t the shown sense does obtain unless, of course, 
the proposition did show its sense; but I am not saying 
what does show. To say what shows would be unnecessary . 
The communication of sensible propositions is accomplished 
by the showing; any saying of what shows is at least 
unnecessary. What I or the Satz say i s that what shows 
do e s actually obtain and if the Satz is true , I or the 
Satz have truly said that what shows is actual. The 
purpose of the saying at 4.022 is not to duplicate the 
showing of sense; the sense is shown, that the sense does 
obtain is what any sensible proposition says -- it 
presents itself as though it were true . 
Regarding (c): We h ave given an account of 4.022 
which does appear consistent with Wittgenstein's claim at 
4.064 that " every proposition must already have a sense." 
What is meant by ''already" suggests that the proposition 
can not be said to be sensible prior to its showing its 
sense. We understand that the assertion is sensible by 
understanding (being shown) its sense, and before we 
[truly] say tha~ its sense is true: 
... I must have determined in what circumstances I call 




Saying and Showing Theses in the Tractatus: 
A Comparison of My Interpretation 
to that of Other comme ntators 
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The u se s to which Wittgenstein puts the doctrines 
of showing are diverse and important. We should recall 
that with the doctrines Wittgenstein distinguishes nonsense 
from tautologies (and contradiction), and both of those 
from significant propos itions . He uses the doctrines to 
give an ad e quate account of how it is possible to com-
municate significant propositions. The position he 
establishes on how the syntax of language is available to 
l anguage users can only be understood in t erms of the 
showing theses. The manner in which a significant prop-
o sition rel a tes to the world, and the manner in which our 
thinking relates to both language and reality is inter-
preted by Wittgenstein as a manner unde rstood in t erms of 
showing and saying . Moreover , the very nature of a logical 
inference and the character of proof shows, and is under -
stood because it shows. 
It seems to me that the showing doctrines provide 
for Wittgenstein an alternative to a number of philosoph-
ical positions he thinks mistaken . 
First, there is a difference between t autologies 
and synthetic propositions. While such a distinction must 
obtain, certain things often said about the distinction 
are false. For example, Wittgens t ei n thought that all of 
the following ar e false: "tautologies are propositions"; 
t auto logies are meaningful"; "the difference betwee n 
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tautolo . gies 
and synthetic propositions can be put in terms 
What has been held 
of conce ptual content or intention." 
not 
correctly is the historical claim that tautologies do 
whereas synthetic propositions do. The dif-
fere . 
say anything, 
nee between tautologies and synthetic propositions 
s ow and what we are shown is that a :-{ll\A-lo\ c,~ ~ 
does h 
only shows its form and in so doing shows itself 
as empty of significance but not nonsensical. It has 
say about the world but it does show a form, a 
nothing to 
form wh' 
ich can be used to organize synthetic propositions. 
Secondly, we can communicate significant proposi-
tions· 
• and we can conununica te them in the language • I 
Understand f . 
what you mean by p because the sense o· pis 
There-
shown to t t me in your using the signs o asser- P· 
fore 
• it is mistaken to hold a sceptical view which pre-
vents us from establishing that any sensible proposition p 
can b 
e communicated. In at 1east this regard, Wittgenstein 
the possibility of language having only private 
de · nies 
sens e. 
It is also a mistake to think that there must be a 
meta-language in which we assert the sense of proposition 
P, or that there must be an "ideal" or indefinable referent 
for any . The aoctri·ne of showing replaces 
significant p. 
any need for the meta-language or the ideal referents, 
both of defending a 
of which had been common avenues 
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0 
e ptical position for the public communication of non-cc . 
s e n s ibl e language . 
Thirdly, Wittgenstein u ses the doctrines of showing 
to av . oid untenabl e alternatives when he discusses the 
o - l anguage and the nature of logical inference and 
syntax f 
The formal nature of l anguage can be esta blished 
Proof. 
A formal proof as well as any logical 
once and for 11 a . 
infe 
r enc e can b e justified by appeal to a rigorous pro-
Cedu 
re, the 1 d d f · rules of which can be clear Yan e- 1nitively 
e sta bli s h ed . h d 
The sceptic is mistaken, Te groun s for 
nee and proof programs are knowable and public; they 
infere 
show th 
- emse lves, eut th• vin traditionally opposing the 
-,c -- the ideal referent view -- is also a mistaken 
scept· 
one. 
While someone holding that position is correct in 
that the syntax of 1anguage , the character of a 
holding 
Proof d b · ' and of logical constants, are knowable an pu 11c, 
is · t b · d 1 
mistake n in thinking that there ~s e 
1 
ea h e · 
ref erents 
features. 
for logical symbols , etc,, to account for those 
For the wittgenstein of the ~ there is 
Only "the" has a logic which is 
language , and the l anguage 
apparent lf as hav1.·ng particula r charact-
, which shows itse -
erist· f inference , numb e r, 
ics. In the s a me manner, proo -s , 
and log1· cal h cter we must consta nts shoW their c ara · 
appea l to the ir obvious n e ss, 
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Fourth, the showing and saying theses suggest 
evidence for a c ase which can be made for the denial of 
any "content" the ory of propositions in the Tractatus. l 
Wittge n s tein did not appea l to the showing theses to offer 
an alternative to such a "content" theory; but several 
comme ntators h ave suggested that the showing theses could 
provide such an alternative. 2 The alternative involves 
interpreting s'a tze as "activities of asserting ... , 11 and 
not items of content at all. If such a view is correct 
then it is mistaken to consider a proposition a sort of 
thing to be compared to the world. Rather a Satz is an 
activity of asserting with sense by employing certain 
signs; the asserting involves both a saying and a showing. 
That is, on their view, Satze are activities that I per-
form as a language user . As s evera l have described it: 
"what we are to analyze is talking sense: and not some 
thing philosophers have called a proposition." 
I must now present some r ecapitulation. All of 
the comme ntators agree with Pitcher that there is no real 
difference between language saying something and the 
lA content theory would hold that a propositional 
sign had a conte nt (the proposition itse lf) which was 
somehow capture d in the sign and transferred from one user 
of the sign to another. 
2 we argue in Chapter II that the textual support 
f this view was not overwhelming -- but it does have or 
defenders , as both the ana ly ses of Shwayder and Schwyzer 
t estify. 
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lang u age u ser say ing it. What Pitcher p articularly 
emphas izes, h owever, is tha t a Satz says (or we say) only 
b ecau se the Satz shows. And wha t Pitche r thinks is shown 
i s a state of affairs. Wha t is said is tha t 
the s tate of affair s shown does obtain. 
Pitcher find s in the Tractatean ma t e ri a l a means 
of di s tingui s hing illumina ting from non-illumina ting 
nonsen se -- the forme r b e ing characteristic of tautologies 
in the 'l'r ac t a tus . The charge against Wittgenstein that he 
is involved in writing nons e ns e by writing the Tractatus 
is answered. Yet one of Pitche r's conclusions is that the 
major p a rt of the showing thesis i s unte nable. 
Wittgenste in's position is unte na ble, argues Pitcher, 
beca u se h e is mistake n in thinking that we cannot say what 
shows. 
My reaction to Pitcher has been mixed. More than 
with many of the comme ntators, the position I have 
develope d i s consistent with Pitche r's. What is not to b e 
found in Pitcher 's ana ly s i s is any deve lopme nt of the 
hints or s ugges tions he provides for an adequate inter-
preta tion of Wittgenstein's ideas abo ~t showing. I think 
Pitche r i s wrong in his charge of the unte n ab ility of the 
showing doctrines . He is not at all care ful enough with 
the distinctions to separate the sorts of showing which 
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can be said from the sorts which can not. Moreove~ I 
think he misses part of what is involved in the Satz's 
showing, e.g. , he neglects the showing of a Satz that it 
says. Pitcher is right in his reading of the saying of a 
Satz, and perhaps the only co1mnentator who appreciates 
this eleme nt of the doctrines. 
\\ , 1 
of show: 
Stenius' primary move is to distinguish two senses 
one to be read as "depict ," which is a sense of 
''show'' which permits what is shown to be said; and one to Ge. 
read as "exhibit " which is a sense which does not p e rmit 
what is shown to be said. A Satz, then, depicts how things 
are it shows and says how things stand. Stenius is 
right, we argued, in distinguishing at least two different 
u ses of " show. " But h e misses an important difference 
between "shown by us" (as language users, etc.) and " shown 
by the proposition" (independently of any language user), 
which is, I think, central to explaining why Wittgenstein 
thought that one sort of showing could not be said. 
Furthermore Stenius is mistaken regarding just what 
Wittgenstein meant by the Satz "saying" at 4.022. On 
Stenius' reading wha~ i s shown is also said. But if 
Stenius i s correct then Wittgenstein is involved in an 
obvious inconsistency with his claim at 4.1212: that what 
can be shown cannot be said. To avoid such difficulties 
we have argued that Wittgenstein does not claim that a 
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Sa tz say s wh a t it shows ; rather a Satz say s tha t what it 
portrays (the state of affairs it shows) does obtain. 
This is a proper place, I think, to sum.marize the 
justification I have for forcing the reading of 4.022, 
4.1212, etc. , in the manner descr i bed directly above. 
At l east in some t yp ical cases, agent A intends to 
communicate something of s i gnificance to agen t B. Agent A 
uses the signs of the language in such a manner as to 
assert p. To agent B, p shows its e lf as having a certa in 
form - - a s e nsible form -- which in this case means that p 
shows that it has a certain set of truth conditions. Pis 
possibly true and poss ibly fa l se . What is shown by p h ere 
is wh a t Wittgenste i n calls the sense of p. The sense of p 
is directly communicated to agent Band by that communica-
tion Bis told (by the fact of A using p or by p -- it does 
not seem to matter to Wittgenstein) that what is shown does 
obtain. However, it is not the nature of a proposition to 
truly say. Agents A or B could say that p was true after 
checking the way things are and compar ing their findings 
to what p shows . It would be mo r e accurate to say that 
A or B cou ld not knowingly say that pis true until 
the y have checked the way things actually are , until 
they h a ve compared the sense of p -- the truth condi -
t i ons o f s ome possible state of affairs -- with the 
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actual state of affairs . 
The sense of p must be cormnun-
icable a nd in accounting 
f or that conununication 
(1) the sceptic's charge that no w. -1.ttgenstein is denying: 
icat.ion is adequate to account for A's communicating justif' 
the idea l referent theory's assertion 
sensibly with B; ( 2) 
the only way to · t'f th · t' f · t 
JUs-i y e communica ing o- pis o 
that 
have some referent (idea l referent) designated by p which 
is appreciated by both agent A and B, And (3) Wittgenstein 
enying that p is conuuunicated by being said in some is d 
other 1 
anguage or some meta-level of language, Proposi-
does not say what it shows because there is no need 
tion p 
irn what is already apparent, There is no argument, 
to cla' 
• in the Tractatus, which fully supports the claim 
however _:....::..-- ~
that a Satz cannot say its own sense, 
On Black's interpretation only a proposition can 
say, 
for the saying is part of the sense, part of what is 
being shown or "presented ," 
My objection to e1ack take• the following form: 
a) W' · t f 
ittgenstein's account of sense does not perm• o 
,, Parts " 1 . b) if saying were a 
' as Black's reading imp ies; 
Part reading would 
of the sense of "p" then Black's 
v· l.olat r -· • e flittgenstein's 
show --..:~ cannot be said") ; and c) 
restriction at 4,1212 ("What~ be 
&lack is mistaken in his 
assu -
1 
s to be understood as 
mption that "darstellt " i s a way 
,, ~•how " . 1 objection has been 
1.n the Tractatus, MY centra ---
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With _ac considers the problem of saying and show-what Bl k 
ing. He suo · 
~gests that the problem is the internal incon-
sistency -of the Tractatus, the inconsistency involved in 
saying (by writing the Tractatus) what he Witt genstein's 
I have argued that that internal 
claims cannot be said. 
••
t
ency could be generally dissolved if the problem incons· 
ing and analyzing the various elements of the of clarify' 
a
nd 
saying distinctions could be accomplished, 
showing 
e interpretation provided by Black of a dif-
Th · 
fer ence b 
etwecn what shows and can be said from what shows 
cannot he said was on the basis of different features and 
Of the 
proposition itself, In bis terms, what shows and 
said are called "material" features, and what shows 
can be 
cannot be said are "f orma 1" features . This ' it has and The 
seemed to me I 
generally misses the proper emphasis, 
the difference is to be found in the ,;_11owing 
reas on for 
and not · in the features shown. 
There are two senses of 
II ' not just two things shown, and what is shown is 
show" 





. . s t · n the Tractatus 
e interpretation of a~ 
1 ~
given 
. by Favrholdt, sc~yzer and shwayder is primarily 
the is~orphism seen by early com-
J.ntended to criticize 
mentat T t, ors in the relation established bY 
th
e~ 
betw een language and realitY. A •rractatean 0"-' for 
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these a nti-i somorphism conunentators, i s an expressed 
though t . Th e express ing i s an activity of asserting with 
some sign. I'ilh e n we express a Satz, or to put it less mis-
l eading ly, when we are "S atz ing, " we are thinking what it 
is we are asserting . "S atzin9:." is thinking made manife s t 
in the u se of the signs of language. 
Wh e n we are "S atz ing," we are prese nting and thi s 
presenting includes both an activity of showing and of say-
ing. Schwyz e r reads these activities as both being per-
formed by us as l a nguage u sers . In light of our both show-
ing and saying the s e nse of a Satz, Schwyzer must claim 
that Wittgenstein's r emark at 4.022 (" ... the Satz shows 
what ... and says that ... ") is "disguised. " Thi s , we have 
see n, i s an unnecessary, if not mistaken, position. 
On Shwayder's reading,the ?atz does the showing of 
sense which I think i s the proper interpre tation; but h e 
find s n o way to reconcile Wittge nstein 's remarks at 4.022 
and at 4.1212. Regrettably, Shwayder's conclusion at that 
point is that 4.1212 i s simply mistaken. 
Shwayder, we h ave ar((\g,ed, i s wrong here ; an 
interpreta tion which r econciles 4.022 and 4.1212 can b e 
give n (our Chapter III and again in our IV). Shwayde r i s 
right, I think, in arguing that, for Wittge nste in, logi c 
mu s t characte riz e the possible relations hips between 
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language (as Wittgenstein r estr icts language ) and reality. 
Thi s l ogic must b e se~n, it mu s t show in our u se of fact 
stating expressions . Wha t we are s hown i s what is presume d 
in the l anguage but canno t be said in tha t language . And 
the possibi lity of communicating sensible proposition s 
rests on the showing of the sens e of a n expression when 
and as we engage in the activity of v erbalizing our 
thoughts. It seems to me tha t on thes e latter is s ues 
Shwayde r' s po s ition is in full agr eement with thi analysis 
we h ave give n of the showing and saying theses in the 
Tractatu s . 
CHAPTER V 
The Saying and Showing Distinctions 
in the Pre-Tractatus Material: 
Notes on Logic (1913), 
Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore (1914), 
Notebooks (1914-1916) 
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This finil chapter is included for the purpose of 
to the 
exa · mining tl . . . 1e writings of Wittgenstein prior 
'.!:E_actatus. 
It should be helpful to buttress the analysis 
pretation we have given of the Tractatus by and inter - - . . 
to Wittgenstein's earlier r emarks and to his appeal . 
development. surprisingly, there has been 
littl 
int 1 e lectual 
e commentary on the pre-Tractatean material by any of 
th ~nown Wittgenstein scholars. I assume they have e well k 
same feelings we have, viz, , that until the issues in the 
the Tractatus itself are thoroughly discussed, it would be 
uncl 
. ear how to carry out the task of unfolding those ideas 
material which is far 1ess developed and complete, and in 
Which · i s, 
Primarily 
by Wittgenstein ' s admission, to b e considered 
as working notes. 
I propose thaf since the effort to understand most 
of the 
elements of the saying and sh~ing distinctions in 
ractatus has now been undertaken by us, it is possible 
the T 
to 
give support to our interpretation by making an appeal 
to the early note s . What we shall find is that the 
anal · 1 · ysis of this early material does produce cone usions 
that 
foreshadow the conclusions we su•arized in the last 
chapter. 
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the N rotebooks 1914 1916. O d ' · 
ur iscussion of the last of 
disproportionally brief judged by the length 
the se will be 
· -erial itself. The reason for our brevity is 
of the mat . 
e position of these Notebooks on the showing and 
that th 
is much the s ame as that in the 
say in d. . g istinctions 
Regarding the showing and saying distinctions 
alone th 
Tra t --~~tu s 
' ere is little change in Wittgenstein ' s position 
form 1916 to 1918. 
Since we do not want to unnecessarily repeat posi-
tions 
already discussed , the plan here is to indicate the 
i es between the early notes and the :r_ractatu_e_ , and a· isparit ' 
reinf · h · orce , if we can , the interpretation we ave given to 
of th e showing doctrines in the~· 
part I 
Even a cursory l ook at the~ would 
rem0 
ve the feeling that all of the pre-Tractatean writings 
a loose collection of notes which shoW little or no 
are 
effort by Wittgens tein toward a developed position. Though 
the comme nts are brief ·~ . only indicate h~ consistent Wittgenstein remained in 
h · is style 
and often aphoristic , which itself 
of writing , the II~ display a careful 
•rr · M angement of arguments and develo~e nt of ,ssues . ore-
over , Miss Anscombe , th• editor of th• material , tell s us 
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that th ere is 
evidence to support the vi ew that 
revised and improved the original notes.I Witt -genste in 
In th e revised version, trans lated and appended to 
have a clear a nd reli ab le expres-
~otebooks 1914-1916, we 
s· ittge nstein's position prior to the Tractatus. ion o f w· 
sections Wittgenstein considers the following In six . 
the sense a nd meaning of a propos ition, atomic 
topics: 
sitions and indef inables, molecular propositions and P:topo . . 
·· analysis, general propositions, the complexities of the ir 
symbolism, and 
the notion of and theory of type 
dist· inct· ions. 
There is, r think, no explicit doctrine developed 
in the 
Notes on Logic conce rning the sh~ing and saying 
inc·t · 1 · d ions. However, even though the textua evi ence dist· 
is not 
very strong, we can infer from the text that 
Witt gen5tein held the following theses: 
1) Certain matters shoW themse lves: 
a) Formal elements of the logic of language sh~ --
"That 
and •not,' etc., are not relations in the same 
sense ( ) as 'right' and •left' is obvious•·· ·" P · lOl 
'or' 
b) Names and forms of sensible propositions show 
them . selves as 
,, 
lndef ' inables ---
the indef inables of those propos itions . 
are of two sorts: 
names and forms." (p. 98) 




c) The form of a tautology shows itself . 
structur 
.ecognize and then 
· e of the proposi· ti' on mu s t be r · d 
the is easy " (p. 96) . rest . 
d) The division of names by the "poles" of a prop-
osition shows I 
and in so doing whether it is true or not 
"The sense of a proposition is de termined 
show . s itself 
poles true and false. The form of a proposi-
by the two 
tion is -- ~ like a straight line which divides all points of 
a plane into right and left " (p. 97) , 




its sense shows, since its sense is its truth 
"I then correlate with each class of poles one of 
two poles (a and b) . 
con s tructe d I cannot define, but I know it . " (p. 101) , 
The sense of the symbolizing fact 
thus 
f) The c=position of elementary propositions into 
mole cular ones 
shows its e lf and the fact that those 
propositions are~ by their being com-
rnolecuJ .ar 
ion s of elementary ones is "apriori-likely" (shows 
Posit· 
"It is apriori likelY that the introduction of 
itself) : 
le propositions is fundamental for the understanding 
atom· 
other kinds of propositions " (p. 100) · Of all 
There are also in the ~ uses of £'1E. showing, 
Uses 
2) 
which we cons ider in chapter III as A uses of show. 
We can show (with an argument) some point• 
Wh e n we say A judges that, e tc., _then we have to 




eith er to me ntion only its consti'tue nt~, 
ls co t· - or not d . Th" ns ituents and form but not in the proper rder. 
st~~ - s l~ows_ that a proposition itself must occur in the 
p. 
9 
~1~~ '.' t to the effect that it is judged (~. , 
Only fact s Cc"'n 
Thi s . • express sense, a class of names cannot. 
is eas ily shown ... (N. L., p. 105.) ., -




prohibiting saying what shows; that is, no remark in 
1913 
r esemb l es the assertion of 4.1212 in the Tractatus. 
genstei11 h d d' t' ~ · · , owever, oes makes~• 1s ·1nec1ons which Witt 
may be 
interpre t e d as a prelude to parts of that prohibi-
tion. 
a) As in the Tractatus, there is apparently no dif-
_:---
ficulty in our 
saying what we show, i.e., what we prove or 
d em onstrate. 
b) The limits on what we can say are the limits of 
What . 15 
significant; that is, we can not say nonsense 
-=· p. 97). There is no way to say what cannot b e 
(N. L 
Said. 
The implication of this position is that saying 
involv 
es asserting with sense, i.e., not just mentioning 
we certainly can mention nonsense ("this table p e n-
for 
holde rs 
th b 96) It also appears that we 
e ook, " N. L. p. · --
cannot k 
say (asser t with significance) what 1ac s sense 
although we can and do me ntion them 
(e .g. ' tautologies), 
(" signs of the form s 
, p v p• are sense l ess ," ~-' P · 100). 
c) we find that we c a nnot saY tha t constants are 
not 
tautologies , and tha t nm•• are not propos itions , but 
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both of th . ese The reason , 
apparently , for our not 
say these things is that to say them (e g 
show. 
be · ing ab l e to " . . ' 
n s are tautologies" ) is not to say something 
consta t 
an ·alse ; rather it is to say (attempt to say ) 
signjf' - . leant d f "nonsense cannot 
non sense 
' 
and, as Wittgenstein repeats: 
bes . aid." 
In addition , constants show the manner in which 
form s d' J.vide 




we say now: for all p's and q's, 
meth ' pro ~ng indefinable about ~he s~nse 
P 
positions which are contained in P 
· 102.) , 
11 p/q" says 
of those simple 
and q (N. L., -
In this quotation from the~· the 
second 
occasion of "say " must be understood as an example 
Where " sh . ow" would be the more clear diction bad 
Witt genstein been 
in th e Tractatus. 
show ----' 
th
en there is an obvious inconsistency: 
as careful in 1913-1914 as he was later 
If it is not translated as a case of 
"p/q says 
someth' ing indefinable (unsayable ), 
11 
d) Concerning the theory of judgment in the Notes 
vve f' 
1nd a thought which articulates part of Wittge nstein's 
ear1 
Y effort to sharpen hi• view as to whether or not there 
are cases of 
tion cannot 
showing which cannot be said, 
11 ••• A proposi-
asse
~.t of itself tha t it is true , 
possibly ,_ 
· · · [ an ) 1 · 1 
11 
(N L p 9 6.) 
a ssertion is me rely psycho ogica .c-:---'- ' · 
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In sununary, the ~ do contain the difference 
between A and B uses of "sho " d t' 
w, an sugges ions of dif-
the uses of "say" which we noticed in the fe rences in 
Tractat - u s 
Of course some of the items we listed on 
l-2 as showing do not show in the Tractatus, but 
Pages 14 
always that what showed (e.g., "forms as 
:the reason is 
indef ' inables ") 
had been dropped or altered between 1913 
Finally, while the prohibition against not say-
ing 
and 1918. 
ows nor showing what is said does not, as we 
what sh 
have 
remarked, occur with any force in the i;_otes on Lo.P£, 
•s one case in the 1913 material of Wittgenstein's 
there . 
lng what could not be said but could only show accord-
say· 
ing to 
his position in the Tractatus (4.1211). The case 
is . ~ saying what the relation between a fact and its con-
st· ituents is: 
A false theory of relations makes it easily seem as if 
th
e relation of fact and constituent were the same as 
t at of fact and fact -- which follows -- from --
~ht. But there is a similarity of the two, expressible 
Us· ~ l • 't'a -> 4> ·a·a === a. 
then, the position on showing and 
w· J..th this exception , 
s ructured in saying t 
anyth' 1.ng incons istent 
the ~_2.S does not involve 
with the positions we analyzedin the 
'I'ra t ~ ·a tu s. -----------------------
Witt !Notes on Logic, P· 99. NO discussion by 
genstein of the~bolism follows hi• remarks. 
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Part II 
Not quite a year after the !i_otes on Logic, 
Witt genstein 
related to Moore a series of comments which 
analyses of logic and language. 
show some growth in his 
Thes e Notes 
(known here 
Dictated to G~' April 1914 
as~) do not display any serious 
at organization. There is neither a system of 
effort 
eadings as was the case in th•~ on Logic nor 
t opica l h 
is there 
any numbering of the remarks so as to indicate 
s igni ficance. However , we can characterize 
the ' ir relat1·ve 
s howing and saying themes of this manuscript. With 
the 
regard to 
topics discuss ed in the~ and 
thos e 
Which 
r e-occur in· the~ there is little 
alterat· 
ion, though there is interesting elaboration. 
Fundamental to the distinction between showing and 
say· ing i 
n the No~ as wel l as in the ~actatuE 
supposition that something can be sh~n through or 
is the 
in the 
symbols that cannot be said by those symbols, 
1 ~-
Ddeed . -' what shows is just what is essential, what cannot 
b e the case with both 1anguage and the world. 
help b ut :.:.---
Logical so called propositions~ 
th
e logical 
[roperties of language and therefore of the universe , 
aut say nothing. This means tha t.bY merely looking 
t them you can see these properties: wh~reas , in a 
rroposition proper, you cannot see what is true by 
ookincr t . . . ossible to saY what these 
pro , . a it. It is imp d~o you would 
pert1es are because 1n order to 
O 
' . . need a 
1 
h. h h dn't got the properties in 
anguage w ic a · l ] d b quest i' - . ' . . · ble that this s 1ou - e a 
on, and it is impossi 
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~roper language. It is impossible to construct an 
1 llog · _ 1 
la icd language. In order that you should have a 
b ngua g e which can express or say everything that can 
a~ds~id; this language must have . certain properties; 
1 
¼he n this is the case , that it has thd can no 
longe r b e said in that language or any language. Thus 
p:~gu~g7 which c a n express everything~ certain 
m partie s of the world by these properties which it 
/
st 
have ; and logical so-called propositions shew j_11_ 
~stematic_~ t110se properties . Every r~ prop-
thitio~ shews something, besides what i~ says about 
e Universe; for , if it has no sense, it can ' t be 
used; and if it has a sense i t mirrors some logical 
property of the universe.
1 
The prohibitions against saying what i s shown 
occur more emphatically in the N~ 
th
an they 
the Notes on Lo<jJS• for instance , here Wittgenstein 
did in 
argues f 1 that the logically essential properties o anguage 
show th ·a emselves ahd cannot be said -- cannot be sai 
-~ 
because 
there is no language to say them in which t he 
Propert· d 
1es in question are not themselves presuppose . 
t · l " r 
side , however , there are "non-essen-ia Pop-
the other 
On 
characteristics of language wh i ch may be 
erties or 
(although they need not be ) shown , said , or evidently both 
-
show and said. In . . "Moore good ," this 
5 
h any ordinary propos i t1 on • ,," · g · ~" is to the left of ~ and does not saY that Moor be said by another 
p good" and here what is shewn c~n totha t part of 
w~opo s iti on-;---llU tthi s onl ~ -apP ies The log icafrrop-
a t is shewn which is arbitrarY· . _ ~at it 
:rties which it shews are not arbitr~:Itions 2 
as these cannot'i,eoaid in anY proP . 
Even ti essential logical 
- --- iough we cannot saY wha"t-~t::_:h_:_e~s_e ____________ _ 
- -----
1Notes to Moor e , P· 107. 
-~--~ -
2Ibid ., p. 110 . 
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properties 
might be ; that there are such proper ties and 
th
e y are obvious to anyone looking at the symbo l s or that 
the worl 11 · 
c gives u s an indication of the restrictions 
ittge nstei'n 2 
imposes the nature of l anguage . There i s no w· 
cation offered , but I presume that Wittgenstein means 
expli . 
proper l anguage " ( c . f. ~ote~to fi?~ ' P. 107) one by II 
Within Wh 1' c l1 d 'd we could say anything that nee be sa1. The -
gic of the proper l anguage is the logic of any sayable lo · 
guage. Moreover, any proposition (rather , any "pseudo 
l an 
Proposition" ) h' h d - w ic oes 
our language i s not part of the proper language 
not comply to the shown grammar or 
logic of 
and · 3 is thereby not a proper proposition. 
The logic of our l anguage can fix th• limits of 
If language 
the 1 4 anguage (proper l anguage ) as a whole. 
-l ef 1 "From the fact that I see that one spot is to the 
it .t of another , or that one coior i s darker_than another , 
11/ecms to follow that it is so-··•"~· P· 
2 Notes to Moore, P· 107. ____ .:_:::_::..:...-
3rb 'd . fortunate l y uses "proper " 
Prop . 1 . Wittgenstein un here and as a synonym 
for os 
1 
ti on in both the manner noted p 1 o 7) How-
a "real" · · (Notes to rv10ore ' · · · ever proposition ~ call a mean1ng-
fu1 n' a r ea l proposition i s what we wo be fairly claimed 
i on-an 1 t ' ·t·on What can . . s th· a y 1c propos1 1 · . t indicate the sat1s-
facti~t the use of •proper " h~re 
15
t ~- and both real and 
ana lyt n of a syr_it~ctical. requi.rern~~t requirement though we 
must ic propos1t1ons will me• t t . t to whether or not 
the recognize differe nces with respec 
y both have sense. h or not Wittgenste in 
whet er ~·a in the 
Would . lfibid ., PP· 101-10 8 . 
Tract ~nclude in 191 4 , as we 
~us, ordinary language 





is fixed, if 
it is closed, then the whole of it shows its 
"In order that you should have a language which limit s . 
can e say everything that£~ be said, this xpre ss or . 
must have certain properties ; and when this is 
language 
it has them can no longer be said in tha t 
the case , that 
lan guage 
or in any language ." 1 This is the central force 
ing the saying of some sorts of showing: we are Of forbid d ' theory encompassing 
never . in a position to say or assert a 
The limits of what can be said must 
a11 of l a nguage . 
show 
And that showing is a paradigm of a showing that 
~ be said 2 
Having now indicated the prohibitive aspects of 
the early doctrines of saying and sh~ing it is appro-
Priate to . 
turn to the relation of those early doctrines 
to Witt genstein's 
account of sensible propositionS, 
tautol . ogies, and the n to his 
It need not be repeated here in detail, but it 
criticism of a theory of . ::.:..:--
type s. 
shou1a h b e evident that Wittgenste in appreciate t e same 
Sort d " " s of distinctions b e tween uses of "show" an say 
-----is h k eff/r e in 1914 an issue . He certai~lY mad~sn ryo l rt t . open he 1· s not discussing or ina 
angu 
O 
indicate that ft t assume 
tha t ~~e or "language a t large-:-.,- one is le · 
0 
is. 
\rbid., p. 107 2 e sayable if and only 
if the Meta- l anguages , I presUine ' . a\0 t the whole of 
lan l a ngu age b e ing t alked about 
1 5 
t~anguage " 
o guage b 1 guage e.g.' . f al ut some par ticular an . ! t comments on t nese 
l ssu~~e bra, etc . There ar~ no exP
1101 
in the 1914 manuscript, 
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What we , of co ur se , 
as w . e noticed 
attention to in this part are those items which 
refl 
in his Notes on Logic. 
are . paying 
change or difference of emphasis in his work 
ect some 
on the showing and saying distinctions. 
Appare ntly an overriding distinction to be made in 
the Notec t 
--------5' o Moore is that between logical propositions 
Real propositions are about the 
and real propositions. 
' ey are meaningful only insofar as they are true 
World· th 
the ir truth or falsity consists in the fact 
or fal se; and 
~ · 
to reality. To say that a 
tha t the proposition relates 
real 
proposition is meaningful (and all real , not-illogical 
Propo s it· 
ions are meaningful ) is to say that it i s true (or 
That pis a real proposition, e.g., 
that . it is false) .1 
is true or fals e , is shown by p ' s showing itself as 
that p 
But~ pi§. true or i§. false 
hav · ing a sensible form. 
Rea l propositions must be 
does sow from p alone, not h 
com Pared 
with reality; theY shOW 50mething about that 
:tea1· it.y (which can be true or false ) · Eve r th · ng besides what 
· Y real propositions shews some 
1 
! its --- · obvious that , 
e ays, about the universe . .• rt 
15 
if it has 
a.g.' with a subject-predicate proposition, -
U
ny sense at all you see the form , as soon as you nde ' . -. . · te of not knowing 
wfie-rs tan~ the propos 1 t1on, 1n spl 
t.her it is true or false ,
2 
lt . 
l.s hel r ema rk containing the 
pful to notice that the 
Phr · . -ase "b . the above quote 1s ope n 
. es1.des what it says " in ----~-------------------
1 Notes to Moore , P · 112. 
_::._::.::...-----
2 _Ibid. I p. 109. 
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to different readings. I think the intent of 
Wittgen s tein's comment is obvious: the Satz ("real 
propo s ition") shows it s sense. '1,he issue is, what does 
it (th e Satz) say. One way, not I think the most helpful 
way, of interpretating the phrase is to argue that 
Wittge nstein holds that S~tze say something about the 
universe , i. e ., what they say is what they show. While I 
think thi s reading may have support in that it is, 
grarnmatically, the most apparent reading, it does not seem 
possib l e that Wittgenstein could be maintaining a thes is 
that so clearly violates his newly and emphatically 
d eve loped prohibition against saying what shows itself. 
The r eading I propose interprets the phrase as referring 
to the fact tha t the Satz does say, but it is not to lead 
us to think tha t the Satz says what it shows. I think he 
is reminding us that a Satz does more than show. It does 
say! But what it says, I argue, is not what it shows. As 
I have attempted to structure Wittgenste in's thesis in the 
earlier chapters, the Satz says that thing s stand in some 
possible world in the way it shows them as standing. That 
thing s do stand (in this world) in just the way the Satz 
shows them as standing is a matter we d e termine after we 
check the world. 
Logical propo s itions and the ir analysis involve 
other di stinctions . Logical proposi tions cannot say 
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anytl . 11ng. 1 . ' )Ut tl1 "''Y all h d 1 
lo . ~ sow -- an w1at they show are the 
prope rti e s of language and of the unive;se. All 
gica l . 




can b e reduce d 
or rendered to either tautologies or con-
There is no procedure offered for the trad. . ictions. 1 
ion of more obvious tautologies from more com-
derivat· 
ones. There would be a difficulty in offering 
Plicated 
a procedure since the "prohibitive" force of the SUch 
show· ing d t 
oc · rine forbids the saying of what sh~• itself. 
case what shows is the relation of atomic to 
In th' is 
molecular 
propositions . Even though the logical prop-
(and of the world) can only be shown 
ert· ies of 1 anguage 
that no language can say what th••• prop-
(we ha ve seen 
erties 
are ) ,2 l anguage must saY everything that~ be 
Said. 
Th. d d is language call it "L", which is nee e to say 
a1 ' 
1 
that · t' can be said must itself have certain proper•••· 
properties L must have, to be the language it must be 
(to 8 
'I'he 
ay all that can be said)' cannot ~emselves (the 
Pro Pert · L t 
•es) he said, in any language. Language mus· 
sho w certain logical properti•• and the way they (the 
Prop 
erties ) are sh~n is by l ogical propositions, both 
taut 
ologies and contradictions, in some systematic manner. 
'I'h. 
>s last is quit• important . 
notion of a systematic manner ----~-------
lrbid., P· 111. 
2
See page s 14• - 141 of this chapter· 
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Even real propositions show some logical properties; but 
the value of logical propositions is that they show log-
ical properties systematical ly. And since the y s how these 
properties systematically , some description 1 of the kind 
of symbols showing these properties can be given. 
Thu s a l anguage which can express everything mirrors 
certa in properties which it must have; and logical-
so-called propositions shew in a systematic way those 
properties . How, u sually , logical propositions do 
sh ew these properties is this: We give a certain 
d escription of a kind of symbo l ... 2 
To one sort of description, in terms of the above, we give 
the titl e "tautology" (e.g ., cj>a • ( cj>a-+ijJa ) ->- ijJa) ;3 its negation 
would b e a contradiction. That these titles apply as they 
do is purely a matter of arbitrary convention. 4 But what 
is not arbitrary is that once we have fixed the rules for 
our descriptive terms then other rules follow in some non-
arbitrary way. That these other rule s are not arbitrary 
can be seen, they show themselves (a "B" u se of show in 
the terminology of our Chapter III). Moreover, they can 
1Notes to Moor~, p. 107. Wittgenstein u ses the 
word "desc ription" but I take it it means primarily some-
thing like "ne cessary role in the language "; i.e., the 
logica l properties show the logical property systematically 
and when I d es cribe the kind of symbo l doing that, I am 
noting what must be the cas e with that kind of symbol. 
2 Ibid . 
3Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
4 Ibid. , p. 113. "We describe a symbol , and say 
arbitrari~a symbo l of this description is a tautology.'" 
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What cannot be done is to 
be seen to follow ne c essarily.
1 
(or to say) that they follow , one cinnot prove 
demon strat e 




one (or gicaJ pr . . f tha t · opos1t1ons are orms of proof: 
more )~~e or mo r e prop~~roITowfrom 
t' The emphasis on the showing character of proposi-
18 
appare ntly supported by Wittgenstein's discovery 
1.ons · 
Of . a graphic · · (" l d" way to present a proposition 1nc u 1ng 
lo · . gical 
properties ) in the "ab" notation- Th• schema ha• 
principle a s his later truth table• but is done 
the same . . 
vv. 1.th 1· ines and arrows. 




e a . is 
e shown as: 
a~ 
~ a 
the truth value "true" and b the truth value 
"f alse. 11 Lf 




is proposition is shown; and Wittgenstein apparently 
thought . it . 
th
at one could see the form even 
th
ough, since 
real t now saY whether the 
l.s a .____ proposition, one canno 
1Ib'd l . ' P· 
2rb·a l • ' P· 
3 Ib'd l . ' P· 
"'I'" 
Lf Tractatus 





"b" is replaced by 
There the a 
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Propo c· i· t. 0 ion is true (or false). 
The r e l evance of showing 
and saying distinctions 
Tha t the re are types 
to II types " can be quickly noted . 
appe ar to be questi oned by Wittgenstein in 1914, 
doe s not 
no particular difficulties in asserting that there Hes aw 
pc differences be~een, for example , thing s , facts, 
Were ty 
ies, relations , names and forms, Wittgenstein doe s 
Proper t· 
1
s ider the re l ated ontologica l issues, that might not co1 · 
interest others I 
as be ing within the province of hi• pur-
He does not, then, seem to think 
Pose in ti . in s writing. 
type distinc tions he i s noting are necessarily 
that the 
physical distinctions between different sorts of me ta 
On the other hand, neither doe s he expose any 
thin g s . 
gument 1 for ho lding that type distinctions are pure Y a.r 
dist· 
inct · 1 1 It ions of l anguage or logical forms or eves , 
is cle . ar tha t h. . t. . s ce rtainlY closer to this 
1 
is pos1 · 1on 1 · 
a.tte 
r alternative but that he cannot say what a type 
lnction is should not c ause u s alarm, Type distinc-
dist · 
tio ns mu s t b e shown - -
That M . . ' d i 1 s a thing can ' t be sai : 
it i s nonsense and 
but~ is 
mprop · --- ·t' sh er-illogical proposi ion: 
ewn by the symbol "M." 
1 
We h f tl . s forffi what 
corr av e to say in anY symbol o · t 11proper name , and 
th esponds to "R" in a!<b is no · a, , ~d 'b'" 
e f a ct tha t "'I<' c·tands be tween a. a l t t be expr " . . bat is soug 1 o 
e e.;ses a r e lation. Thl S is w - . "symbo l s 
.____ xpressed by the non-sensical assertion, 





like th. . s ay . . . 1 s a r e of a certain type. " This you can ' t of whar
0
~ ~ the _type and the re fore also the type 
the s i s 
1
s ymbol1 zed ... you c an't s ay anything about 
ymbol. 
' s ince we are prohibited from saying the type Moreover . 
ion , then those propos itions (especially those dist· inc t· 
philosophe r s ) in which we do (nons ensically) spCak 
Used by 
are als o unsayable, 
To avoid 
Of th ' 1.ng s , r e l a tions I etc. , 
o f incons istency Wittgenstein suggests (in a 
the cha rge 
1 
ar to Russell's reduction of denoting phrases ) 
move . sim · 1 
of analyzing the se "improper" propositions into 
a ma nne r 
not using terms like "relation", "form", etc . 
Propo . . s 1t1ons 
In th h' "Th e express ion (&y) t Y• one is apt to say tis means 
S 
e r e i s a thing such that. .. " But in fact we should 
ay "t 
symb h e r e is a y, such that ... " th~ fact that the y 
olizes e xpre s s ing what we mean, 
as a 
s e cond mane uve r , Wittge nstein reminds us that 
While 
we c annot s ay "R says the relation betwee n a and b"; 
R is be tween one name and anothe r symbolizes (i,.e., 
that . ~ a i s r 1 
3 
It l·s th·l·s second move which 
Sho e a t ed to b) . 
Wes aw empha sized in the Tractatus, -~
Finally, his criticism of anY theory of types fol-
lows from the above restrictions on what we saY · A 
th
eory 
Of type s W. . . . ossible for it tries 
' ittge nste lD argue s , J-S lffiP 
to sa ·a . 
y I t can be sai 1s 
. some thing about types, when all t1a -----~ ------------------
1Ib'd _ _ l • ' 
2rb·a __ l . ' 







oug1 we cannot say any 
Of symbol s which show types. Alth l 
ypes , we can see the relation between types theory oft . 
ttge n s t e in calls "internal relations"). What we 
(what Wi -
n in the symbols which exhibit this type and see . is show · 
th
e r e l a tion of their type to other types. symbols show 
show 
such inte rna l relations as identity, entailment, and 
comparat· 
qualities (e.g. , "darker in color than") . As 
We hav::, 
1ve 
e argued, those symbols exclusively shming internal 
:telat· ions . . 
in some systematic manner are tautologies. That 
say a theory of types is no accidental feature 
We cannot 
Of th e Note s to Moore. 
we would be saying what the relations gong types 
for if we could say such a theory 
then , 
comes 
to, and to do that is to say the nature of a logical 
But to say the nature of a 1ogical proposi-
Propo . · s1tion 





language must shoW and cannot be 
lo · 91.cal 
Said , 1.n 
properties of 
any language, 
not even a meta-language. 
Th t 
1
·n as we have seen, the 




a) There are A (or demonstrative) uses 
includin (our showing that such 
g our showing with proofs, 
such follows) and our showing that a sensible prop-
ana 
o ' -
Sit· l.on p i s true or 
, against what is 
false, bY checking p 
also in the 1914 material B (or 
the case 
:tefl exive ) 
There are 
"the •formal ' 
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features 
of a proposition (e.g., the form's arrangement of 
show themse lve s"; "that a proposition is ·sensible names ) 
(real) shows"· I 
contr d' " i c tion) shows its elf"; and "the sense of a ( real] 
ion shows itself. " All of th•• e later appeared, 
"that a proposition is a tautology (or 
Proposit' 
\vith the 
exce ption of the sh~ing of forms and names, in 
the rrracta tu s . 
b) Regarding 
Wittgenstein's discussion of sensible 
there is no distinc-
Propo . . s1t1ons in the~' 
between our ~aying that p tion 
is sensible and p say-
made 
in g that it is sensible. 
is 
ice that in the Notes to Moore Wittgenstein has 
What is of additional interest 
to not· 
at least ~ made the initial formulations of his central 
thes· is d regarding the saying and showing of ~ faun at 
Ber• in th• 1914 material as well 
4.022 in the Tractatus. 
as in 
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein contends that what shows 
the · sense, but he does not claim that what shows is is 
also said "Every real proposition ~ some
th
ing' 
bes· -ides what it says about the universe: f'<Jl: if it has 
sense i't 1 something is said (by us 
no can't be used ... ·" 
O:t th 
e ~I but what is said is that a possible state of 
f 
· being 
aff . airs . is actual, the 
' bl state of af airs 
possi e interpretation, a 
\vhat th w· e proposition show•· so, on my lttgen l-· t shows, because 
steinian Satz does not saY what 
\vhat 
--it shows of affair•, whereas what 
is a possible state 
---
1Ib'd _ _ 1 ., p. 107. 
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it says is that this possible state of affairs is actual --
not, however, saying that it shows this possible state of 
affairs. 
c) Appearing for the first time in the pre-
~ctatus manuscripts is the clear prohibition against 
saying what shows itself. Logically essential (formal ) 
aspects of language, or a proposition, show but cannot be 
said, by language or by us. However, a real (significant) 
proposition can be both shown (A use) and said to be true; 
for there is no prohibition against both saying and showing 
what shows in what we have called an A use. These theses 
are ones which do appear in just this form in the 
Tractatus. 
Part III 
The remarks here will be brief, hardly more than a 
cataloging of the relevant section~ fr6m the 1914-1916 
period. Contained in those Notebooks 1 for the Tractatus 
is Wittgenstein's record of his thinking regarding the 
analysis of propositions and the relationship of that 
analysis to the showing doctrines. Th e novel topics in 
this material include : the origin of Wittgenstein's 
developrne~t of a picture theory of propositions; the 
1M. Black, Notebooks 191 4-1916 "A Critical Notice," 
Mind, January 1964, p. 140. 
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notion of an Urbild as a logical picture; and the full 
account of a proposition as a n expressed (o r thought ) 
thoug ht. The issues r eoccu rr ing in the Notebooks from the 
earlier pieces are that a proposition h as a r eference ; the 
concept of the general form of a proposition; the reductive 
ana lysis of propos itions to their component s imp l es ; and 
the notion of a comp l ete and formal structure of langu age . 
The 1914-1916 Notebooks , however , are sketchy. Often only 
pre ludes to some of the Trac t atu s positions c a n b e found. 1 
Regardi ng the saying and s howing elements in the 
Notebooks 1914-1961, there is no presentation of any major 
themes that were not we ll formed by the time of the 191 4 
Notes to Moore; nor ar e there any aspects of the ear lier 
distinctions which are d ropped in the Note books. Wha t is 
emphasized in the Notebooks includes : the prohibit ion 
against saying what in some cases shows ; and the s howing 
of the form of a proposition. 
The two sorts of showing we h ave b een 
111 0n the other hand , there is almost no ontolog ica l 
discussion of the sort that cons titutes entries 1 - 2.063 
of the Tractatu s ; Wittgenstein ' s ideas about the proposi-
tion as a log ica l picture are still far fr om the e l abora-
tion the y received in the b ook ; and the same is true about 
the theory of propositions as truth-functions (4.2 6 - 4.45, 
5.101 - 5.132, etc .). It is clear that Wittgenstein must 
have done a grea t deal of work in the period between the 
writing of these Notebooks and the publica tion of the 
fin a l t ex t." M. Biack , Note b ooks 1914-1916 "A Critical 
Notic e ," Mind , J a nuary 19 64 , p . 140. 
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characterizing are found in the Notebooks. These two 
varieties of showing occur there as a difference between 
"shown by language" and "shown by experience": 
Then, if everything that needs to be shewn is shewn 
by the existence of subject-predicate SENTENCES, etc., 
the task of philosophy is different from what I 
originally supposed. But if that is not how it is , 
then what is lacking would have to be shewn by means 
of some kind of experience, and that I regard as out 
of the question. 
If the existence of the subject-predicate sentence 
does not show everything needful, then it could surely 
only be shewn by the existence of some particular fact 
of that form. And acquaintance with such a fact can-
not be essential for logic (p. 4e), 
The logical constants signalize the way in which the 
elementary forms of the proposition represent , (p. 22e) . 
Others more typical of the uses of '~ho~' include: 
If we tried to shew it by means of an index to "x ", 
e.g., like this ... (p. 18e). 
The proposition expresses what I do not know; but what 
I must know in order to be able to say it at all , I 
shew in it ( p . 18 e) , 
Restrictions prohibiting the saying of all that 
shows itself are found in the Notebooks in a form that 
strongly resembles the Tractatus remarks at 4.12 and 
following. 
What can be shewn cannot be said ( 34e ) . 
What is mirrored in language I cannot use language 
to express ( 42e ) 
An argument which occurs in the Notebooks but nowh e re else 
in the Tractatus literature regarding the prohibition 
against saying what shows is one directe d against th e 
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possibility of say ing the ne cessary conditions for under-
standing sensible l ang uage. 
What can b e s a id can only b e said by means of a 
propos ition, and so nothing that is necessary for 
the unders t a nding of all propositions can be said 
( 25 e ) , 
Hi s othe r argume nts h ad adop ted the view that without a 
me t a -language (which he thought ''illogica l," since it 
would b e a l anguage beyond all language) there could be no 
l angu age in which we could say the necessary conditions 
for all langua g e . The argument above appears to stress a 
differe nt line , viz ., on the l evel of sensibly communicat-
ing any information about the whole of language I need to 
say i t (sensibly) in a proposition . But the proposition I 
n eed to say is one no one can be in a position of sensibly 
unde rstanding. 
It is mor e than like ly that neither this argument 
( s ince one may not be convinced that it is impossible to 
b e in a position to understand a sensible proposition 
about the whole of language) nor the others Wittgenstein 
presents in the Tractatus firmly support the conclusion 
that nothing can (s ignificant ly) be said about all prop-
o s itions . But it does not seem that the lack of such a 
cogent argument is good reason to doubt the plausibility 
of Wittge .1ste in's effort to maintain a clear set of dis-
tinctions between saying and showing . 
163 
In ant· · tion icipa tion of the strictness of the distinc-
made b Witt etween tautologies and ~ in the Tract~· 
genste · ~ , a·es the following remarks in the Notebooks: in m k 
rhe _ ~ 
tauto l contradi _ ";gY shews what it appears to say, the 
appea c t1.0n shews the oppos ite of what it 
- rs to say (12 e ). 
The · propos · t · · · 1· t is a p . • ' · ion only says something 1n so far as 
lctures _" ·: ,tautologies say nothing, they are not 
p · ictur 
of situat1ons (Se). 
There (2le ) . are no such things as analytic~· 
(58e ) . utologies say the same thing. NamelY nothing All ta 
i
. t propoc· . t. . . . t s y s rela -~
1 
ion must show what it 1s trJ1ng o a --The 
descri b
0
n to.its reference must b~ like that of a 
situatption to 
1
ts subject, The logical form of the 
ion , however cannot be described (2De ) , 
lt m 
S 
ust sho · . · · t lf that 1· t says 
ometh . · w 1n the proposition~ ~ • ing and in theta~tha t it says nothing 
'l'he . interes t. k . to ing suggestion of these and similar remar 
5 15 
:te· 
lterat . , 1 · th• ?r e a thesis we have found consistent Y in 
act atean 1· s~t iterature· 
~2. , 
. --: its e lf l..ts says, but, 
sense 
h 
ws and the 
the sense of a~ s 
O 
' 
as we have argued, it do•• not say 
The · 1 pro · the 1091ca 
stru position must enable us to se• 
f 
ctu k 5 it true or 
Bl s re of the situation that ma·e 
e (15 e ) . Th ·t e pro .· . b mean• of i s 
logi· po s 1 ti.on constructs a world Y actuallY cal . h' we can 
see i scaffolding and that is w ) 1 gical could 
stand n i the proposition hOW everyt111n9 o 
f l t were true ... (16e) ' 
'l'he (1 sense 
9e ) 
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Th e proposition must shew what it i s trying to say . 
Its relation to its reference must b e l ike that of 
a de scr iption to it s subject ( 2 Oe ) , 
Th e proposition says : thi s i s how it i s and not: 
that. It presents a pos s il:i"ili ty and itse lf con-
spiciously forms one pa rt of a whole - - whose 
features it bears -- and from which it stands out . 
(56e ) . 
Because we are dealing with a series of notes and 
n o t an essay developed fo r publication , there are some 
difficulties in appreciating any one Wittgensteinian 
remark. I think this is exemplified in the di scuss ion of 
whethe r or not a Satz shows its truth value . 
a ) Whether a proposition is true or fal se is some-
thing tha t has to sich zeigen. We must know in 
advance how it will sich Zelgen (2 3e ) . 
b) The proposition must conta in (and in this way 
shew ) the possibility of its truth. But not 
more than the possibility ·(1 6e ) . 
The comment we have labe l ed (a ) could be inte r-
preted to mean that the Satz shows itse lf as true of the 
way things are , viz., that it bears some mark of being 
true or being false . Such a r e ading , however , is alto-
gethe r too bizarre. What Wittge nstein must mean by sich 
zeigen is "make itself known " or " show up" in exper i ence . 
Thi s I think i s supported by the nex t part o f the quoted 
rema rk, "we know in advance .... " What Wittgen s tein think s 
i s apparent is "how to v erify it!" 
The quotation , then , at (b ) seems to give u s thG 
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proper key to interpretating Wittgenstein h ere . A Satz 
must be contingent. It h as a truth value, so it can be 
said t o be possibly true (or possibly false), depending 
on how we find things in the world. It is this view which 
we h ave found in the Tractatus . That a Satz shows its 
sense is to be understood as a Satz shows a possible state 
of affairs. That what the Satz shows is true of the way 
things are is determined by us, after experience~ The 
Satz does show a state of affairs, and it does say that 
the state of affairs it shows is the case. It is in this 
way we can understand the meaning of: 
tions say something about the world." 
"se nsible proposi--






Correspondence with Russell began 
regarding the character of logical 
constants. 
The Notes on L?gic were written. 
Wittgenstein wrote a reaction to 
Russell's reading of the Notes on Logic; 
the emphasis of the reaction has to do 
with the analysis of a proposition in 
terms of "a/b" functions. 
Correspondence with Russell occurred 
with the visual form of analysis of a 
proposition being emphasized. A prop-
osition shows its truth ("ab") condi-
tions. 
Notes Dictated to G. E. Moor e were 
written. 
August 22, 1914: The first entry in Notebooks 1914-1916 
listed by the editors. 
January 10, 1917: The date of the last entry in Notebooks 
given by the editors. 
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1 9 1 8 : 
Augu s t 19 , 1 9 1 9 : 
1 92 1: 
May 1 922 : 
19 61: 
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Wi ttgen s t e in wro t e pr e fac e to the com-
ple t ed Trac t a t us . 
Wittge nstein cor responde d again with 
Ru ssell. Russell had s een Tractatus 
ma nus cript, a nd a discu s sion of the 
cha r ac t e r of thought wa s the center 
of the corresponde nce . 
The fir s t Germ a n edition of Tractatus 
without Russ e ll's "Introduction" 
appeared in Oswa ld's Annale n der 
Na turphilo s ophi e , Le ipzig. 
The first Ge rman and English edition of 
Tra cta tus , with Ru s sell's "Introduction" 
(Ogde n and Richards translation), 
a p peared. 
The s econd Ge rman and English edition 
(P e ar s and McGuiness translation) 
appeared. 
I /G L 
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